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Abstract
Received entrepreneurship research suggests that entrepreneurial action helps people and com-
munities in the aftermath of disastrous events. To study this phenomenon, scholars focus on two
central themes: 1) entrepreneurial actors (individuals, organizations, or firms in the community)
with the right knowledge and motivation possess capabilities determine whether an identified op-
portunity represents an opportunity for them to exploit so as to alleviate others’ su↵erings, and 2)
the feedback from an exploitation of an existing opportunity significantly influences the recognition
and evaluation of subsequent opportunities of helping others. However, contemporary research has
examined the first theme while largely ignoring the second one. Addressing this oversight, we
develop three graph-theoretic models and operationlize them using the computational social sci-
ence approach to investigate both the temporal dimension of entrepreneurial action as a process
of opportunity identification, evaluation and exploitation over time, and the spatial dimension of
entrepreneurial action as a feedback to identify subsequent opportunities among networked actors
under disasters.
The first model depicts a simple supply-chain structure where each actor’s entrepreneurial
action can feed back to his/her spatially interdependent upstream and downstream neighbors.
Our model suggests that feedback mechanisms significantly influence actors’ entrepreneurial action
decisions to alleviate the negative impacts of unanticipated disasters on supply chain performance.
Next, we extend the one-dimensional chain structure into a grid network setting in the second
model. This model highlights the importance of reciprocal feedback between neighboring actors in
facilitating recovery entrepreneurial actions in the aftermath of disasters. Finally, our last model
examines the spatiotemporal dynamics of entrepreneurial action over additional network structures,
such as small-world and scale-free, determining how information and knowledge feedback circulates
in the system facing disastrous events. We show that a shift in the network structure at the spatial
dimension changes the number of actors who act entrepreneurially over time.
In sum, we consider entrepreneurial action emerging from the interactions among community
members over not only time but also space in times of disasters. The modeling and analysis extends
the action-based entrepreneurship framework into the context of disasters by explicitly specifying
dynamic and interactive behavior among community members that are inputs to, and outcomes
of, one another in the entrepreneurial process to alleviate the su↵erings.
Chapter 1
Introduction
We, human, live in a world that is fraught with dangers and disasters that frequently bring
out su↵ering to a great number of people (Rynes, et al., 2012; Shepherd and Williams,
2014). Despite its centrality to societies and organizations, why and how actors behave
in the context of disasters is under-researched. Entrepreneurship research has made the
link between entrepreneurial behavior and disaster. The literature suggests that when a
community experiences a disaster, the resultant pains or losses can be alleviated via en-
trepreneurial action (e.g., Dacin et al., 2011; Peredo and Chrisman, 2006; Shepherd, 2015).
The act to alleviate the su↵ering and improve the well-being of one self and others following
a disaster is inherently entrepreneurial because it involves risk taking, innovation and rec-
ognizing opportunities to create value for community members with an uncertain return for
the actor(s) (Miller et al., 2012; Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd and Williams, 2014). However,
we know little about why and how entrepreneurs compassionately engage in di↵erent forms
and levels of action in resource devastated environments to bring about relief and well being
for themselves and others in response to disaster, the major focus of this thesis.
To contribute to the entrepreneurship-disaster research interface, we develop a formal
analysis on how individuals and their community engage in pro-social entrepreneurial action
in response to random value destroying events such as natural disasters. We assume that
disasters bring about su↵ering in the community and actors engage in some forms of action to
recover from adverse conditions. Our formal modeling approach is grounded in the nascent
literature that seeks to study the role and impact of entrepreneurial action in alleviating
1
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the su↵ering of others through an interaction- and community-based perspective (McMullen
and Shepherd, 2006; Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011; Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2007;
Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013). In this thesis, we examine an interaction-based entrepreneurial
action process and analyze how di↵erent levels of desirability, feasibility, community size,
and other factors a↵ect the relationship between actors’ entrepreneurial action and the
community’s collective welfare in response to random value-destroying events.
Disasters provide novel contexts that can advance entrepreneurship research. They ne-
cessitate a focus on the largely understudied interaction- and community-based perspective
of entrepreneurial action (Shepherd, 2015) in the face of adversity. That is, a number
of community members (i.e., networked actors) – individuals, organizations, or firms –
are altered to the occurrence of disastrous events and willing to act entrepreneurially to
help the less fortunate and unfortunate. Although the temporal process of entrepreneurial
action has been extensively studied (McMullen and Dimov, 2013; Keyhani et al., 2015),
entrepreneurship literature overlooks the spatial dynamics of entrepreneurial action in the
networked system (i.e., community) where these actors share knowledge and experience with
each other through business and social connections, then resulting in the feedback from an
existing entrepreneurial action to a subsequent one (Gaimon and Bailey, 2013; Shepherd,
2010). Further little has known on the structure of connections and its implications for
entrepreneurship in space-time in the context of disasters (Parker, 2008).
Evidence indicates that entrepreneurs are intimately embedded in a broader commu-
nity (e.g., business and social networks) and benefit from their connections with other en-
trepreneurs for the discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities in response to unanticipated
disasters (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Markman et al., 2005; Parker, 2008; Shepherd, 2015).
In other words, network connections facilitate the feedback from exploitation of an existing
opportunity to discovery of subsequent opportunities over space and over time. In a commu-
nity, networked actors continuously modify the identification, evaluation, and exploitation of
opportunities based on connected others’ behavior. For instance, an actor’s entrepreneurial
action may increase the feasibility and desirability of subsequent opportunities and provide
3
such information to other actors through network connections (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013).
The role of community is to determine the magnitude of feedback that one’s action could
possible generate, in terms of how many (i.e., the number of connected others) and how
much (i.e., the degree of connections).
Several studies have started to consider entrepreneurial process involving connected ac-
tors, including spousal relations (Aldrich and Cli↵, 2003), parent-subsidiary organizational
structure (Bradley et al., 2011), and strategic alliance (Hora and Dutta, 2013). Those stud-
ies, however, only take spatial feedback as an exogenous input to the focal entrepreneur’s
action, thereby overlooking the strategic interactions between him/her and the community
members around (Keyhani et al., 2015; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013). Therefore, the distinct
phenomenon of networked and contagious entrepreneurial-action dynamics over time is still
largely unexplained. Studies of graph theory, which is the principal mathematical language
for describing the properties of networks, shed light on this underexplored topic.
Graph theory suggests that there are two key aspects of investigating a network (or
graph) of interconnected potential entrepreneurial actors: time dynamical property, i.e.,
behavioral rule, and space dynamical property, i.e., network structure (or ”who-connects-
to-whom” structure) (Barabási and Albert, 1999; Erdős and Rényi, 1960; Keeling, 1999).
The behavioral rule formulates each networked actor’s decision on entrepreneurial action –
a temporal process of identifying, evaluating and exploiting opportunities for value creation
(Keyhani et al., 2015; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). The network structure identifies an
actor’s spatial connections, who generate direct feedback on the actor’s behaviors (Albert
et al., 2000). Thus, community members are arranged following a topological structure
and take entrepreneurial actions in the aftermath of disasters, during which an actor’s
entrepreneurial-action decision both constrains and are constrained by their connections’
entrepreneurial-action decisions. The interplay of the temporally and spatially properties in
a community creates a dynamic context in which entrepreneurship thrives.
To highlight the underlying dynamism, we employ the computational techniques, cellular
automata (CA) and agent based modeling (ABM) (Miller and Page, 2007; Nair et al., 2009),
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to operationalize the graph theoretic models over time and space dimensions. CA and
ABM are organizational research simulation methods that e↵ectively explore the strategic
interactions among neighboring actors (e.g., Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007; Miller
and Page, 2007; Yang and Chandra, 2013). Our work starts from the simple CA method
in which actors adopt a common, fixed rule to examine the stylized models. We next
construct more complicated ABM method by adding complexity and heterogeneity among
actors in the networked system. In this sense, the simulation methods truly pinning down
the fundamental spatiotemporal dynamics of entrepreneurial actions. The modeling and
analysis extends the action-based entrepreneurship framework into the context of network
dynamics and disasters by explicitly specifying dynamic and interactive behavior among
networked actors that are inputs to, and outcomes of, one another in the entrepreneurial
process to respond value destroying events.
1.1 Motivation and structure
Following the lead of the entrepreneurship and graph theory literatures, we formally explore
the dynamic interplay between spatial feedback process rooted in network structure and
temporal entrepreneurial action process under uncertainty among community members. In
particular, we consider entrepreneurial opportunities arising from the value-changing un-
certainty (e.g., natural and man-made disasters). We investigate the occasions to see the
emergence of entrepreneurial action in space-time in the following ways (see Table 1.1 for a
summary).
In Chapter 3, we explore a one-dimensional chain structure of community and examine
the opportunity exploitation in times of extreme environmental events. While natural and
man-made disasters disproportionately impact the business landscape, little is known how
they influence the process of opportunity identification, evaluation and exploitation among
community members. Herein, we consider disasters creating recovery “opportunities” for
potential economic, social and environmental value creation. In the context of disasters,
somebody needs to recognize the presence of an recovery opportunity, evaluate the situa-
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tion and decide whether to launch a recovery action, and eventually engage in or disengage
from the recovery activities. We develop a one-dimensional supply-chain model to examine
the e↵ectiveness of popular recovery activities to address disruptions caused by unpredicted
disasters. The central theme of this chapter is to examine the pursuit of recovery oppor-
tunities in times of extreme environmental events. Our analysis shows that a supply chain
recovers best if member firms adopt a radical, rapid, costly recovery strategy that imme-
diately resolves the disruption. This observation is robust to various resource consumption
requirements. We apply our methodology in the case of Taiwan’s 2011 food contamination
scandal and provide managerial insights.
In Chapter 4, we conceptualize the notation of altruistic entrepreneurship and opera-
tionalize it as opportunity beliefs with di↵erent degrees of altruistic reciprocity that actors
use to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities amid disasters in a two-dimensional square lat-
tice (i.e., grid) structure of community. A CA model is developed to investigate the impact
of di↵erent opportunity beliefs on the community value creation. Our simulations suggest
that altruistic opportunity beliefs are associated with higher value creation in times of dis-
asters than non-altruistic opportunity beliefs, especially when actors adopt an aggressive
opportunity-evaluation rule. This work extends the theory of entrepreneurial action into
the context of disaster by specifying its link with reciprocal altruism.
In Chapter 5, we explore the spatiotemporal dynamics of entrepreneurial action over
several network structures. They are square lattice networks, pack networks, ring lattice
networks, random graphs, small-world networks, and scale-free networks, each determining
how information and knowledge feedback circulates in the systems. Our modeling and anal-
ysis show that a shift in the network structure at the spatial dimension changes the number
of actors who act entrepreneurially over time. And such direct impact is moderated by
the actors’ opportunity-recognition belief (i.e., whether a third-person opportunity arising
from spatial feedback is present) and the degree of feedback against friction under mar-
ket imperfection. Our work provides a formal foundation of action-based entrepreneurship
framework. Chapter 6 extends the findings in the context of both value-adding (e.g., tech-
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nological advancement) and value-destroying events. The simulation results suggest that
scale-free networks are better at fostering entrepreneurial actions under uncertainty.
Table 1.1: Structure




3 This chapter examines the ro-
bustness of di↵erent types of en-
trepreneurial actions (i.e., recovery
activities) to alleviate the disrup-
tions in the community caused by
unanticipated disasters.
Chain cellular automata
4 This chapter explores the e↵ective-
ness of various opportunity beliefs
on taking entrepreneurial actions to
create collective values for a commu-
nity in the aftermath of disasters.
Square lattice cellular automata
5 & 6 This chapter investigate the role of
network structures on exploring
and exploiting entrepreneurial
opportunities for a community’s
collective value creation under
uncertainty.






The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literatures on entrepreneurial
action process, graph theory, and computational social science. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 presents
the three behavioral models and computational analysis to explore the entrepreneurial dy-
namics in space-time. Chapter 6 summarizes our finding and propose a synthesized model




This chapter reviews the key literatures on two substantive areas, entrepreneurship and pro-
social motivation, and two methodological areas, graph theoretic model and computational
social science. Specifically, the substantive literatures provide theoretical foundations to
rationalize an interaction- and community-based entrepreneurial action process to alleviate
the pains and losses after disasters. And the methodological literatures help us formalize
those theoretical arguments to explore possible insights.
2.1 Entrepreneurship
2.1.1 Entrepreneurial action framework
Entrepreneurship requires actions. Following Shepherd and Patzelt (2013) and McMullen
and Shepherd (2006), the model of entrepreneurial action includes three steps: interpreting
environment to identify opportunities for someone (i.e., third-person opportunity), evalu-
ating the feasibility and desirability of an identified opportunity to determine whether it
is the opportunity for oneself (i.e., first person opportunity), and engaging or disengaging
from action by mobilizing resources and e↵orts with uncertain outcomes and payo↵s (i.e.,
entrepreneurial action).
The entrepreneurial action literature has extensively explored this entrepreneurial pro-
cess. Table 2.1 summarizes the possible sources from which an entrepreneurial opportunity
may arise. Actors that have the right the knowledge and motivation are able to identify
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Table 2.1: Exemplar studies on entrepreneurial opportunity recognition
Sources Definitions
Change in supply – Technological change (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Schumpeter, 1934; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000)
– Lead user attributes: Individuals “whose goal fulfilment is hampered by technological performance bottlenecks”
and have the ability to develop “techonolgocal solutions by themselves” (Autio et al., 2013, p.1352)
– Technological probing : The activity that “users open new discussion threads to signal and frame a new issue,
problem, call for advance, or area of exploration” (Autio et al., 2013, p.1353)
Change in demand – Prior knowledge of markets, of customer problems, and of ways to serve customers (Ardichvili et al., 2003)
– Prior knowledge of customer problems and potential financial reward (Shepherd and DeTienne, 2005)
– Entrepreneurial education (e.g., on underserved markets or of how to produce a particular product) (Mũnoz C.
et al., 2011)




– Sustainable entrepreneurship: “The discovery, creation, and exploitation of opportunities to create future goods
and services that sustain the natural and/or communal environment and provide development gain for others”
(Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011, p.632; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011)
– Knowledge of the natural/communal environment : problems in the natural and communal environment (or
market failure); triple bottom line – economic gain, environmental gain, and social gain; understanding the
market for natural resourcesrenewable and non-renewable resources; education in forestry, oceanography, and
tourism (Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011)
– Perceptions of threat of the natural/communal environment : threats to needs for competence, relatedness, and
autonomy (Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011)
– Altruism: “An altruistic motivation arises when individuals experience empathy and sympathy for others”
(Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011, p.640)
Operations e ciency – Operational entrepreneurship: “The selection and management of transformation processes for recognizing,





– Alertness : the abstract talent and unique knowledge that leads to the discovery of an opportunity (Kirzner,
1973; Gaglio and Katz, 2001; Gaglio, 2004; Gaimon and Bailey, 2013)
– Counterfactual thinking : “thinking in a way that is contrary to existing facts” (Gaglio, 2004, p.539)
– Exploration alliances : join with the motivation to discover something new (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004)
– Spino↵ : “entrants founded by employees of firms in the same industry” (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005, p.1291)
– Cognitive learning, Behavioral learning, and Action learning (Lumpkin and Lichtenstein, 2005)
– Pattern recognition: comparing the opportunity prototypes of experienced and novice entrepreneurs (Baron and
Ensley, 2006)
– Information acquisition (comprehension over apprehension) and Information transformation (extension over
intention, promotion over prevention) (Corbett, 2007)
– Entrepreneurial cognition: “the mental process of overcoming ignorance to inform a third-person opportunity
belief” (Shepherd et al., 2007, p.76)
– Knowledge spillover (Acs et al., 2009)
– Prevention focus : paying attention to prevention-relevant outcomes, such as threats to the organization (instead
of opportunities for the organization) (McMullen et al., 2009)
– Self-compassion (self-kindness, common humanity, mindfulness) (Shepherd and Cardon, 2009)
– Opportunity-recognition beliefs (Grégoire et al., 2010)
– Opportunity-image: potential value (desirability), knowledge relatedness (feasibility), window of opportunity
(environment), and number of potential opportunities available (environment) (Mitchell and Shepherd, 2010)
– Self-image: fear of failure (vulnerability) and entrepreneurial self-e cacy (capability) (Mitchell and Shepherd,
2010)
– Business ownership experience of an experienced entrepreneur (Ucbasaran et al., 2009)
– Appliance portfolio scope & depth (Hora and Dutta, 2013)
Network design – Formal business networks: “enables entrepreneurs to share good and bad practice can improve e ciency and
social welfare” (Parker, 2008, p.627)
– Network ties: access to capital and intangible resources (e.g., information, advice, and emotional support)
(Hoang and Antoncic, 2003; Jack, 2010)
– Family embeddedness (Aldrich and Cli↵, 2003)
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them (e.g., Shepherd et al., 2007; Shepherd, 2010). They next determine whether a third-
person opportunity is indeed for oneself and make action decisions in terms of its feasibility
given the actors’ knowledge, skills, and capabilities, and of its desirability given the actors’
motivation (e.g., Haynie et al., 2009, Phan and Chambers, 2013), see Table 2.2 for a review.
Table 2.2: Exemplar studies on entrepreneurial opportunity evaluation and exploitation
Factors Definitions
Risk perception – Overconfidence: the failure to know the limits of one’s knowledge
(Keh et al., 2002)
– Belief in the law of small numbers: the use of a small sample to
draw from conclusions (Keh et al., 2002)
– Planning fallacy : the failure to consider past experiences in similar
situations because predictions induce a future orientation (Keh et al.,
2002)
– Illusion of control : the overemphasis on one’s ability and skills to
control events and people (Keh et al., 2002)
– Entrepreneurial cognition: “the mental process of reducing doubt
to inform a first-person opportunity belief” (Shepherd et al., 2007,
p.76)
Profit-maxmization Timing of exploitation theory: “entrepreneurs go through exploration
activities to reduce their ignorance and eventually shift their atten-
tion to exploitation in order to accrue revenues.” (Choi et al., 2008,
p.336)
– Optimal stopping in a POMDP (partially observed Markov decision
process) with costly information (Lévesque and Maillart, 2008)
– Entrepreneurial rent : the economic rents attributable to an en-
trepreneurial action (Keyhani et al., 2015)
Network design – Community attention: attention received from others in his/her
community that facilities insights on unrealised user needs (Autio
et al., 2013)




Learning & Cognition – Exploitation alliances: “join existing competencies across organi-
zational boundaries in order to generate synergies” (Rothaermel and
Deeds, 2004, p.205)
– Perceived knowledge of customer demand, perceived development of
enabling technologies, perceived capability of the management team,
and perceived stakeholder support (Choi and Shepherd, 2004)
– Resource relatedness: relatedness of the entrepreneurs’ human cap-
ital (e.g., existing knowledge, skills, ability, resources) (Haynie et al.,
2009)
– Coporate entrepreneurship: perceived top management support,
perceived work discretion, perceived rewards and reinforcements, per-
ceived time availability, and perceived flexible organizational bound-
aries (Hornsby et al., 2009)
– Entrepreneurial self-e cacy (Chen et al., 1998; Fitzsimmons and
Douglas, 2011)
– Perceived desirability (Douglas and Shepherd, 2002; Fitzsimmons
and Douglas, 2011)
Operations e ciency – Technology commercialisation: “the translation of technological ca-
pabilities into beneficial products and services that increase profit
and/or social welfare” (Krishnan, 2013, p.1443)
– Product/service design (Loch and Terwiesch, 2005; Joglekar and
Lévesque, 2013)
– Product/service integration with one or more complementary tech-
nologies (Anderson Jr. and Parker, 2013)
– Operational capabilities (Tatikonda et al., 2013)
Feedback from exploiting an existing opportunity in discovering subsequent opportuni-
ties plays a significant role in this dynamic entrepreneurial process (Shepherd and Patzelt,
2013). The feedback may take two possible forms: (1) a temporal process that one actor’s
current entrepreneurial action may change his/her ability and ability and motivation to
evaluate subsequent opportunities (McMullen and Dimov, 2013), and (2) a spatial process
that other actors’ entrepreneurial actions can enhance his/her recognition of subsequent
opportunities (Shepherd, 2010). In this sense, entrepreneurship is a spatiotemporal process
of identification, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities for potential value creation
arising from direct and indirect interactions among potential actors networked with each
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other.
To recognize opportunities in a networked system, spatial feedback directs actors’ at-
tention to possible entrepreneurial spillover from others. Actors raise their awareness of
entrepreneurial action launched by a connected actor that disrupts the existing market
and equilibrium. By doing so, they are likely to discover opportunities for potential value
creation and receive forward-looking benefits of entrepreneurial spillover flowing from the
connected actor (Gaimon and Bailey, 2013; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011). Examples include
a new venture spino↵ from a parent firm (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005), a technology startup
with knowledge transferred from labs and universities (Keyhani et al., 2015; Markman et al.,
2005), and a novice entrepreneur inspired by and learned from an experienced entrepreneur
(Parker, 2008; Phan and Chambers, 2013). Thus, in a networked system, opportunities may
take the forms of possible spillover fed back from other actor’s entrepreneurial action.
Actors next evaluate an identified opportunity on its feasibility, i.e., knowledge and abil-
ities to capture the entrepreneurial spillover, if any, in the presence of market imperfection,
and desirability, i.e., the spillover from a connected actor is positive to his/her own value
creation (Haynie et al., 2009; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). They have to overcome fric-
tions arising from imperfection in the economy, such as transactional costs and barriers to
trade (e.g., Chatain and Zemsky, 2011), to actually get access to the value spilled over from
a neighboing entrepreneur. Such friction gives advantage to some actors over others for en-
trepreneurial rent (Keyhani et al., 2015), which creates barriers to spillover and diminishes
the degree of feedback. Yet the spillover does not always take the form of positive value
creation to connected others. Rather, it is possible that an entrepreneur brings damage to
the networked system, such as overexploitation of public goods and being environmentally
unfriendly (e.g., Santos et al., 2008; Shepherd et al., 2013). This negative feedback, intu-
itively, is not desirable to his/her connected actors who would su↵er additional potential
costs for exploitation. In the long term, the actor self is likely to be punished by receiving
no valuable spatial feedback from connections (Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006).
As a result, actors’ interdependent entrepreneurial-action decisions lead to the spatiotem-
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poral dynamics of entrepreneurship. A number of actors acting entrepreneurially, i.e., en-
trepreneurs, create values to self and others and promote the identification of subsequent
opportunities in the networked system (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013). That is, we concep-
tualize the role of feedback in the action-based entrepreneurship framework as a facilitator
of opportunity identification, evaluation, and exploitation for value creation in a networked
system in which potential entrepreneurial actors are embedded.
2.1.2 Entrepreneurial bricolage framework
Entrepreneurial bricolage framework suggests that entrepreneurs take a di↵erent route to
identify and exploit opportunities under substantial resource constraints. The notion “brico-
lage” is defined as “making do by applying combinations of resources at hand to new prob-
lems and opportunities” (Baker and Nelson, 2005, p.33). So facing with penurious environ-
ment, someone engaged in bricolage refuses to enact resource limitations but make do with
what is at hand to solve problems (Baker, 2007; Desa, 2012). Entrepreneurial bricolage cap-
tures the process that entrepreneurs, while typically do not possess rich resources (Shepherd
et al., 2000), can leverage the physical, customer/markets, skills, labor, and institutional
inputs at hand in novel ways to discovery opportunities (Di Domenico et al., 2010; Hoegl
et al., 2008; Shepherd and Williams, 2014; Zahra et al., 2009).
Specifically, entrepreneurs may enact bricolage by making do physical materials that
are rejected or ignored by other firms with new use-value (Baker, 2007). For instance,
a UK-based social enterprise acquired disused fire station building and turned it into a
community center; another entrepreneur collected and refurbished the discarded computers
from corporations for community use (Di Domenico et al., 2010). Second, by creating
products or services that would otherwise be unavailable, entrepreneurs enact bricolage
to make do customers/markets resources (Baker and Nelson, 2005). Third, entrepreneurs
act as bricoleurs utilize skills inputs that permit and encourage the use of amateur and
self-taught skills that would otherwise go unapplied (Fisher, 2012). For example, they can
recruit people that are low-skilled or long-term unemployed to provide front-line training
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to the youth (Di Domenico et al., 2010). Fourth, entrepreneurs can involve stakeholders,
such as customers, suppliers, and members of local communities, in decision making and
corporate governance, i.e., making do labor resources (Garud and Karnøe, 2003; Shepherd
and Williams, 2014). Finally, entrepreneurs may refuse to enact institutional limitations
(e.g., rules and regulations) and try to actively engage in the construction of new laws from
fragments of existing ones (Di Domenico et al., 2010).
Literature suggests that bricolage activities have both positive and negative impacts. On
one hand, entrepreneurial bricolage is e↵ective when other options is to wait for do nothing,
i.e., refusal to enact resource constraints and discovery of opportunity in pursuit of market
creation (e.g., Baker and Nelson, 2005) and nascent firm growth (e.g., Baker et al., 2003;
Senyard et al., 2009). This is particularly successful when entrepreneurs only engage in
making do selective types of inputs (Di Domenico et al., 2010). On the contrary, extensive
bricolage in multiple types of inputs will result in bricolage “trap” that restricts firm growth
(Baker and Nelson, 2005; Fisher, 2012). That is, the solutions built through bricolage are
likely to be imperfect (due to the resource constraints) that can hardly meet high quality
standards. Hence, entrepreneurs engaged in high level of bricolage may find it di cult
to compete with other firms that are less resource constrained and/or satisfy demanding
customers (Ciborra, 1996). In sum, bricolage can enable entrepreneurs to overcome resource
limitations in the short term, but it can also lock the firm in a reinforcing cycle of providing
‘good-enough-only’ products/services that harm long-term growth.
2.1.3 Summary: A community-based entrepreneurial action process
Entrepreneurship is the pursuit of opportunity to create value with uncertain outcomes (Mc-
Mullen and Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013). The entrepreneurship literature
well recognizes the fact that entrepreneurial opportunities are not a product of a solo act,
but are rather developed and refined through social interaction and feedback from commu-
nity members (Autio et al., 2013; Peredo and Chrisman, 2006; Shepherd, 2015). Despite
the centrality of community as a perspective and unit of analysis in entrepreneurship, cur-
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rent research tends to treat it as an exogenous environmental factor (e.g., Ardichvili et al.,
2003. In this thesis, we explicitly adopt the interaction and community-based perspective
to entrepreneurship and theorize entrepreneurs as actors embedded in a network where they
recognize, evaluate and exploit potential opportunities within a local economy.
Specifically, an actor interprets the external world and interacts with other actors in
the community and, depending on certain prior knowledge and motivation, the actor forms
a ‘third-person opportunity belief’. That is, the actor perceives that opportunities exist
for someone (Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011; Shepherd and DeTienne, 2005; Shepherd et al.,
2007). Next, the actor evaluates the feasibility and desirability of a recognized opportunity
to form a ‘first-person opportunity belief’. In other words, the actor perceives that the
opportunity is desirable for him/herself (Autio et al., 2013; Haynie et al., 2009; Shepherd
et al., 2007). Finally, the actor engages in a decision making process and decide whether to
continue or discontinue the entrepreneurial action by mobilizing resources and people and
bear the uncertain outcomes (Choi et al., 2008; Choi and Shepherd, 2004; Lévesque and
Maillart, 2008). Although the entrepreneurial action mechanism describes what happens in
the market context, it is relevant and applicable to the non-market context such as disasters.
2.2 Pro-social motivation
Once a disaster occurs, pro-social motivation directs an actor’s attention to others’ su↵ering
and to act entrepreneurially to help and improve others’ welfare (Grant, 2007; Grant and
Berry, 2011). Prosocial motivation involves the pursuit of multiple goals that include the
desire to sustain personal gains (pro-self interest) and to alleviate others’ su↵ering (pro-
social interest) (Baron and Ensley, 2006; Penner et al., 2005). For instance, an actor and
member of the community may be willing to alleviate the su↵ering of other less fortunate
members because the actor wishes to maintain long-term relationships with them. On the
other hand, the actor may do so out of sympathy for others’ loss and feel that it is the right
thing to do. Therefore, there are two forms of prosocial motivation (Miller et al., 2012):
compassion, where pro-social acts are driven by a genuine concern for others; and reciprocal
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altruism, where pro-social acts are driven by an expectation of future payback by others,
and not at the expense of self-interest.
2.2.1 Compassion
Compassion is the disposition to respond empathically to others’ pain and stress. In other
words, other’s su↵ering can motivate actors to help and benefit others (Dutton et al., 2006;
Rynes et al., 2012). When a disaster hits a community, people with the sense of compassion
will pay more attention to the needs of su↵ering others in the local area (e.g., Shepherd
and Williams, 2014) by feeling the pains and losses of others and/or coordinate actions to
alleviate them. For instance, a non-for-profit organization may distribute the gains from its
operation to the victims in the community. Following this logic, compassion often drives
action that is costly to oneself but beneficial for others (Batson and Shaw, 1991; Miller et al.,
2012).
2.2.2 Reciprocal altruism
Altruism, the desire to help others at one’s own costs (Nowak, 2006; Penner et al., 2005),
has been acknowledged as a driver to motivate opportunity recognition (e.g., Patzelt and
Shepherd, 2011, Zahra et al., 2009) in a system. However, following the reciprocal altruism
theory in evolutionary research (e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981, Nowak, 2006, and Trivers,
1971), altruistic actions occur and evolve only under highly specialized circumstance where
the altruists act will eventually returned to him/her and confer (directly or indirectly) its
benefit (Nowak et al., 2010; Penner et al., 2005; Trivers, 1971). In other words, reciprocity
forms the motive future benefits of an altruistic action will compensate the current sacrifice
to help others.
Evolutionary theorists define altruism in terms of consequences, i.e., evolutionary success,
instead of motivation (Penner et al., 2005). Evolutionary success is measured as the survival
of ones genes in subsequent generations. Five major mechanisms or processes are identified
leading to evolutionary success kinship selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity,
group selection and network reciprocity (Nowak, 2006; 2012).
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In kinship systems, kin members are genetic related such as parents, siblings, and chil-
dren, which determine their closeness. There is an evolutionary benefit to those who help
close relatives rather than non-relatives (Hamilton, 1964). Direct reciprocity extends the
kinships to friendships and long-term cooperative alliances. There is evolutionary advantage
to help (genetically) unrelated individuals if the favor is repaid during repeated encounters
(Trivers, 1971). Indirect reciprocity, on the other hand, rewards the altruists by establishing
a good reputation (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005). Group selection investigates the multilevel
(individual and group levels) selection. A group with a larger number of altruists will have
an advantage over a group with mostly selfish individuals (Traulsen and Nowak, 2006). Fi-
nally, network reciprocity acknowledges that some actors interact more often than others
in the real-world social networks; hence it explores the network configuration that allows
altruists help each other and form clusters (Lieberman et al., 2005), the focus of this study.
Formally, the altruistic activity occurs when the benefit-to-cost ratio, b/c, exceeds the
average number of connected neighbors, w, per actor (i.e., b/c > w), where c is the cost to
the altruist for helping others, b is the benefit to the recipient in expectation of returning
back to the altruist, and w is determined by the network configuration of the community
(Lieberman et al., 2005; Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006). In essence, reciprocal altruism is
a social interaction phenomenon where an individual makes sacrifices for another individual
in expectation of similar treatment in the future.
In the next section, we elaborate the spatial dimension of entrepreneurship using the
graph theoretic methods.
2.3 Graph theoretic method
The graph theoretic method models the possible network configurations of community in
which ‘prospective’ entrepreneurs are embedded to take actions amid disasters. Before
introducing the detailed network structures, we first review the terminologies in this field.
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2.3.1 Primer on graphs and terminology




, · · · ,!n}
with their own rules of behavior, the “arcs” (or edges, links) N = {Iij(G)} that are directed
connections from node i to node j embedded in certain network structure G, and the “arcs
weights” ⇤ = { ij} that are the corresponding degree of connections between the linked
nodes, where i, j 2 {1, 2, · · · , n}. A graph is said to be directed and weighted when the arcs
and arcs weights are asymmetric, i.e., Iij(G) 6= Iji(G) and  ij 6=  ji. (On the contrary, an
undirected graph is formed with unordered arcs between connected nodes, without regard
to whether the link points from i to j or the other way around, and symmetric arc weights:
Iij(G) = Iji(G) and  ij =  ji. Since this study uses the weighted directed graph only, the
following sections will use graph/network and weighted directed graph interchangeably.)
For any ordered pair of nodes (i, j), the arc Iij(G) takes two possible values, 0 or 1, i.e.,
Iij(G) 2 {0, 1}. We have Iij(G) = 1 only if a directed link is drawn from node i to node
j, denoted as i ⇠ j; in other words, i is j’s (first-order) neighbor. Then, 0   ij  1 is
a measure of their degree of connection, with larger values leading to stronger connection
between nodes. Note that in a weighted directed graph, a link from i to j does not imply
a link from j to i. The number of nodes that i connects to is defined as its “out-degree” ,
the number of connections node i have is 
(out),i ⌘
P
Iij(G), and the number of nodes that
connect to node i is defined as i’s “in-degree” , the number of connections from other nodes




A simple weighted directed graph is illustrated in Figure 1, for n = 6, and also repre-
sented by an incidence matrix in Table 2.3, where a one is recorded in the cell of row i and
column j if node i is linked to node j and zero otherwise. Then, the out-degree of each
node is the number of 1’s in each row, whereas the in-degree is the number of 1’s in each
column. Note that the incidence matrix of a directed graph may not be symmetric. Yet the
total in-degree and out-degree of all nodes are always the same, equal to the total number














Figure 2.1: A weighted directed graph
Table 2.3: An incident matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6 
(out),i
1 – 1 0 0 0 0 1
2 0 – 0 1 0 0 1
3 0 0 – 0 0 1 1
4 0 0 0 – 1 0 1
5 0 1 0 1 – 1 3
6 0 0 0 0 1 – 1

(in),i 0 2 0 2 2 2 8

















0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 1 0 1 0 1
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The structure matrix (of arcs) N and the degree matrix (of arc weights) ⇤ both have n rows
and n columns, as well as zero diagonal for irreflexive connections. Matrix N illustrates
the structure of network connection, which characterizes the space dynamical property of
a networked system, and matrix ⇤ describes the degree of connection, which regulates the
time dynamical property of a networked system. So, these two matrices together depict how
nodes interact with each other over time and over space (Albert et al., 2000; Rivkin and
Siggelkow, 2007; Szabó and Fáth, 2007).
In general, a structure matrix has n⇥n entries, but only (n2  n) of its elements can be
chosen freely for an asymmetric irreflexive arc. Thus, there can be at most (n2   n) arcs,
i.e., 0  M  (n2 n). If M take the largest value possible, then every node is connected to
every other; if M = 0, then the graph only has independent nodes with no arc in between.
In these two extreme cases, only one corresponding structure matrix exists. If M = 1, there
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are (n2   n) possible structure matrices, depending which arc of the ordered pair of nodes







M ! (n2 n M) ! possible structure matrices. For





= 5.85⇥ 106 possible structure matrices,
suggesting various topological patterns of arcs, i.e., network structures.
2.3.2 Network structures
To investigate and categorize the implied network structures, graph theorists have proposed
two measures1 – degree distribution and average path length (e.g., Barabási and Albert,
1999; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). First, the out-degree and in-degrees distributions, which




arcs, are the most important
topological properties of a weighted directed graph. This measure roughly divide graphs
into two groups. Regular graphs have a structure in which all the nodes have the same
number of arcs; that is, the out-degrees (in-degrees) of all the nodes are drawn from a delta
distribution. The structure matrix N specifies the out-degree and in-degree of each node by
row sum and column sum, respectively. Therefore, the structure matrix of a regular graph
has the same number of 1’s on each row (column). The other group of complex networks
have structures that allow some heterogeneity among the number of arcs. Their out- and
in-degree distributions can take the form of Poisson, power-law, exponential, or be arbitrary
specified (e.g., Newman et al., 2001). Our example falls into the second group because the
six nodes do not have the same out- and in-degrees and node 5 has a relatively larger number
of connections.
Second, a path from node i to node j is an adjacent sequence of arcs Iiu1(G) = 1, Iu1u2(G) =
1, · · · , Iukj(G) = 1. (Note that in a directed graph, a path from i to j does not imply a path
from j to i. ) Then the path length is one more than the smallest k for which such a path
exists. For an arc Iij = 1, the path length is 1 as k = 0. Take the graph in Figure 2.1 as
an example. There are two paths from nodes 5 to 4: an arc from 5 to 4 with k = 0 and a
1Clustering coe cient is another popular measure, the likelihood of two nodes building an arc (i.e.,
a direct connection) if they have another connection in common. However, it applies only to undirected
graphs; so not included in this study.
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sequence of two arcs from 5 to 2 to 4 with k = 1. So, by taking the smallest k (= 0), the
path length from node 5 to node 4 is 1. Following this logic, we can calculate the average
path length by taking the mean value of path lengths between all pairs of nodes. In general,
regular graph structures tend to be associated with longer average path length than complex
graph structures (e.g., Albert et al., 2000; Newman and Watts, 1999).
Measuring the specified two properties of a graph, the out- and in-degree distributions
and the average path length, is the first step towards understanding its structure. Next, we
will discuss the topological features of six well-established graphs, G = 1, 2, · · · , 6, so as to
investigate the spatiotemporal dynamics of entrepreneurial action in a networked system.
Specifically, they are square lattices (G = 1), packs (G = 2), ring lattices (G = 3), random
(G = 4), small-world (G = 5), and scale-free (G = 6). The six network structures in our
study can be further divided into two groups. G = 1, 2, 3 are regular graphs where each
node is connected with the exact number of neighboring nodes. In other words, the out-






(out),0), f((in)) =  ((in)   (in),0).
Numerically, all nodes have the same out-degree (in-degree) – each row (column) of the
connection matrix has the same number of 1’s. Considering a graph of n interacting nodes,
in our study, 8 !i 2 ⌦, (out),i = 4 and (in),i = 4 if the graph has N = {Iij(G)}, G = 1, 2, 3.
The other three types allow for more heterogeneity among the connections. For instance,
the graph in Figure 1 is embedded in a random topology (G = 4) where the arcs are placed
between pairs of nodes chosen uniformly at random. The resulting in-degree distribution and


























are the values of the mean out-degree and mean in-degree of the graph. Scale-












where typically 2 <  out,  in < 3, for instance,  out ' 2.45 and  in ' 2.1 for the world-wide
web (Albert et al., 1999). This distribution allows for a few actors of very large in- and
out-degree to exist. In general, for some !i, !j 2 ⌦ and i 6= j, (out),i 6= (out),j and/or

(in),i 6= (in),j if the graph has N = {Iij(G)}, G 2 {4, 5, 6}. Accordingly, we are able to
explore whether entrepreneurship can thrive in certain directed graphs.
Square lattice (G = 1) networks. On a square lattice network we consider the standard
von Neumann neighborhood including four neighbors to the east, south, west, and north,

(in),i = (out),i = i = 4 (e.g., Hauert and Szebó, 2003; Ohtsuki et al., 2006). The lattice
then characterizes a system where the behavior of each node depends much more upon
the behavior of its nearest connections than that of distant connections. When making an
decision on entrepreneurial tasks, for instance, one individual is more likely to be influenced
by his/her spouse than distant relatives. Square lattices is an initial network structure for
the creation of more realistic graphs, introduced later.
This network topology has been widely studied in evolutionary game theory literature.
Scholars place individual players in a two-dimensional spatial array and investigate their
interaction to examine the emergence of cooperative behaviors (Hauert and Szebó, 2003;
Lieberman et al., 2005; Nowak and May, 1993). They find that the connection structures
have pronounced e↵ects on the fate of cooperators, who pay a cost for another individual to
receive a benefit: A single cooperator could be wiped out immediately by several neighboring
defectors, who pay no cost and do not distribute benefits; a cluster of cooperative neighbors,
on the contrary, can help each other such that cooperation thrives in the network (Hauert
and Szebó, 2003; Lieberman et al., 2005; Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006).
In our study, we arrange n nodes into a square lattice network that has c columns and
r rows. So, a actor i will be located at row {bi/cc} and column {i   (bi/cc) ⇥ c}, where
bxc is the largest integer not greater than x. No statistical rule is needed to define the
lattice’s degree distribution because the number of degrees (4) is the same for each node.
The topological rule is that each actor is connected to all of its four nearest neighbors:
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Algorithm 1 (Square lattice networks). Choose i = 0, 1, · · · , n  1,
Connect actors to north neighbors;
if bi/cc < r
set Ii,i+c(1) = 1;
else
set Ii,i+c n(1) = 1;
Connect actors to east neighbors;
if i  (bi/cc)⇥ c < c
set Ii,i+1(1) = 1;
else
set Ii,i+1 c(1) = 1;
Connect actors to south neighbors;
if bi/cc = 0
set Ii,i+(r 1)⇥c(1) = 1;
else
set Ii,i c(1) = 1;
Connect actors to east neighbors;
if i  (bi/cc)⇥ c = 0
set Ii,i+c 1(1) = 1;
else
set Ii,i 1(1) = 1.
Pack (G = 2) networks. The topology of pack networks has the key property of nearly
decomposability (Simon, 1962) and is related to the notion of modularity (Baldwin and
Clark, 2000). Specifically, nodes form cliques for decision-making such that nodes within
each clique all connect with each other but are relatively weakly connected to nodes in other
cliques. In other words, the cliques are discernable, at the same time are dependent through
cross-clique connections. In the short run, the dynamics of one clique is approximately
independent of another clique, whereas the long-run dynamics of any clique depends on all
other cliques in an aggregate way (Simon, 1962).
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A number of physical and social networks in product and organization design demon-
strate this topological characteristic in pursuit of desirable outcomes (Ethiraj and Levinthal,
2004). For instance, an organizational structure combined with formal and informal commu-
nication networks is nearly decomposable for knowledge searching and sharing so that the
organization’s innovation quality can be enhanced (Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008). Following
Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007), we will compare pack networks to other graphs to examine
the entrepreneurial action dynamics.
In our study, we arrange n nodes into n/4 packs (i.e., cliques) so that each pack has
four nodes. Specifically, node i will be located at pack Jq if 4(q   1)  i < 4q, where
q = 1, · · · , n/4. The nodes in the same pack are densely connected among themselves, while
packs are loosely coupled. We create the pack network in two steps:
Algorithm 2 (Pack networks).
Connect actors within the packs;
Choose i = 0,
repeat
I
4i,4i+1(2) = I4i,4i+2(2) = I4i,4i+3(2) = 1,
I
4i+1,4i(2) = I4i+1,4i+2(2) = I4i+1,4i+3(2) = 1,
I
4i+2,4i(2) = I4i+2,4i+1(2) = I4i+2,4i+3(2) = 1,
i = i+ 1;
until i = n/4  1.
Connect actors across the packs;
Choose i = 0, 1, · · · , n  1,




Ring lattice (G = 3) networks. In a ring lattice network, each node is assumed to be
connected by its adjacent neighbors on either side of it. This topolog describe a sequentially
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interdependent system: nodes are in series where the behavioral output of one node becomes
the input to another one (Thompson, 1967). In production systems, loop-based plant layout
is one common design of facility planning and material handling (Asef-Vaziri and Laporte,
2005). Interfirm examples include the various buyer-supplier relationship along a value chain
or a logistic chain (Kumar and van Dissel, 1996).
Pulling one node out of a loop is like breaking the chain; the subsequent set of nodes will
be negatively a↵ected (Kumar and van Dissel, 1996). In extreme cases, the whole system
may cease to function. For instance, the literature on supply chain disruption has inves-
tigated this distinctive phenomenon. One entity that hit by unanticipated and unplanned
events cannot support the normal flow of goods and materials within a supply chain. Con-
sequently, all supply chain entities are exposed to operational and financial risks (Craighead
et al., 2007; Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005). Therefore, the behavior of any node is likely to
a↵ect at least the adjacent and possibly all nodes in the system. According to Ohtsuki et al.
(2006), cooperative actions will be refrained if one cooperator is surrounded by defective
neighbors. Following this logic, we will investigate the impact of ring lattices on the fate of
entrepreneurs.
In our study, we spread out n nodes on a ring. Each node is connected to four adjacent
neighbors, for instance, node 5 is a↵ected by nodes 3 and 4 on its left side, as well as by
nodes 6 and 7 on its right side. Specifically,
Algorithm 3 (Ring lattice networks). Choose i = 0, 1, · · · , n  1,
Connect actors to nearest right neighbors;
if i < n  1
set Ii,i+1(3) = 1;
else
set Ii,i+1 n(3) = 1;
Connect actors to next-nearest right neighbors;
if i < n  2
set Ii,i+2(3) = 1;
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else
set Ii,i+2 n(3) = 1;
Connect actors to nearest left neighbors;
if i > 0
set Ii,i 1(3) = 1;
else
set Ii,i+n 1(3) = 1.
Connect actors to nest-nearest left neighbors;
if i > 1
set Ii,i 2(3) = 1;
else
set Ii,i+n 2(3) = 1.
Random (G = 4) graphs. A random graph Gn,M consists of n nodes and M acrs (Erdős
and Rényi, 1960), where the connections between nodes are drawn randomly. Consequently,
every node does not necessarily have the same number of out- and in-degrees as nodes
embedded in regular graphs.
Traditionally, networks of complex topology have been described as random graphs.
Epidemiology (Kretzschmar and Morris, 1996), ecological food web (Williams and Martinez,
2000), and many other fields have employed random graphs as models of real-world networks.
For instance, the susceptible–infectious–recovered epidemiological models frequently make
an assumption of fully mixed approximation. That is, the contact (i.e., arcs) between nodes,
either infected with the disease or susceptible to it, are random (Kretzschmar and Morris,
1996). However, studies show that random graphs cannot fully capture the real-world
phenomena (Williams and Martinez, 2000), whereas small-world and scale-free networks
provide a better understanding on the topological properties of large networks (Newman
et al., 2001), introduced next.
To generate a random graph in our study, we simply throw down M arcs between node
paris chosen at random from n initially unconnected nodes, with the constraint that any
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pair of nodes cannot have more than two connections from the same direction. In other
words, the elements in the structure matrix, N , can only take values of 0 and 1.
Algorithm 4 (Random graphs).
Choose k = 1,
repeat
Take a random pair of nodes (i, j), i, j = 0, 1, · · · , n  1, i 6= j, and i ⌧ j,
Iij(4) = Iji(4) = 1,
k = k + 1;
until k = 2n.
Small-world (G = 5) networks. Following Watts and Strogatz (1998), a small-world
network is created from a ring lattice network by randomly rewiring a fraction ↵ of connec-
tions in a way that conserve the out- and in-degree for each node. In the limit ↵ ! 0 the
depicted topology is equivalent to a ring lattice network. If all connections are randomly
rewired (p = 1), we derive a random graph. That is, the small-world network interpolates
between ring lattice network and random graph. After all, most of real-world networks
are neither entirely regular nor entirely random. Graphically, most nodes embedded in
the small-world network are connected to the adjacent neighbors, yet a few have distant
connections.
In the language of graph theory, the core features of small-world networks are both high
clustering, like ring lattice networks, and short path length, like random graphs (Newman,
2001; Watts and Strogatz, 1998). First, clustering measures the likelihood of two nodes
building a direct connection if they have another neighbor in common. Watts and Strogatz
(1998) define a network having high clustering if it is much greater than a random graph of
the same population size and average out- and in-degrees. As to the path length, regular
graphs, such as square lattice and ring lattice networks, that do not o↵er short path length for
remote node pairs because a long and circuitous route is required to connect them. Examples
include two nodes located on posit sides of the loop. In this sense, the distant connections
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in the small-world topology create “shortcuts” within the network (Milgram, 1967; Newman
and Watts, 1999). They significantly reduce the path length between randomly chosen pair
of nodes. Accordingly, the average path length of the small-world network is relatively short.
The small-world topology has been documented in many real-world networks, including
alliance network of U.S. firms (Schilling and Phelps, 2007), business networks of board inter-
locks of the Fortune 1000 companies (Newman et al., 2001), neural network of the nematode
worm C. elegant (Watts and Strogatz, 1998), collaboration networks of scientists (Newman,
2001) and power grid of the western U.S. (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Generally, entities
embedded in small-world networks can e ciently access a wide range of connections due to
short path length and are likely to cooperate due to high clustering. Thus, this network
topology has been recognized as an important structure to foster innovation (Schilling and
Phelps, 2007; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005).
In our study, following the algorithm by Watts and Strogatz (1998), we allocate n nodes
on a ring lattice network, then randomly rewire each arc of the network with probability ↵.
Note that we allow varying ↵ such that the transition between regular (↵ = 0) and random
(↵ = 1) can be closely monitored.
Algorithm 5 (Small-world networks). Set a rewiring probability ↵ 2 [0, 1].
Choose i = 0,
repeat






choose a random actor j 6= i and j ⌧ i,
Iij(5) = Iji(5) = 1,
else
if i < n  1
Ii,i+1(5) = Ii+1,i(5) = 1,
else
Ii,i+1 n(5) = Ii+1 n,i(5) = 1;







choose a random actor j 6= i and j ⌧ i,
Iij(5) = Iji(5) = 1,
else
if i < n  2
Ii,i+2(5) = Ii+2,i(5) = 1,
else
Ii,i+2 n(5) = Ii+2 n,i(5) = 1;
i = i+ 1;
until i = n  1.
Scale-free (G = 6) networks. In a scale-free network, the out- and in-degree distributions
have power-law tails, indicating that some nodes have significantly larger connections than
others (Albert et al., 1999; Barabási and Albert, 1999). As such, those highly connected
nodes a↵ect a great number of others’ decisions. This distinctive phenomenon is practically
absent in random graphs and Watts-Strogatz small-world networks, where the probability
of finding a node with large degree decreases exponentially with the  value (Albert et al.,
2000). Comparing to the other five graphs, we have a large chance to find highly connected
nodes in a scale-free network.
To explain the origin of power-law tails, Barabási and Albert (1999) proposed a model
based on preferential attachment. In their model, starting with a small number of nodes,
network expands by the continuous addition of new nodes to the system. The new node
connects to the existing nodes, not randomly, but based on their degrees. Specifically, the
probability that the new one links to a highly connected node is much greater than that
the new one links to other nodes with small connections. In other words, the existing nodes
gain new connections in proportion to the number they already have (Albert and Barabási,
2002); thus, an initial heterogeneity in out- and in-degrees will further increase as the
network expands. This is also called the “rich–become–richer” phenomenon. The absence
of preferential attachment eliminates the scale-free feature of the degree distribution.
A number of networks have been shown to be scale-free such as the world-wide web
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(Albert et al., 1999), the physical Internet (Faloutsos et al., 1999), transportation network
(Banavar et al., 1999), and citation network (Redner, 1998). In this sense, we may consider
prospective techonogy-based entrepreneurs, who identify opportunities arising from social
media and other web tools, as nodes embedded in scale-free networks. Then the highly
connected nodes are responsible for the reduction of average path length of the network,
which facilitates better coordination and flow of information and higher degree of robustness
against random failures (Albert et al., 2000). For instance, our ability to locate information
on the web is not a↵ected by the temporary unavailability of some web pages. It is worth
noting that the robustness property is not shared by random graphs and small-world net-
works, as it is much easier to remove a few actors to tear the network apart. Consequently,
we expect that the dynamics of entrepreneurship actions in a scale-free network is not likely
to be disrupted by disastrous events.
We propose a model in which the network expands by the addition of one new node
at one time, with two in-degrees and two out-degrees linking to the nodes already in the
network. New nodes will preferentially connect to two existing nodes with large degrees. As
such, the total number of connections (M) is comparable to that of the other five networks
of the same size.
Algorithm 6 (Scale-free networks).
Choose i = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,
set Ii,i+1(6) = 1 for i = 0, 1, 2, 3 and Ii,i 4(6) = 1 for i = 4.
Growing and preferentially connecting,
Choose i = 5,
repeat
choose node j with a probability of j/
P
j j, j = 0, 1, · · · , i  1,
Iij(6) = Iji(6) = 1,
choose node h 6= j with a probability of h/
P
h h, h = 0, 1, · · · , i  1,
Iih(6) = Ihi(6) = 1,
i = i+ 1;
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until i = n  1.
To capture the entrepreneurial process in space-time, a dynamic behavioral model is
required. We next introduce computational social science as a new field that facilitates
process-oriented research.
2.4 Computational social science
Computational social science (CSS) is a field that “leverages the capacity to collect and
analyze data at a scale that may reveal patterns of individual and group behaviours” (Lazer
et al., 2009, p.721). The foundations of CSS is complex adaptive system – a system of
interdependent elements change their states in response to changing conditions (Miller and
Page, 2007). The operations of complex adaptive system are through phase transitions in
order to maintain collective performance under dynamic environmental conditions (Gilbert
and Troitzsch, 2005). A community is an example of a complex adaptive system based on
business and social connections in a geographic area, such as the well-known von Neumann
neighborhood where an actor interacts with four neighboring actors to the east and west and
to the south and north, that relies on a small set of initial conditions and intuitive rules (e.g.,
Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005; Miller and Page, 2007). Once a disaster occurs, community
members take actions to adapt the resulting dramatic changes and create collective values for
community to endure. Hence, CSS o↵ers enormous but untapped opportunities to explore
social complexity and study patterns of group (macro) behavior from assumptions at the
individual (micro) level using the computational approach.
Computation is a language to formalize theory and empirical findings to by studying
‘what ifs’ and experimentation (e.g., Cio -Revilla, 2014). CSS includes two types of com-
putational techniques: equation-based paradigm including queuing models and system dy-
namics (SD) models, and object-based simulation models such as cellular automata (CA)
and agent-based models (ABM) Cio -Revilla, 2014. Each technique in CSS takes a feedback
view to simulate the actions and interactions of actors in the business and social environment
32
(Gilbert and Troitzsch, 2005).
For instance, queuing models, based on queuing theory in operations research literature,
are applied for social systems and processes where queues of entities (e.g., customers, pa-
tients, ) are serviced by various kinds of stations or processing units. Likewise, SD models
depict nonlinear feedback systems in which variables are in circular causal relationships
and influence each other (Kunc and Morecroft, 2009; Sterman, 2000). This computational
technique has been greatly used in organization and strategy studies. For example, Sas-
try (1997) study discontinuous or punctuated organizational change by modeling it as a
function of organization–environment fit and of trial periods following reorientation during
which the change process is suspended. Repenning (2002), Repenning and Sterman (2002),
and Rahmandad et al. (2009) examine the dynamic process that influences the members’
adoption of new innovation in an organization. In this sense, SD models are useful to pro-
duce dynamic management theory and help practitioners understand and predict various
potential consequences of their proposed policies and strategies.
CA and ABM relax the homogeneity and perfect mixing assumptions of SD models; they
can capture heterogeneity across actors and spatial interactions among them, hence show
how aggregate behavior emerges from the interactions (Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008).
Both types of models can show how aggregate behavior emerges from the interactions among
In particular, CA models study emergent patterns based on localized interaction between
neighboring cells (e.g., actors) on a given landscape. One well-known example is Shelling’s
Segregation model on racial segregation in a community (Miller and Page, 2007), showing
how segregation emerges when actors are tolerant of di↵erent race. On the other hand,
ABMs have become increasingly significant to explore systems consisting of heterogeneous
actors and networks of relationships among them that evolve over time (Bonabeau, 2002;
Rahmandad and Sterman, 2008). This computational technique has been widely applied to
study complex crisis and emergencies (Cio -Revilla, 2014).
In entrepreneurship literature, there is a growing trend among scholars to study emer-
gence of entrepreneurial actions using object-based simulation models (e.g., Keyhani et al.,
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2015; McMullen and Dimov, 2013; Yang and Chandra, 2013). Emergence is a phenomenon
when system-level behavior arises out of the micro, localized interactions among individual
actors and where the interactions are nonlinear, characterized by action threshold, and if-
then rules (Lichtenstein et al., 2007; Miller and Page, 2007), which is unable to be explored
using traditional static methods. Therefore, computational social science approach is an
excellent way of exploring the proposed spatiotemporal process in our study. We embrace
the CSS approach and employ computational techniques to study entrepreneurial emergence
in the context of disaster using an interaction- and community-based perspective. Stylized
simulation models are built to examine the entrepreneurial action dynamics in space-time
through systematic experimentation on key model parameters.
Chapter 3
Robust supply chain strategies for recovering from
unanticipated disasters
3.1 Introduction
Today’s global business landscape is characterized by increasing uncertainty and vulner-
abilities. Recent years have brought unforeseeable disasters – man-made and natural –
including terrorist attacks, computer viruses and ‘hackings’, financial crises, earthquakes,
tsunamis, the SARS and Ebola epidemics, and nuclear reactor accidents, etc. Anecdotal
evidence about the global production plummet due to Japan’s March 2011 earthquake and
nuclear reactor semi-meltdown shows that most serious, unpredictable disasters can disrupt
the normal flow of goods and materials within and across supply chains. Such unpredictable
disasters expose firms enormous operational and financial risks (Kleindorfer and Saad, 2005;
Papadakis, 2006; Xiao and Yu, 2006; Bueno-Solano and Cedillo-Campos, 2014). Motivated
by these real-world observations this paper examines the e↵ectiveness of popular recovery
strategies when a supply chain faces unpredictable, hazardous events, and then provides
managerial insights for supply chain managers.
Historical data indicate that the total number of natural and man-made disasters has
soared dramatically over the last two decades (see e.g., www.cred.be; www.munichre.com).
For instance, the March 2000 lightning bolt that struck a Philips semiconductor plant in
Albuquerque, New Mexico, created a 10-minute blaze that contaminated millions of IC chips
and subsequently delayed deliveries to its two major clients, nokia and Ericsson (Latour,
2001). Thailand’s 2011 massive flooding a↵ected the supply chains of computer manufactur-
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ers dependent on hard disk drives and of Japanese auto companies including Honda, Toyota,
and Nissan with factories in Thailand (BBC, 13/10/2011), among others. Empirical obser-
vations indicate that most supply chains tend to break down during major disruptions and
many cannot recover afterwards (e.g., Eskew 2004; Tang 2006). The detrimental e↵ects of
various catastrophic disasters (Hendricks and Singhal, 2005; Green et al., 2011) motivate us
to identify robust supply chain strategies to promptly and e↵ectively address unanticipated
disasters; that is, strategies enable supply chains to maintain their operations during and
closely after disaster-caused disruptions.
To pursue the research motive, we construct a behavioral supply chain model using the
cellular automata (CA). CA, a simulation method used in management research, enables
an exploratory examination of supply chain dynamics by considering strategic interactions
among neighboring firms (Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007; Nair et al., 2009; Yang
and Chandra, 2013). Using the aforementioned lightning-sparked fire in New Mexico and
floods in Thailand as examples, we employ CA to model how an unanticipated disaster in a
supply chain firm places the entire supply chain’s operational and financial performance at
risk, following the forest fire model in physical science (see Robertson and Caldart, 2008).
Therefore, our model mirrors many real-world supply chain disruption cases.
Research that explores ways to minimize the adverse impact of supply chain disruptions
has generally followed one of two streams: disruptions caused by anticipated and unantic-
ipated disasters. In practice, a supply chain frequently faces disruptions with anticipated
probability of occurrence and magnitude of impact, due to forecast errors caused by de-
mand fluctuations, machine breakdown, and poor supplier performance (e.g., Hilletofth and
Hilmola, 2008; Lättilä and Saranen, 2011). The first stream, anticipated disaster-caused
disruptions, suggests that the disruption’s adverse impact can be mitigated by taking steps
to diminish the likelihood of a disruption (e.g., Chang et al., 2007); on this, Altay and
Green (2006) o↵er a comprehensive literature survey. However, a question arises: How can
a firm reduce the chance of a disruption if the probability distribution of the hazards is
unknowable, such as those caused by unpredictable, sudden-onset natural and man-made
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disasters? The first stream of research cannot address this thorny problem, which is impor-
tant in global supply chain management of product production ranging from airplanes to
consumer goods to chemicals (She , 2007; Simchi-Levi et al., 2014). But the second stream
of research, unanticipated disaster-caused disruptions, attempts to address this problem of
unforeseeable incidents.
In the past decade, managers of supply chains and operations have become much more
concerned about the potential consequences of unanticipated disasters at their facilities
and those of their supply chain partners (Sheu, 2007; Kunz and Reiner, 2012). The in-
creased concern is partly the result of greater inter- and intra-organizational complexity
and increased exposure to unpredictable natural and man-made disasters. These events will
inevitably disrupt supply chains because shipping, air freight, trains, and other transporta-
tion modes along with fuel shortages, communication and electricity outages and electricity
supply disruptions, will be greatly a↵ected by increasingly extreme weather events. As
noted earlier, Ericsson lost 400 million euros after its supplier’s semiconductor lab in New
Mexico caught fire in 2000; Ford closed five vehicle manufacturing factories for several days
when all air tra c was suspended after September 11, 2001 terrorist attack, and Japan’s
2011 earthquake and tsunami halted Toyota’s production at three plants for several days
and damaged American dealerships (see Chopra and Sodhi (2004; 2014) for more details
and examples).
To address the practitioners’ and researchers’ increased concern about unanticipated
disasters, a second stream of research has recently emerged that explores the role of supply
chain disruptions caused by unpredictable natural and man-made disasters (Sheu, 2007).
For instance, Bueno-Solano and Cedillo-Campos (2014) develop a system dynamics model to
analyze the devastating e↵ects of terrorist acts on global supply chain performance. Qi et al.
(2004) examine a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain experiencing demand disruptions
and the resultant impacts on supply chain’s coordination mechanisms in pursuit of maximum
supply chain performance. Xiao and Qi (2008) extend Qi et al.’s (2004) analysis of a one-
manufacturer-two-competing-retailers supply chain under disruption. However, most studies
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in this stream explore the e↵ects of supply chain disruptions but fail to consider recovery
strategies – the major focus of this work (see, Altay and Green, 2006; Sheu, 2010). We
extend this research stream by developing a formal model of supply chain dynamics under
unanticipated disasters and their e↵ects on member firms over time. Also, we summarize
several observations by carefully analyzing extensive simulation outcomes.
Our key qualitative findings are as follows. An incremental recovery strategy mitigates
disruptions from unanticipated disasters by incrementally improving the supply chain’s re-
covery performance; this strategy performs well when bringing the entire supply chain op-
erations from a poor to good state consumes considerable resources. However, with the
incremental recovery strategy, the supply chain may not perform as well as expected if the
above condition – high resource consumption requirement – does not hold. As Lee (2004)
highlights, a good supply chain strategy for recovery must perform at “triple-A” job by
employing agility, adaptability, and alignment. Our computational analysis demonstrates
that a radical (the most rapid) recovery strategy – one that contains the impact of a disaster
within the e↵ected firms and strives to immediately fix the disruption – is most robust. That
is, in most disruptive cases, the radical recovery strategy consistently performs reliably. In
contrast, strategies using the state-of-immediate-neighbors as a reference point are not as
e↵ective as the radical strategy to inhibit the contagion e↵ect of disasters across the supply
chain, leading to relatively low recovery performance. Their lack of e ciency is more sig-
nificant when the supply chain is relatively large (e.g., the supply chain has ten echelons).
These findings and insights under the supply chain structure generally hold in a stochastic
setting in which a firm’s recovery strategy is altered over time. We describe those conditions
and strategies in detail, and justify these insights and other results in subsequent sections.
3.2 Model
While our model encompasses a wide range of technical systems (e.g., information systems,
manufacturing processes), we focus on supply chains. A long tradition in the model-based
literature on operations, supply chain, and organization (see, Cachon and Netessine, 2004;
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Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al., 2007) leads us to conceptualize the supply chain as the
interaction of all member firms each of which makes a number of interdependent decisions.
Specifically, each firm follows its strategy to interact with its adjacent upstream and down-
stream neighbor firms; together their unique interactions influence the supply chain’s overall
performance.
In the context of modeling the supply chain’s evolution, the cellular automata (CA)
framework assumes that each firm interacts within a supply chain following fixed, homo-
geneous rules. Since a supply chain consists of autonomous or semiautonomous business
entities (i.e., firms) engaged in various independent and interdependent activities, CA is an
ideal research methodology to explore supply-chain issues (Nair et al., 2009). The firms in
our model populate a one-dimensional array; consider a supply chain in which every firm
interacts with its adjacent upstream and downstream neighbors. We refer to N as the size
of the supply chain; thus N firms populate the supply chain. Without loss of generality, we
number these firms consecutively 1, 2, · · · , N so that firm 1 is the most upstream (the first
or start) firm and thus firm N is the most downstream (the last or end) firm. As a result,
firm 1 has only one (downstream) neighbor, firm 2, and firm N has also only one (upstream)
neighbor, firm N   1.
3.2.1 Firm performance
In our stylized supply chain model, each firm can operate in one of three states based
on supply chain events or circumstances: bad, normal, and good, designated by 0, 1 and
2, respectively. We denote the state of firm i at period t by si(t) 2 {0, 1, 2}, where i =
1, 2, · · · , N and t = 1, 2, · · · , T . Parameter T indicates the simulation periods of each run.





Accordingly, our model is a discrete dynamic system with discrete and integral space, time,
and states (see Robertson and Caldart, 2009).
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A firm’s state can change due to an unanticipated disaster. Suppose that a disaster oc-
curs. A bad state (0) represents major damage to terminal facilities and/or halted produc-
tion. At the other extreme, a good state (2) indicates restored operations from disruptions,
which represents the firm functioning well. The normal state (1) represents the intermediate
status whereby day-to-day operations are not fully recovered yet still functional, for instance,
the firm utilizes supply chain collaboration, inventory, and/or transportation rerouting to
remain operational (Rogers, 2012).
For the sake of simplicity, each firm in the supply chain at each period has a probabil-
ity f of being derailed when encountering an operations shutdown from “severe” disasters
and a probability g of being a↵ected by “mild” disasters. Note that our study focuses on
sudden-onset disasters that arrive rapidly with little or no forewarning, such as tsunamis,
earthquakes, acts of war, and terrorist attacks; slow-onset disasters such as famines and
droughts are not sudden onset and thus are not considered in this study (van Wassen-
hove, 2006). Specifically, upon encountering a mild disaster at period t, firm i’s operational
performance is
⇠i(t) = max{si(t  1)  1, 0};
during disruption from a severe disaster at period t, firm i’s operational performance post
disaster at that time is
⇠i(t) = 0,
irrespective of its state prior to encountering the disaster, si(t  1).
3.2.2 Recovery strategy
Following CA modeling convention, we assume that each firm’s behavior is controlled by an
identical decision rule, and that this rule uses the firm’s post-disaster state (bad – 0, normal
– 1, or good – 2) and the post-disaster states of its two adjacent neighbors (upstream and
downstream) to determine the recovery state. Theoretically, a decision rule is a mapping of
each possible input state (i.e., post-disaster performance, ⇠j(t), j 2 {i   1, i, i + 1}) to an
output state (i.e, recovery performance, si(t)) for every firm in the supply chain. A decision
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rule thus specifies a supply chain ‘strategy’ to restore every member firm’s performance to
its pre-disruption state following a disaster .
Given that each firm has three possible states, a fully specified rule will map the 27 (=
33) possible combinations of actions that the firm and its two neighbors can take to achieve
the firm’s new state. Because the rule must designate one of three possible states for each
of the 27 situations, 327 possible rules could direct a firm’s behavior. Therefore, searching
for optimal strategies is unrealistic and impractical in most CA models (Miller and Page,
2007). Following the modeling practice for complex adaptive systems (Gintis, 2009; Miller
and Page, 2007), we choose ten possible rules (or strategies) based on their similarity to
real-world decision making for supply chain recovery activities. Table 3.1 illustrates the ten
decision rules selected, which determine the state of firm i at period t given ⇠i(t) 8i.
To sum up, a recovery strategy represents a firm’s option to change its state (i.e., op-
erational performance). The action set, however, is limited and localized to the firm itself
and two of its adjacent upstream and downstream neighbors. In this sense, our model
can be viewed as a modeling framework of behavioral game theory similar to nonlinear
dynamic systems, following the principle of cognitive limits in human and organizational
decision-making and judgement (see Gintis, 2009; Robertson and Caldart, 2009).
41
Table 3.1: Recovery strategies considered
Mathematical representation Remark
DR1
si(t) = 2. This rule can be considered a radical recovery
strategy to reach the best state recovered
from a disaster-caused disruption. A
real-world example is Japan’s semiconductor
supply chain responding to the 2011
earthquake/tsunami, where each supply chain
firm worked to successfully repair damaged
facilities and fix the electrical power supply
interruptions that had hindered chemical
plants and fabs (SEMI, 2011).
Firm i will return to the good state (2)
no matter what states its upstream and
downstream neighbors held post disas-
ter.
DR2
si(t) = 2 if This rule can be considered a benchmarking
recovery strategy since it returns a firm to
the best state of itself and of the neighboring
firms. A real-world example this is following
the 2011 earthquake/tsunami when Toyota
paid its workers to help its hard-hit suppliers
in Japan return to functional production,
leading to a quick supply chain disruption
recovery (Guardian, 11/03/2012).
max{⇠i 1(t), ⇠i(t), ⇠i+1(t)} = 2; other-
wise si(t) = 1.
Firm i will return to the good state (2)
if there is one good-state firm among
the neighbors and itself post disaster;
otherwise, the recovery will be to the
normal state (1).
DR3
si(t) = 2 if there are any two j 2 J =
{i   1, i, i + 1} such that ⇠j(t) = 2:
at least two firms have a good state
(the value of 2) in the set J ; otherwise
si(t) = 1.
This rule is less likely to return a firm to a
good state (2) than DR2. A real-world
example is Entergy New Orleans’s slow
restoration following hurricanes Katrina and
Rita in 2005, when flooding destroyed gas
facilities and equipment of its domiciled
response contractors, and brought massive
damage to its supply chain’s logistics and
communications; that is, both Entergy New
Orleans and its upstream contractors were
not in the good post-disaster state. It took
Entergy New Orleans two years of
bankruptcy protection and numerous e↵orts
to recover fully.
Firm i will return to the good state (2)
if there are two good-state firms among
the neighbors and itself post disaster;





si(t) = 2 if ⇠i 1(t)+ ⇠i(t)+ ⇠i+1(t) = 6;
otherwise si(t) = 1.
This rule is the least likely to return the firm
to a good state (2) compared to DR2 and
DR3. A real-world example: Malaysian
Airline had di culties in coping with the
catastrophic losses of Flight 370 that went
missing over the Indian Ocean in May 2014
and Flight 17 shot down over Ukraine in July,
2014.
Firm i will return to the good state (2)
if it and both of its adjacent neighbors
(up- and down-stream) had been in a
good state (2) post disaster; otherwise,
the firm will recovery to the normal
state (1).
DR5
si(t) = 1 if ⇠i 1(t)+ ⇠i(t)+ ⇠i+1(t) = 6;
otherwise si(t) = 2.
A member firm in a supply chain adopting
this rule does not just reinstate what the
disaster had destroyed, but improves the
supply chain over its post-disaster state.
DR5 is similar to DR1 except for one
situation in which firm i’s state will
change from good (2) to normal (1).
DR6
si(t) = max{⇠i 1(t), ⇠i(t), ⇠i+1(t)}. This rule can be considered a matching
recovery strategy because it matches the
state of its up- and down-stream neighbors.
A real-world example is the Unitited States
Enrichment Corporation (USEC), one of the
biggest suppliers of uranium to Tokyo
Electric Power (TEPCO), who maintains the
Fukushima reactor before the meltdown
caused by Japan’s 2011 earthquake/tsunami.
Its recovery activities were largely
constrained by the lack of demand from the
downstream firm in the supply chain,
TEPCO, and the low market prices.
Firm i will recover to the best post-
disaster state of its adjacent neighbors
and of itself.
DR7
si(t) = min{⇠i(t) + 1, 2}. This rule can be considered an incremental
recovery strategy. Real-world examples are
small- and medium-size-firms’ recovery
activities that are hindered by no or little
access to capital, resulting in a slower
recovery than expected.
Firm i will recover its post-disaster
state incrementally, going from bad (0)
to normal (1), normal (1) to good (2),




si(t) = ⇠i 1(t) if ⇠i(t) 6= ⇠i 1(t); other-
wise si(t) = min{⇠i(t) + 1, 2}.
A member firm in a supply chain adopting
this rule follows the post-disaster state of its
upstream neighbor. This strategy, similar to
the reverse bullwhip e↵ect, implies that
upstream firms are more powerful to initiate
recovery activities after disasters and this
action will correctly align the rest of the
chain.
Firm i will adjust its recovery state to
its adjacent upstream neighbor’s post-
disaster state when its state di↵ers from
that of its upstream neighbor post dis-
aster; otherwise, the firm will recover
its state by one additional unit.
DR9
si(t) = ⇠i+1(t) if ⇠i(t) 6= ⇠i+1(t); other-
wise si(t) = min{⇠i(t) + 1, 2}.
A member firm in a supply chain adopting
this rule follows the state of its downstream
neighbor. This strategy, similar to the
bullwhip e↵ect, assumes that downstream
firms have more power to initiate recovery
activities after disasters.
Firm i will adjust its recovery state
to its immediate downstream neigh-
bor’s post-disaster state when a di↵er-
ence exists between its state and that
of its downstream neighbor post disas-
ter; otherwise, the firm will improve its
state by one unit.
DR10
si(t) = max{⇠i 1(t), ⇠i+1(t)} if ⇠i(t) 6=
max{⇠i 1(t), ⇠i+1(t)}; otherwise si(t) =
min{⇠i(t) + 1, 2}.
A member firm in a supply chain adopting
this rule follows the post-disaster state of its
neighbor immediately before and after it.
This strategy assumes that firms in the literal
centre of the chain have more power to
initiate recovery activities after disasters.
Firm i will adjust its recovery state to
match the highest post-disaster state of
its adjacent downstream and upstream
neighbors; otherwise, the firm will im-
prove its state by one unit.
3.2.3 Resource consumption
Undoubtly, a firm needs to consume a degree of resources to increase its post-disaster oper-
ational performance. We thus assume that the firm does not need to consume any resources
for decreases in its performance. The resource consumption function for firm i with post-
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for ⇠i(t) = 0 and si(t) = 1,
c
2
for ⇠i(t) = 1 and si(t) = 2,
c
3
for ⇠i(t) = 0 and si(t) = 2,
where c
3
is the resource amount spent to recover from a severe disaster at one time unit, c
2
is the resource amount spent to recover from a mild disaster, and c
1
is the resource amount
needed to find alternatives, such as another supplier and a substitute route, in order to
maintain day-to-day operations following a severe disaster. We consider six scenarios of













(Our results are insensitive to the choice of C in the experiments, see the supplementary
notes in Section 3.7.)
Table 3.2: Six resource consumption scenarios
  Recovery Degree    
Scenario 0→1 (!!) 1→2 (!!) 0→2 (!!) Graph 
RC1 1 2 10 
 
RC2 2 1 10 
 
RC3 1 10 2 
 
RC4 2 10 1 
 
RC5 10 1 2 
 
RC6 10 2 1 
 
 
Firm i’s resource amount at period t is Ri(t); there is an increase   in resources per
period. Parameter   can be thought of as a firm’s investment in risk mitigation in each





Ri(t  1) +   C(⇠i(t), si(t)) if ⇠i(t) < si(t),
Ri(t  1) +  otherwise.
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3.2.4 Simulating the model
The simulation procedure for the proposed model is as follows. At period 0, we assign the
recovery strategy, the resource consumption scenario, the probabilities of disasters (f and
g), and the initial state for each firm. Since firm 1 has no upstream neighbor and firm N
has no downstream neighbor, we assume that either firm 1’s upstream neighbor or firm N ’s
downstream neighbor is in a good state, or has the value of 2. (This assumption does not
impact our outcomes since these two firms are outside the boundaries of our framework.)
The simulation is executed until time T is reached. Next, we calculate the supply chain’s
performance by adding up the state of each member firm to evaluate the robustness of the
ten recovery strategies employed by the N supply chain firms.
Figure 3.1 illustrates a recovery procedure at time period t: this simple example of five
firms shows how recovery dynamics operate in our supply chain model. The numbers in
the five large squares in the bottom row stand for state or operational performance, the
numbers in the five small top-row squares present the level of the remaining resources, and
the two firms denoted by circles present firm 1’s upstream supplier and firm 5’s downstream
customer. DR2 and RC1 are applied to the recovery strategy and resource consumption
scenario; and, each firm obtains one unit of resource at the start of each time period. Note
that recovery actions following a strategy require adequate resources for implementation;
that is, if the resource level is too low to execute the recovery strategy, the firm will remain
in its original state (see Firm 1 as an example).
The objectives of this chapter are to consider the model in which the recovery actions
reflect popular strategies in practice and capture the interactions among supply chain mem-
bers, to assess how such actions can result in a firm’s counterintuitive behaviors in supply
chain dynamics, and ultimately to gain insights into supply chain risk management strate-
gies. The simulation of the CA model was carried out in a Java program, and is similar
to the forest fir models introduced by Miller and Page (2007). As Robertson and Caldart
(2009) note, CA is a dynamic network found in nature. We simulated our CA model in a
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The end of period t
 
! Figure 3.1: An illustration of a recovery procedure
MATLAB program.
In the next section, we unpack the robustness of recovery strategies for supply chains




Prior to running an extensive experimental analysis, and based on simulation research prac-
tice, we perform a base case in a pilot study: N = 5, T = 365, Ri(0) = 3, and   = 1.
We set g = 134/365 and f = 17/365 for the probabilities of mild and severe disasters oc-
curring during a year based on She ’s (2007) empirical analysis, thus, these values are also
fixed in our experimental study. Each firm’s operational performance at period 0 is either a
good state (“good” setting) or randomly assigned (bad – 0, normal – 1, or good – 2) state
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(“random” setting) for the outcome reliability. Every parameter instance is repeated 200
times for outcome reliability; we observe that the firm’s initial state does not significantly
impact the robustness of recovery strategies. Specifically, panels 1 to 3 in Table 3 show
the average of supply chain performance S per period, the average of (S/S
max
)⇥ 100% per
period, and the standard deviation of S per period. S
max
is the upper bound of supply chain
performance, which is 10 (= N ⇥ 2) in the base case.
In the supply chain risk management arena, we are primarily concerned about worst-
case-scenarios rather than average and optimistic scenarios of unanticipated disasters (Tang,
2006). Thus, Table 3.4 cannot identify which recovery strategy best addresses routine
disruptions and major disruptions caused by unanticipated disasters (e.g., a 7.5 Richter
scale earthquake at a major production plant) because the measure is the average number
of all simulated events across a supply chain. Following risk analysis and management best
practices (e.g., Myerson, 2004), we address this concern by reporting the 25th percentile, 5th
percentile, and 1st percentile of supply chain performance S among the 200 simulations (see
Table 3.4). These three performance measures result in very similar ranking outcomes across
all the ten strategies considered. Hence, we use the 1st percentile as the only performance
measure to rank recovery strategies since it provides a strict standard by which to evaluate
the performance of strategies used to recover disruptions caused by unanticipated disasters.
Tables 3.3 and 3.4
show that in the base case, only the radical recovery strategy, DR1, and the incremental
recovery strategy, DR7, achieve first place among the ten strategies considered. That is, they
are the most orbust recovery strategies. Notice that the increment strategy, DR7, is ranked
first only under either RC1 or RC3. The common characteristics of these two resource








; that is, to restore the firm’s state from bad
to good in the next period requires the firm to spend a great deal of resources. if this
condition of resource consumption does not hold, the performance of incremental strategies
is not as good as most other recovery strategies. Based on our results, the radical recovery
strategy, DR1, can achieve success under various resource consumption scenarios; that is,
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Table 3.3: Base case results for the supply chain performance
Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random
DR1 7.606 7.531 9.740 9.651 8.025 8.026 8.175 8.171 10.000 10.000 9.995 9.995
DR2 7.788 7.747 9.198 9.182 7.387 7.387 7.429 7.422 9.670 9.654 9.646 9.653
DR3 5.025 5.010 5.014 5.002 5.016 5.011 5.010 5.004 1.277 1.246 1.274 1.255
DR4 5.003 5.002 4.996 4.992 5.005 7.649 4.998 4.991 1.223 1.217 1.233 1.216
DR5 5.613 5.595 7.024 6.975 7.645 7.649 7.768 7.780 9.072 9.071 9.049 9.060
DR6 7.594 7.591 9.228 9.125 7.362 7.391 7.431 7.431 9.656 9.657 9.652 9.642
DR7 9.619 9.604 9.629 9.623 5.789 5.787 5.169 5.146 8.073 7.957 4.494 4.437
DR8 5.709 5.726 6.272 6.235 5.338 5.332 5.109 5.095 6.443 6.399 6.242 6.207
DR9 5.710 5.694 6.243 6.194 5.340 5.335 5.103 5.106 6.436 6.431 6.235 6.240
DR10 7.136 7.045 8.661 8.632 6.823 6.835 6.863 6.866 9.560 9.555 9.480 9.486
DR1 76.060 75.305 97.400 96.507 80.250 80.255 81.750 81.707 100.00 100.00 99.950 99.951
DR2 77.884 77.473 91.978 91.820 73.870 73.867 74.285 74.224 96.70 96.54 96.459 96.530
DR3 50.251 50.095 50.143 50.015 50.159 50.105 50.099 50.044 12.77 12.46 12.737 12.549
DR4 50.034 50.016 49.961 49.916 50.047 76.486 49.975 49.912 12.23 12.17 12.326 12.163
DR5 56.132 55.947 70.241 69.746 76.449 76.486 77.675 77.796 90.72 90.71 90.494 90.598
DR6 75.943 75.909 92.276 91.252 73.618 73.908 74.305 74.306 96.56 96.57 96.518 96.419
DR7 96.188 96.036 96.287 96.234 57.889 57.871 51.687 51.461 80.73 79.57 44.940 44.367
DR8 57.085 57.255 62.723 62.347 53.382 53.322 51.085 50.954 64.43 63.99 62.418 62.068
DR9 57.101 56.941 62.431 61.936 53.400 53.352 51.032 51.058 64.36 64.31 62.350 62.395
DR10 71.364 70.446 86.606 86.315 68.226 68.349 68.632 68.664 95.60 95.55 94.800 94.859
DR1 0.429 0.527 0.076 0.075 0.156 0.167 0.069 0.071 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.006
DR2 0.374 0.385 0.124 0.119 0.257 0.250 0.138 0.147 0.057 0.059 0.069 0.063
DR3 0.020 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.022 0.018 0.014 0.018 0.081 0.075 0.084 0.091
DR4 0.005 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.012 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.067 0.071 0.074 0.065
DR5 0.218 0.218 0.051 0.050 0.227 0.192 0.048 0.049 0.047 0.048 0.043 0.048
DR6 0.453 0.407 0.122 0.122 0.245 0.245 0.129 0.153 0.059 0.060 0.064 0.068
DR7 0.045 0.052 0.067 0.063 0.049 0.047 0.067 0.062 0.493 0.524 0.611 0.673
DR8 0.365 0.355 0.091 0.091 0.276 0.281 0.111 0.107 0.201 0.189 0.188 0.202
DR9 0.335 0.365 0.088 0.080 0.276 0.274 0.120 0.110 0.189 0.197 0.207 0.212
DR10 0.387 0.362 0.110 0.111 0.282 0.308 0.114 0.122 0.047 0.043 0.073 0.071
Note. "Good" is the good setting where each supply chain firm operations in a good state (2) at period 0. "Random" is the random 
setting where each firm's state is randomly assigned. Each result is an average of 200 runs of 365 period experiments. 
Panel 3. Standard deviation
Panel 1. Average of supply chain performance (S) per period
Panel 2. Average of (S/Smax) × 100% per period
RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6
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Table 3.4: Base case results for the performance ranking of the recovery strategies
Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random Good Random
DR1 7.307 7.169 9.655 9.534 7.977 7.977 8.123 8.121 10.000 10.000 9.992 9.992
DR2 7.566 7.490 9.019 9.012 7.296 7.308 7.332 7.326 9.634 9.618 9.606 9.608
DR3 5.011 5.000 5.003 4.992 5.008 5.003 5.003 4.992 1.218 1.197 1.216 1.192
DR4 5.000 5.000 4.992 4.986 5.000 5.000 4.993 4.984 1.175 1.169 1.186 1.167
DR5 5.492 5.462 6.874 6.826 7.612 7.614 7.736 7.744 9.041 9.034 9.021 9.029
DR6 7.296 7.295 9.060 8.980 7.285 7.306 7.330 7.326 9.615 9.616 9.611 9.599
DR7 9.592 9.570 9.596 9.592 5.743 5.741 5.121 5.099 7.784 7.611 4.078 3.969
DR8 5.462 5.493 6.112 6.049 5.280 5.269 5.033 5.030 6.300 6.271 6.134 6.078
DR9 5.477 5.389 6.056 6.036 5.277 5.282 5.021 5.040 6.312 6.289 6.097 6.110
DR10 6.870 6.781 8.473 8.395 6.748 6.751 6.780 6.789 9.526 9.527 9.441 9.440
DR1 7.003 6.684 9.408 9.353 7.901 7.904 8.067 8.058 10.000 10.000 9.981 9.984
DR2 7.155 7.114 8.738 8.762 7.175 7.203 7.193 7.166 9.575 9.555 9.532 9.540
DR3 5.003 4.997 4.980 4.973 5.000 5.000 4.988 4.980 1.143 1.135 1.153 1.115
DR4 5.000 5.000 4.973 4.969 5.000 5.000 4.978 4.970 1.110 1.101 1.121 1.118
DR5 5.256 5.214 6.648 6.685 7.570 7.563 7.685 7.703 8.995 8.997 8.980 8.982
DR6 6.880 6.945 8.753 8.699 7.155 7.173 7.243 7.174 9.552 9.552 9.536 9.533
DR7 9.544 9.507 9.559 9.543 5.688 5.699 5.056 5.047 7.184 7.040 3.564 3.416
DR8 5.110 5.067 5.789 5.775 5.180 5.189 4.941 4.918 6.125 6.099 5.944 5.859
DR9 5.149 5.164 5.747 5.681 5.208 5.190 4.908 4.927 6.147 6.141 5.907 5.864
DR10 6.529 6.455 8.162 8.092 6.647 6.666 6.675 6.675 9.477 9.480 9.345 9.358
DR1 6.425 6.167 9.280 9.214 7.834 7.837 8.021 8.030 10.000 10.000 9.974 9.975
DR2 6.918 6.871 8.552 8.527 7.095 7.059 7.099 7.086 9.529 9.492 9.433 9.510
DR3 5.000 4.997 4.958 4.948 5.000 5.000 4.978 4.958 1.111 1.101 1.114 1.066
DR4 5.000 5.000 4.963 4.951 5.000 5.000 4.966 4.953 1.069 1.075 1.067 1.088
DR5 5.036 5.041 6.522 6.558 7.512 7.530 7.664 7.675 8.975 8.960 8.927 8.936
DR6 6.488 6.833 8.611 8.440 7.058 7.092 7.156 7.122 9.523 9.500 9.500 9.471
DR7 9.503 9.475 9.523 9.500 5.627 5.638 5.021 5.003 6.843 6.651 2.988 3.032
DR8 4.907 4.943 5.573 5.488 5.141 5.123 4.870 4.833 5.956 6.037 5.766 5.689
DR9 4.993 5.012 5.471 5.466 5.174 5.151 4.821 4.818 6.008 5.997 5.733 5.711
DR10 6.051 6.264 7.907 7.912 6.549 6.585 6.606 6.611 9.451 9.462 9.277 9.307
DR1 4 5 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
DR2 2 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 2 3 3 2
DR3 7 9 10 10 9 9 7 7 9 9 9 10
DR4 7 8 9 9 9 9 8 8 10 10 10 9
DR5 6 6 6 6 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5
DR6 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 3
DR7 1 1 1 1 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 8
DR8 10 10 7 7 8 8 9 9 8 7 6 7
DR9 9 7 8 8 7 7 10 10 7 8 7 6
DR10 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4
Note. Each result is based on 200 runs of 365 period experiments.
Panel 4. Ranking of recovery strategy
Panel 3. The 1st percentile 
Panel 1. The 25th percentile 
Panel 2. The 5th percentile 
RC1 RC2 RC3 RC4 RC5 RC6
50
it is the most robust strategy because its worst performance still achieves the second place
among nine others. Following this logic, we examine the mean rankings of each recovery
strategy across all six resource consumption scenarios for the robustness analysis. We find
that a highly ranked strategy can e↵ectively restore the supply chain performance following
unanticipated disasters.
3.3.2 Experimental design
To characterize the range of recovery performance after unpredictable disasters and to assess
the impact of each parameter, we analyze the proposed model under a variety of parameter
instances (Montgomery, 2004). Hence, a full factorial design is employed to explore the
proposed model and to check whether the insights derived from the base case are applicable
in other circumstances as well. We examine 12 (= 2⇥ 3⇥ 2) parameter instances consisting
of every combination in Table 3.5. These parameter instances are selected to provide a
wide range of possible scenarios (i.e., a low-to-high resource increase per period,  , a small,
medium, or large supply chain size, N , and short-to-long simulated periods, T ). We run
each parameter instance 200 times to achieve statistical reliability. This computational anal-
ysis enables us to identify the underlying conditions for one recovery strategy to dominate
another.




∆  for resource 1, 10 
N  for size 3, 5, 10 
T  for period 365 days (1 year), 3650 days (10 years) 
 
Table 3.6 shows the impact of each experiment factor (parameter , N , or T ) on recovery
dynamics among the ten recovery strategies. We highlight the parameters that lead to
significant di↵erences in the performance ranking of recovery strategies at p < 0.05. We
find that chain size (N) has the greatest impact on the ranking of recovery strategies (seven
p-values are less than 0.05; three are not: DR1, DR3, and DR4) over the other two factors,
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Table 3.6: Impact of experimental parameters on the ranking of recovery strategies
Par value DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8 DR9 DR10
  {1} 1.500 2.778 8.625 8.736 4.514 3.444 5.069 7.472 7.694 4.708
(0.993) (0.716) (0.985) (1.492) (2.169) (1.362) (2.661) (1.233) (1.328) (0.458)
{10} 1.000 2.708 9.000 9.139 5.986 3.139 3.556 7.403 7.583 4.528
(0.000) (0.680) (0.000) (0.348) (0.118) (0.997) (1.288) (0.494) (0.496) (0.581)
N {3} 1.188 2.500 8.938 8.729 5.625 3.021 5.521 6.958 7.146 4.312
(0.571) (0.505) (0.522) (1.498) (1.721) (1.695) (2.052) (0.771) (0.743) (0.468)
{5} 1.271 2.625 8.979 9.146 5.271 3.042 4.208 7.333 7.646 4.812
(0.792) (0.761) (0.526) (0.545) (1.594) (0.713) (1.978) (0.630) (0.978) (0.394)
{10} 1.292 3.104 8.521 8.938 4.854 3.812 3.208 8.021 8.125 4.729
(0.849) (0.660) (0.945) (1.019) (1.726) (0.762) (2.021) (1.041) (1.024) (0.574)
T {365} 1.292 2.833 8.681 9.014 5.278 3.278 4.181 7.542 7.736 4.542
(0.759) (0.822) (0.728) (0.911) (1.762) (0.953) (2.381) (1.006) (1.061) (0.580)
{3650} 1.208 2.653 8.944 8.861 5.222 3.306 4.444 7.333 7.542 4.694
(0.730) (0.535) (0.690) (1.259) (1.646) (1.411) (2.048) (0.856) (0.934) (0.464)
Note. The ranking of recovery strategies is based on the 1st percentile of supply chain performance per
period on an average of the six resource consumption scenarios of the good and random initial state
settings; each is based on 200 runs of 12 experiments. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Recovery
strategies with smaller numbers rank higher in supply chain recovery performance, where 1 is the best
possible ranking.
resource increment ( ) and time (T ). Chain size has both positive and negative e↵ects
on supply chain performance and the resulting ranking of recovery strategies; for instance,
chain size has the strongest positive e↵ect in DR7 and DR5 as it increases their ranking
by 1.313 (= 5.521   3.208) and 0.771 (= 5.625   4.854), respectively. Chain size has the
strongest negative e↵ect in DR8, DR9, and DR6, as it decreases their ranking by 1.063
(= 8.021  6.958), 0.979 (= 8.125  7.146), and 0.791 (= 3.812  3.021), respectively. This
suggests that when the chain size grows larger, DR7 and DR5 will generate better supply
chain performance. In contrast, strategies that depend on the good state of immediate
neighbors (up- and down-stream) as a reference, such as DR6, DR8 and DR9, will lead to
inferior supply chain performance.
Table 3.6 also shows that resource increment ( ) is the second most influential moder-
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ating factor, where the e↵ects are significant for DR1, DR5 and DR7 with p < 0.05. The
resource increment appears to have a strong positive e↵ect on DR7 with a 1.513 increase in
ranking and on DR1 with a 0.5 increase. On the other hand, resource increment has a strong
negative moderating e↵ect on DR5 with a 1.472 decrease in ranking. Finally, the time pe-
riod (T ) has an insignificant impact (p > 0.05) on the ten recovery strategies’ performance
ranking. As a result, we omit parameter T in our discussion.
To illustrate the ranking of the ten recovery strategies, we provide a boxplot in Figure
3.2, where the robustness of each strategy is clearly expressed by its mean and variation
in their performance ranking. For example, DR1 is the most robust recovery strategy for
unanticipated disasters because it has the lowest mean values and a very small variation
in ranking, followed by DR2 and DR6. In contrast, DR3 and DR4 have poor supply chain
performance. DR10, DR5 and DR7 have relatively moderate rankings (despite DR7’s very
large variations). Table 3.6 and Figure 3.2 illustrate some interesting findings at a more
granular level, summarized as follows.









Figure 3.2: Boxplot of the 1st percentile performance ranking of recovery strategies.
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The firms using DR1 return to best supply chain performance following unanticipated
disasters when they have greater resource increments per period. This is in line with the
base-case result in that DR1 must consume a large amount of resources, and therefore ranks
lower under RC1 and RC2 than under the other four resource consumption scenarios. Yet
a small variance implies it has a consistently high recovery performance under the six RC
scenarios. In contrast, the amount of resources does not play a significant role in DR2
and DR6. These two strategies are more e↵ective in restoring supply chain performance
following unanticipated disasters as the number of firms in a supply chain decreases from
ten to five (or three).
The robustness of DR5 and DR7 is dependent on both the amount of resource increments
and the supply chain size. In DR5, the supply chain’s recovery performance increases as
the chain size increases, yet decreases as the amount of resource increments increases. In
contrast, a large supply chain using DR7 is likely to have better recovery performance when
firms receive greater resource increments per period. While the resource impact of DR7 is
similar to DR1, the supply chain’s recovery performance is more sensitive to chain size when
the supply chain’s firms incrementally returns to a good state than rapidly and radically
returning to a good state following a disaster.
DR8, DR9, and DR10 show consistent ranking patterns suggesting that the chain size is a
significant factor of influencing supply chain recovery performance, which negatively a↵ects
the performance following unanticipated disasters. This pattern for these three strategies
reinforces our findings observed in strategies DR2 and DR6 that when a supply chain grows
larger, if firms use the state of their adjacent upstream and downstream neighbors as a
benchmark, the overall recovery performance decreases.
Finally, DR3 and DR4 are not responsive to the resource increment and chain size
parameters, and they are less robust than the other eight recovery strategies that rank 9
and 10 in average.
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3.4 Robustness of the model and insights
Thus far, we have examined supply chain performance in which all member firms implement
an identical rule over time based on CA convention. In this section, we extend our model
settings to incorporate plausible real-world situations to investigate the robustness of the
findings in Section 3.3. That is, we relax the identical rule assumption and allow member
firms to make stochastic decision rules during the simulation period. This model further
validates our understanding of the robustness of each proposed recovery strategy against
disruptions caused by unanticipated disasters, obtained in Section 3.3.
This model extension specifies that member firms in a supply chain implement het-
erogeneous recovery strategies over time, which impacts the chain’s overall performance.
Specifically, we introduce a new decision rule, DR11, which is a function of the discrete
probability distribution of the ten recovery strategies (Table 3.1). Supply chain firms that
adopt DR11 can change a selected recovery strategy at each time period based on its recov-
ery performance in the preceding period. The rationale for DR11 is that firms are inclined to
choose a recovery strategy that has been proven e↵ective to restore supply chain performance
following a disaster.
DR11 begins with period 0, where member firms select one of the ten strategies, DR1 to
DR10, each strategy with an equal probability 0.1 of being selected. If the chosen strategy
improves supply chain performance from the previous period, then, at period 1 its probability
increases to 0.109, taking 0.001 from each of the other nine (not chosen) strategies. That
is, the probabilities are no longer equally distributed among the ten strategies: one has a
probability of 0.109 and nine have the probability of 0.009. As a result, the proven robust
recovery strategy (the one with probability 0.109) has a larger chance of being chosen again
in the subsequent period. For instance, DR1 is robust in most scenarios (see Figure 3.2);
therefore, DR1 is likely to become the dominant strategy once it is selected. In contrast,
consider a scenario where a strategy is constantly passed by member firms or fails to generate
positive supply chain performance. Its probability diminishes as time proceeds and will
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Table 3.7: Impact of experimental parameters on the ranking of the stochastic decision rule
Par value DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8 DR9 DR10 DR11
  {1} 1.528 2.944 9.611 10.014 5.347 3.375 5.708 8.472 8.694 5.097 4.972
(1.061) (0.837) (0.972) (1.081) (2.579) (0.926) (3.208) (1.233) (1.328) (0.754) (1.363)
{10} 1.000 2.875 10.000 10.139 6.806 3.306 3.889 8.403 8.583 4.694 5.347
(0.000) (0.711) (0.000) (0.348) (0.432) (0.973) (1.588) (0.494) (0.496) (0.799) (1.620)
N {3} 1.479 2.750 9.521 9.917 5.562 3.104 5.438 8.604 8.812 4.771 5.542
(1.010) (0.786) (0.850) (1.069) (2.475) (0.857) (2.946) (1.180) (1.249) (0.831) (0.743)
{5} 1.188 2.979 10.104 10.292 6.312 3.521 4.417 8.083 8.250 4.875 5.417
(0.673) (0.887) (0.371) (0.544) (1.776) (1.031) (2.916) (0.647) (0.729) (0.761) (1.674)
{10} 1.125 3.000 9.792 10.021 6.354 3.396 4.542 8.625 8.854 5.042 4.521
(0.606) (0.619) (0.713) (0.668) (1.509) (0.917) (2.021) (0.815) (0.850) (0.798) (1.701)
T {365} 1.319 2.833 9.681 10.014 5.861 3.306 4.514 8.542 8.736 4.708 5.861
(0.853) (0.822) (0.728) (0.911) (2.085) (0.988) (2.778) (1.006) (1.061) (0.795) (0.810)
{3650} 1.208 2.986 9.931 10.139 6.292 3.375 5.083 8.333 8.542 5.083 4.458
(0.730) (0.722) (0.678) (0.678) (1.865) (0.911) (2.572) (0.856) (0.934) (0.765) (1.703)
Note. The experimental settings are identical to those in Table 3.6.
eventually become extinct.
We examine 12 (= 2⇥3⇥2) parameter instances consisting of every combination (see Ta-
ble 3.5) and analyze the impact of parameters  , N and T on the eleven recovery strategies,
as illustrated in Table 3.7. The patterns in DR1 to DR10 are predominantly consistent with
those in Table 3.6, showing the reliability of our chief findings in Section 3. However, di↵er-
ent from the results of those ten strategies, time is a significant factor of DR11. Specifically,
member firms adopting DR11 return to a better recovery performance when the simulated
period is 10 years. Specifically, we observe a large increase in DR11’s performance ranking
1.403 (= 5.861   4.458) because it takes the robust strategies such as DR1 and DR2 some
time to dominate the others (e.g., DR3 and DR4) and achieve a high supply chain recovery
performance. As illustrated in Figure 3.3, DR1 ranks higher than DR11, yet DR11 can
perform slightly better than DR5 and DR7. These observations support our main result (in
Section 3.3) – that the radical recovery strategy (DR1) is most robust in resolving supply
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chain functioning following unanticipated disasters.









Figure 3.3: Boxplot of the 1st percentile performance ranking of the stochastic decision rule.
In summary, the chief insights we derived from Section 3.3 are generally consistent with
the extension of the stochastic decision rule.
3.5 Case study and model validation
In this section, we use the case of Taiwan’s 2011 food contamination scandal to validate our
findings on the robustness of supply chain recovery strategies in a real-world setting. This
food safety scandal arose when Taiwan’s health department discovered that upstream firms
had used an industrial plasticizer, DEHP, rather than the customary palm oil in food and
drinks as a clouding agent and to reduce costs (Economist, 11/06/2011). Evidence shows
that repeated exposure to DEHP among children could lead to cancer and developmental
problems as it a↵ects hormones. The customers, both locally and globally, stopped buying
those contaminated products and were in shock and panic about the fact that these two
firms’ immoral conduct had gone unnoticed for two decades. The discovery and ensuing
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embargo on the contaminated foods severely damaged major food and drink supply chains
in Taiwan; the food contaminated an estimated 780 products including beverages, soda fruit
juices, sports drinks, tea, jam, syrups, health supplements, pastries, and yoghurt powder
(TaipeiTimes, 05/06/2011).
3.5.1 Background and parameter settings
The food scandal was exposed on May 23, 2011, a↵ecting five echelons of member firms, the
DEHP supplier, emulsifier supplier who substituted palm oil with the toxic plasticizer (Yu
Shen Chemical Co.), food ingredient supplier (Seicheng Biotechnology Group), manufacturer
(Triko Foods Co.), and retailer (7-Eleven), i.e., N = 5. As the downstream firms claimed
innocence, their investment in mitigating food safety risk was small or   = 1. Taiwan’s
health department had carried out a large-scale domestic food inspection for approximately
one month from May 23 until June 18, 2011 (T = 27), up to 465,638 bottles of DEHP-tained
beverages had been taken o↵ from shelves, after which the department declared that food
products should be relatively safe.
In order to amid the food safety scares, the supply chain firms took a radical strat-
egy (i.e., DR1) to restore customer confidence. Specifically, the manufacturer immediately
stopped production and sales of all of its manufacturing processes, recalled the tailed prod-
ucts and voluntarily submitted their products to government inspectors for DEHP test; the
retailer pulled the tailed products from its shelves without sending the foods through DEHP
tests. The manufacturer and retailer’s rapid, radical, yet costly recovery actions of pulling
o↵ the food enabled them to maintain day-to-day operations. However, this hazardous
event had dented Taiwan’s once good reputation as a reliable and safe exporter of food.
Several countries banned Taiwanese food imports, such as Malaysia (which lifted its import
restriction in March 2012) and Singapore (which dropped its restrictions in March 2012).
So, reinstating the supply chain’s reputations worldwide cost even more than the actions of




. A fundamental and cheap solution was available when the
government enforced new food safety regulations – The manufacturer and retailer knocked
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out the unscrupulous emulsifier supplier and replaced it with other reliable firms. This case
study’s resource consumption scenario is similar to RC4 so we adopt it in the section. Based
on the above information, we use this case to verify our findings, obtained by our formal
modeling, on the robustness of recovery strategies for restoring supply chain performance
following this specific disaster.
3.5.2 Model validation
Figure 3.4 illustrates the supply chain recovery performance based on the parameter settings
considered in the Taiwan food disaster case study. In addition to the adopted radical
recovery strategy (DR1), we also include the recovery performance resulting from the five




























Note. The parameters used in the Taiwan food disaster case study are N = 5,   = 1, T = 27, f = 17/365.
A small   can also mean that when food supply chains encounter a safety disaster, they rarely receive
government or humanitarian support for recovery. si(0) = 0 and RC4 is applied.
Figure 3.4: Simulating 1st percentile supply chain performance for the case study of Taiwan’s
2011 food scandal.
It is clear that DR1 is more e↵ective and robust than the other five strategies in the
Taiwan food disaster case in terms of restoring supply chain’s performance following the
disaster. In other words, supply chains are more likely to return to their pre-disrupted
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condition when using DR1. This result is in line with the findings in Figure 3.2: the rad-
ical recovery strategy, in general, dominates other strategies (e.g., DR2, DR5, and DR6)
in which firms use their neighbors’ state as a reference. In fact, the Taiwan’s food supply
chain recovered well from this disaster by containing the devastated impact to the emulsifier
supplier by quickly excluding them from the supply chain. We can predict that an incre-
mental strategy, DR7, which carries out recovery activities in a gradual manner, does not
reinstate consumers’ confidence as well as other strategies, as evidenced by the low ranking
in Figure 6. Likewise, strategies such as DR8, in which firms adjust only to the state of one
upstream firm (in the Taiwan case, that would be the dishonest supplier), would halt the
entire supply chain. In summary, as the main insight generated in our formal analysis, the
radical recovery strategy, DR1, is most e↵ective in preventing a crisis from escalating and
in recovering the supply chain to a good state.
3.6 Discussion and managerial implications
In this section, we discuss the findings and their empirical and management implications.
The simulation outcomes, illustrated in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, suggest that DR1 is the most
e↵ective strategy for recovering from unanticipated disasters (since we consider only the 1st
percentile results as our performance measure). Results also suggest a rather small variation
in DR1’s performance ranking in comparison to the other nine strategies. Consistent with
Chopra and Sodhi’s (2014) strategy on regionalizing the supply chain, the radical recovery
strategy DR1 will mitigate the negative impact of disruptions caused by unanticipated
disasters within the a↵ected region because one bad-stated firm will not drag the entire
supply chain down. In other words, the supply chain becomes less fragile as the devastating
impact of a disruption will be halted quickly, and will not spread to all member firms. Table
3.6 shows that the robustness of DR1 increases in resource increments per period (parameter
 ). Table 3.4 reports no clear relationship between the initial states of firms (i.e., either good
or randomly assigned) and supply chain performance following the simulations. From this,
we can infer that recovery strategies have a greater impact on supply chain performance
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than do resource consumption scenarios and the firms’ initial states. Drawing on these
findings, we propose the following observations:
Observation 1a. A supply chain is robust against disruptions from unanticipated disasters
if each supply chain member employs a radical recovery strategy aimed to return to a good
state following a disruption.
Observation 1b. The robustness of the radical recovery strategy increases with resource
increment.
Our analysis statistically demonstrates that the radical strategy (DR1) is the most ef-
fective among the nine others for supply chains striving to recover from an unanticipated
disaster, no matter how serious the disaster is. However, using the radical strategy may be
unrealistic in practice due to the high level of resource consumption (high costs) that a firm
must invest in order to return to a good state after a disruption (i.e., in RC1 and RC2).
Therefore, we search for alternative recovery strategies under scenarios RC1 and RC2. We
first consider DR2 and find that it generates the best recovery performance among the ten
strategies (see panel 4 of Table 3.4). As reported in Table 3.6, benchmarking recovery
strategy leads to better performance following unanticipated disasters when the chain size
is small. This leads to the next observation,
Observation 2a. A supply chain is robust against disruptions caused by unanticipated dis-
asters if firms employ a recovery strategy using the strategy of at most one neighboring firm
with good performance as a benchmark to improve their operational performance following
a disruption.
Observation 2b. The robustness of the benchmarking recovery strategy in a supply chain
decreases as the chain size increases.
We now consider DR7 that firms take recovery activities incrementally. Similar to DR2,
we find that DR7 can perform well under RC1 or RC2 (for details, see panels 3 and 4 of
Table 3.4 and Figure 3.2). In other words, DR7 is quite e↵ective in recovering from extreme
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disasters when the recovery process that involves changing a firm’s state from bad (0) to
good (2) requires plenty of resources. If this resource consumption condition does not hold,
the performance of the incremental recovery strategy is not as good as most other recovery
strategies. Also, we find that the robustness of DR7 increases as the chain size (N) increases,
as shown in Table 3.6. Formally,
Observation 3a. Supply chain performance following unanticipated disasters is sensitive
to resource consumption requirements for recovery when an incremental recovery strategy is
employed by each supply chain member.
Observation 3b. The robustness of an incremental recovery strategy increases as the size
of the supply chain increases.
The insights from the analysis and discussion are distilled into a conceptual framework
in Figure 3.5, which provides managerial insights in the demarcating regions of robustness
of a supply chain’s various recovery strategy options. Specifically, the radical strategy is
the best recovery option for scenarios in which the resource consumption requirements are
relatively low for recovery activities from a bad state (0) to a good state (2). A benchmarking
strategy is a good option for a small supply chain with high recovery resource needs. When
the supply chain size is large and the recovery resource consumption requirements are high,
the use of incremental recovery strategy among member firms in a supply chain is expected
to outperform all the nine other strategies.
This chapter contributes to the literature by examining the robustness of practical sup-
ply chain strategies for recovering from unanticipated disasters in a dynamic setting. We
develop a supply chain model of unanticipated disasters using cellular automata (CA), a
complex adaptive system found in nature (Miller and Page, 2007). The proposed CA model
incorporates the spirit of behavioral game theory as do past studies (e.g., Xiao and Yu, 2006;
Gintis, 2009) and the key features extracted from real-world supply chain recovery activities
(e.g., Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Rogers, 2012). Our stylized, behavioral model depicts the dy-



































Figure 3.5: Robust supply chain recovery strategies.
disasters. Through carefully chosen computational analysis, we uncover the weaknesses of
popular incremental strategies for supply chain recovery when the chain size is relatively
small. We further find that supply chain member firms using a radical recovery strategy can
help maintain a positive supply chain performance over time. Counterintuitively, playing
strategically for recovery by looking at what one’s neighbors do in a large supply chain may
hurt the entire supply chain’s performance in the long run.
3.7 Supplementary Notes













2 {1, 8, 10}. Together with the func-






2 {1, 2, 10}, our study considers a
wide range of possible resource consumption scenarios. Following the experimental design
in Section 3.3.2, we apply C and C, respectively, to verify the robustness of recovery strate-
gies to restore supply chain performance following unanticipated disasters. The results are
consistent with the findings in Section 3.3.
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2 {1, 5, 10})
Par value DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8 DR9 DR10
  {1} 2.417 3.125 7.958 7.986 4.889 3.361 5.014 7.417 7.444 5.347
(3.015) (1.034) (2.185) (2.635) (2.678) (1.011) (2.976) (1.123) (1.277) (1.090)
{10} 1.000 2.875 9.000 9.181 5.944 3.083 3.583 7.403 7.583 4.500
(0.000) (0.786) (0.000) (0.387) (0.285) (1.045) (1.275) (0.494) (0.496) (0.605)
N {3} 1.771 2.688 8.500 8.521 5.938 2.833 5.104 7.250 7.354 4.500
(2.299) (0.776) (1.726) (2.114) (1.405) (1.018) (2.205) (0.758) (1.041) (1.130)
{5} 1.688 2.917 8.604 8.458 5.479 2.938 4.333 7.417 7.583 5.104
(2.233) (0.895) (1.634) (1.967) (2.000) (0.836) (2.157) (0.942) (0.794) (0.515)
{10} 1.667 3.396 8.333 8.771 4.833 3.896 3.458 7.562 7.604 5.167
(2.234) (0.962) (1.534) (1.848) (2.282) (0.905) (2.551) (0.873) (1.047) (1.038)
T {365} 1.736 3.167 8.361 8.597 5.333 3.333 4.208 7.458 7.514 4.875
(2.270) (0.993) (1.698) (2.080) (2.014) (1.187) (2.367) (0.887) (1.075) (1.100)
{3650} 1.681 2.833 8.597 8.569 5.500 3.111 4.389 7.361 7.514 4.972
(2.226) (0.822) (1.553) (1.868) (1.936) (0.848) (2.430) (0.844) (0.856) (0.839)
Note. The experimental settings are identical to those in Table 3.6.









Figure 3.6: Boxplot of the ranking of recovery strategies under C.
64
First, C is applied so that the overall resource consumption requirement for recovery
increases in comparison to C. As illustrated in Table 3.8, resource increment (parameter
 ) and chain size (parameter N) both have significant impacts on the performance ranking
of the recovery strategies, where time period (parameter T ) does not impose a significant
impact. Figure 3.6 further shows that the radical recovery stately (DR1) and the bench-
marking recovery strategy (DR2) are the most robust to restore supply chain performance
following unanticipated disasters. Further, DR1’s ranking outcome increases as the resource
increment increases; DR2’s ranking outcome increases as the chain size decreases. On the
other hand, the performance ranking of the incremental recovery strategy (DR7) increases
in chain size, yet is sensitive to the resource consumption scenarios (as evidenced by the
large variability of its boxplot). These findings are consistent with the results in Section 3.3
and the derived observations in Section 3.6.






2 {1, 8, 10})
Par value DR1 DR2 DR3 DR4 DR5 DR6 DR7 DR8 DR9 DR10
  {1} 3.306 3.500 7.125 7.194 5.542 3.736 4.403 7.181 7.375 5.514
(3.347) (0.993) (2.818) (3.450) (3.314) (1.267) (3.300) (0.998) (0.926) (0.904)
{10} 1.000 2.681 9.000 9.167 5.944 3.250 3.569 7.556 7.431 4.514
(0.000) (0.747) (0.000) (0.375) (0.231) (1.031) (1.287) (0.500) (0.499) (0.556)
N {3} 2.125 2.750 8.042 7.979 6.167 3.083 5.021 7.208 7.375 4.688
(2.598) (0.786) (2.315) (2.740) (2.046) (1.334) (2.329) (0.824) (0.815) (1.206)
{5} 2.167 3.042 8.021 8.125 5.771 3.229 3.979 7.438 7.396 5.250
(2.668) (0.922) (2.178) (2.695) (2.425) (1.016) (2.320) (0.712) (0.707) (0.438)
{10} 2.167 3.479 8.125 8.438 5.292 4.167 2.958 7.458 7.438 5.104
(2.668) (1.052) (2.140) (2.509) (2.518) (0.834) (2.551) (0.874) (0.712) (0.805)
T {365} 2.139 3.208 7.986 8.208 5.625 3.639 4.000 7.389 7.319 4.944
(2.613) (1.020) (2.211) (2.690) (2.486) (1.325) (2.573) (0.848) (0.688) (0.963)
{3650} 2.167 2.972 8.139 8.153 5.861 3.347 3.972 7.347 7.486 5.083
(2.659) (0.903) (2.197) (2.604) (2.216) (0.995) (2.506) (0.772) (0.787) (0.835)
Note. The experimental settings are identical to those in Table 3.6.






2 {1, 8, 10},
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an even higher resource consumption requirement than C and C. In this case, recovery
activities mostly cost the firm a huge amount of resource units. In Table 3.9 we observe
that firms’ adopting a radical recovery strategy achieve the best recovery performance when
the resource increment is high. Additionally, the performance ranking of the benchmarking
recovery strategy, DR2, decreases in chain size; the incremental recovery strategy, DR7
increases in chain size. In spite of DR7’s large variability, these three strategies are generally
robust and have high ranking outcomes, as illustrated in Figure 3.7.
In sum, the observations we derived from Section 3.3 are preserved under various resource
consumption requirements.
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Figure 3.7: Boxplot of the ranking of recovery strategies under C.
Chapter 4
Resolving the altruist’s dilemma: Towards a the-
ory of altruistic entrepreneurship in times of dis-
aster
4.1 Introduction
We, humans, live in a world that is fraught with dangers and disasters. Throughout the
history, nature-made and man-made disasters have repeatedly destroyed cities and lives,
and even wiped many civilizations. Despite its centrality to societies and organizations, the
behavioral aspect amid disasters is under-researched and has, to-date, remained a mystery.
The quest for knowledge about this disaster-prone world calls for more studies beyond
Gaussian averages (i.e., “at the tail of the bell curve”).
This study of disasters is intertwined with two research streams: entrepreneurship and
altruism. Disasters create recovery “opportunities” for potential economic, social and envi-
ronmental value creation (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). In pursuit of such opportunities,
actors (e.g., people, teams, firms) need to bear uncertainty, create value, and importantly,
motivate to improve the welfare of other actors or known as altruism (Nowak, 2006; Penner
et al., 2005). Christopher Girdwood and his Recovery Pledge is a notable example of pur-
suing altruistic opportunities to address disastrous events. Recovery Pledge is founded to
help small businesses recover from disasters by connecting them with customers to stabilize
their sales. Specifically, a customer can purchase recovery pledges once a disaster occurs,
which are the vouchers for the goods and services that are produced by small businesses in
need (recoverypledge.com). His/her consumption behavior not only satisfies personal needs,
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but also o↵ers cash to small businesses that is essential to their recovery from a disaster. In
other words, recovery pledges build a reciprocal relationship between customers and small
businesses in times of disasters. In this sense, Recovery Pledge identified and exploited this
opportunity to launch a crowd-funding campaign in pursuit of both customer satisfaction
and small business survival.
The role of altruism has been recently recognized in the study of entrepreneurship (Shep-
herd and Patzelt, 2011). In times of disaster, altruistic behavior is essentially entrepreneurial
as it involves bearing uncertainty through expending resources and e↵orts to save/help oth-
ers instead of accumulating them for self benefits; absorbing sunk costs of (possibly) not
receiving any reciprocal help from others in future disasters; and, creating entrepreneurial
spill over as it can stimulate others to behave in a similar manner. Given the interface
between entrepreneurship and altruism in the context of disasters, we introduce altruism-
related variables such as benefit-cost ratio, the average number of neighbors in the networked
system, and di↵erent beliefs of discovering and exploiting recovery opportunities, to extend
the theory of entrepreneurial action into the context of disasters.
We conduct this study using a two-dimensional cellular automata (CA) model, which
is a special type of agent-based computational model and mimics the real-world supply
network disruptions. Our CA model is structured as a network of interconnected actors,
each with east, west, south, and north neighbors that are hit by disasters with minor and
major probabilities. Actors are given opportunity beliefs with di↵erent levels of altruistic
reciprocity and each entrepreneurial act is influenced by di↵erent opportunity evaluation
rules and cost scenarios for recovery. In this chapter, we are interested in how altruistic
reciprocity can provide a deeper understanding of the entrepreneurial action process.
Our results provide a clear view of what might be called the strong altruistic en-
trepreneurship hypothesis. Our simulation analysis demonstrates how altruistic opportunity
beliefs generate better recovery performance than the non-altruistic opportunity beliefs un-
der many cost scenarios. Through this study, we discover that the processes leading to
entrepreneurial recovery action and ultimately the collective value creation is strongly mod-
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erated by the joint altruistic reciprocity, cost scenarios for recovery, and network size (i.e.,
the number of actors in the network). These results resolves the “altruists dilemma” by
highlighting the boundary conditions of altruistic entrepreneurship in times of disaster. Our
findings advance entrepreneurship research by linking the theories of entrepreneurial action
and altruistic reciprocity for better explaining entrepreneurial processes and outcomes in
the context of disasters.
4.2 Altruistic Entrepreneurship
Altruism, the desire to help others at one’s own costs (Nowak, 2006; Penner et al., 2005), has
been acknowledged as a driver to motivate opportunity recognition (Patzelt and Shepherd,
2011; Zahra et al., 2009). The reciprocal altruism theory in evolutionary research (Axelrod
and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006; Trivers, 1971) posit that altruistic actions occur and
evolve only under highly specialized circumstance where the altruists act will eventually
returned to him/her and confer (directly or indirectly) its benefit (Nowak et al., 2010; Penner
et al., 2005; Trivers, 1971). In other words, reciprocity forms the motive future benefits of
an altruistic action will compensate the current sacrifice to help others. Following McMullen
and Shepherd (2006) and Haynie et al. (2009), altruistic reciprocity essentially constructs
the entrepreneurial action decision as future-oriented judgment on “feasibility” (costs to
help others are a↵ordable given the existing resource endowments) and “desirability” (can
fulfill the underlying reciprocal motive). We therefore consider altruistic reciprocity an
mechanism for explain why some actors act entrepreneurially whereas others are not in
times of disasters.
We define altruistic entrepreneurial action as behavior in response to a judgmental de-
cision under uncertainty about a possible opportunity for reciprocal benefits. According to
the reciprocal altruism theory, an altruistic entrepreneurial action occurs when the benefit-
to-cost ratio, b/c, exceeds the average number of neighbors, w, in the network (i.e., b/c > w),
where c is the cost to the altruist for helping others, and b is the benefit to the recipient in
expectation of returning back to the altruist (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006;
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Ohtsuki et al., 2006). Follow this logic, altruistic entrepreneurial action is inherently long-
term self-serving since it is motivated by potential future benefits derived from reciprocity
(Kenrick et al., 2009; Trivers, 1971).
The notion of reciprocity distinguishes altruistic entrepreneurial action from action taken
by social entrepreneurs. Although both types of action take others’ benefit into account,
social entrepreneurship literature always emphasizes compassion – unselfish sacrifice of self
benefits to create social values (Penner et al., 2005; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2011), which does
not impose strong assumption on reciprocal return. It expects capable social entrepreneurs
to scarify self to develop benefits to weak others for the sake of social wealth creation. Herein,
the underlying motivation is to develop benefit for ‘others’ to address social problems and
achieve fairness (Austin et al., 2006). In contrast, altruistic entrepreneurial action focuses on
the long-term personal benefit. It can emerge as a direct consequence of the “selfish”motive
of a rational player (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Nowak, 2006). Either economic wealth,
or social wealth, or both can drive the altruistic act, as long as altruistic entrepreneurs
perceive satisfactory benefits feedback from such actions. Put it simple, do onto others as
s/he would have others do unto s/he.
Additionally, altruistic entrepreneurial action di↵erentiates itself from commercial ac-
tions in terms of the altruistic motive. According to Austin et al. (2006), commercial
entrepreneurs pursue personal economic gains. Altruistic acts incurring sacrifice are detri-
mental to this goal, hence barely taken by commercial entrepreneurs. Yet the altruistic
entrepreneur’s desire to help others will motive such actions (Penner et al., 2005). And
the reciprocal feedback further allows him/her to tolerant short-term sacrifice and create
mutual benefits in the long run (Kenrick et al., 2009; Ohtsuki et al., 2006). As a result, we
expect altruistic entrepreneurs to recognize more opportunities since they pay attention to
changes in not only his/her but also others business environment. This is consistent with
anecdotal evidence in the entrepreneurship literature that emphasizes altruism as motivat-
ing opportunity recognition (Austin et al., 2006; Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011; Zahra et al.,
2009).
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Above we have illustrated the altruistic reciprocity mechanism to stimulate entrepreneurial
actions, and how such actions are di↵erent from social and commercial actions. Building
on the reciprocal altruism theory and entrepreneurship literatures, we define altruistic en-
trepreneurship as the study of recognition and evaluation of altruistic opportunity, and the
mobilization of resources and e↵orts in pursuit of reciprocal benefits for self and others.
The process involves identifying altruistic opportunity for someone (third-person altruistic
opportunity), evaluating whether the opportunity is reciprocal to him/her self (first-person
altruistic opportunity), engaging or disengaging from altruistic action by mobilizing re-
sources and e↵orts with uncertain outcomes and payo↵s (altruistic entrepreneurial action).
Specifically, actors need to escape ignorance in order to detect a third-person altruistic
opportunity (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Shepherd et al., 2007). On one hand, agents
who attend to the reputation of potential partners and their encounter history are more likely
to figure out an opportunity to reciprocate (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Ohtsuki et al.,
2006). Reciprocity is indeed an obligation derived from a history of exchanges and favors
(Trivers, 1971). Actors who have su cient memory and knowledge on what others have done
to them are more likely to detect an altruistic opportunity. On the other hand, the motive of
helping others and receiving equivalent repayment will direct focused attention. Following
Nowak and May (1993) and Nowak (2006), a robust strategy for altruistic entrepreneurs is
as follow: if the reciprocal motive is fulfilled, the actor will continue the altruistic actions;
if the partner cheats, the agent will stop his/her altruistic move until the partner starts to
repay the benefit.
Given the recognition of third-person altruistic opportunity, actors next need to overcome
doubt in order to form a first-person altruistic opportunity (Shepherd et al., 2007). The
doubt is derived from the time lag one helps the other and must wait a period of time
before s/he is helped in turn (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971). Therefore, agents
enhance the feasibility of the altruistic opportunity with the knowledge, skills, and abilities
to shorten the time lag, so that the resources are adequate to support his/her own value
creation during this waiting period. Meanwhile, agents assess the desirability of acting on a
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third-person opportunity, i.e. action threshold (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). In the long
run, an agent surrounded by other altruists is more likely to detect altruistic opportunity
since the reciprocal return can be secured (Ohtsuki et al., 2006). And reciprocal altruistic
actions are most desirable within a long-lived community where agents have an opportunity
to interact not once but frequently (Nowak et al., 2010).
We next formalize the altruistic entrepreneurial action process in times of disasters. In
particular, seven beliefs on the existence of entrepreneurial opportunity are introduced that
vary in the level of altruistic reciprocity, such that we can explore the robustness of altruistic
entrepreneurship in the following sections.
4.3 Model
Following Robertson and Caldart (2009) and Yang and Chandra (2013), we consider en-
trepreneurial dynamics of networked actors that evolve over discrete time steps. The actors
populate a two-dimensional network in our model, which includes K rows and N columns,
thus a size of K ⇥N . The network is unwrapped so that there are “walls” around the edge
of the network. This could represent the bounded organizational and market landscape in
which the interdependent decision-making on entrepreneurial recovery actions takes place
after disasters (Parker, 2008). Without the loss of generality, we model the standard von
Neumann neighborhood where an actor interacts with his/her two row neighbors to the
east and west, as well as two column neighbors to the south and north, see Figure 4.1a for
an example of an actor at column n 2 {1, · · · , N} and row k 2 {1, · · · , K}. (Note that
actors at the edge will have less neighbors.) Together their unique interactions influence the
network’s overall entrepreneurial value creation.
In our stylized model, the actors can have poor, fair, or good entrepreneurial states by
taking recovery actions, designated by 0, 1 and 2. A good state (2) indicates entrepreneurial
growth or value creation. At the other extreme, a poor state (0) stands for entrepreneurial
failure or severe damage to the actor’s value. Then a fair state (1) represents the intermediate











Figure 4.1: The standard von Neumann neighborhood.
an actor’s post-recovery state at time t  1 by  n,k(t  1) 2 {0, 1, 2}, where t 2 {1, · · · , T}
indicates the simulation period.
Disasters may sway the network and damage the actor’s entrepreneurial state from the
preceding period. We denote this prior-recovery state (post disaster) at period t by  n,k(t) 2
{0, 1, 2}. To make it simple, each networked actor has a probability ✓
0
of being hit by ‘major’
disasters and a probability ✓
1
of being a↵ected by ‘minor’ disasters at each period. The two
types of disasters vary in the levels of severity. Specifically, encountering a major disaster
at period t, an actor’s prior-recovery state is
 n,k(t) = 0,
regardless of recovery e↵orts in the preceding period,  n,k(t  1); whereas su↵ering a minor
disaster at period t, an actor’s prior-recovery state is
 n,k(t) = [ n,k(t  1)  1] _ 0,
where a _ b := max{a, b} for a, b 2 R.
Entrepreneurial actions are taken to improve the prior-recovery states. So an entrepreneurial
opportunity is the attainment of the good state post recovery. In this chapter, we consider
altruistic reciprocity a mechanism that facilitates the actors’ recognition of entrepreneurial
opportunities in the network. An altruistic actor shares his/her information and experi-
ences with each neighbor at a cost of c and help them explore the benefit (b) of achieving
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the good-recovery state. In other words, the altruist’s cost and the recipient’s benefits are
measured in terms of entrepreneurial opportunities. We say the benefits can be reciprocated
if b/c > w, as with Lieberman et al. (2005), Nowak (2006), and Ohtsuki et al. (2006), where
w is the number of neighbors. We define the overall entrepreneurial states of networked







4.3.1 Recognizing third-person opportunities
Entrepreneurial opportunities arise from disaster-caused state changes. Someone who re-
ceives possible help from neighbors is more likely to acknowledge an opportunity. In the
network setting, we separate the benefits acquired from the row neighbors and those from
the column neighbors such that each actor can be exposed to a large pool of third-person
opportunities. As illustrated in Figure 4.1b, we denote the possible opportunity identified in
the row and column by hn,k(t) and vn,k(t), individually. Following CA modeling convention,
we assume that each actor’s entrepreneurial action is controlled by a fixed, homogeneous
rule, and that this rule uses the pre-recovery state of the actor and the pre-recovery states of
its two adjacent row- (or column-) neighbors to determine the new state. In this sense, our
model can be viewed as a modeling framework of behavioral game theory similar to nonlin-
ear dynamic systems, following the principle of cognitive limits in human and organizational
decision-making and judgement (see Gintis, 2009; Robertson and Caldart, 2009).
Theoretically, a decision rule is a mapping of each possible input state,  j,k(t), j 2
{n   1, n, n + 1} ( n,l(t), l 2 {k   1, k, k + 1}), to an output state, hn,k(t) (vn,k(t)), for
every actor in the network. A decision rule thus specifies a belief on the existence of a
third-person entrepreneurial opportunity following a disaster. Following the modeling prac-
tice for complex adaptive systems (Miller and Page, 2007; Gintis, 2009), we choose seven
possible rules (or opportunity beliefs) in this chapter based on their similarity to real-world
decision making in times of disasters. In particular, to examine the e↵ectiveness of altru-
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istic entrepreneurial actions, we deliberately consider both opportunity beliefs that satisfy
altruistic reciprocity (i.e., b/c > w), namely altruistic opportunity beliefs, and opportunity
beliefs that go against altruistic reciprocity (i.e., b/c  w), namely non-altruistic opportu-
nity beliefs. Table 4.1 illustrates the seven beliefs selected, which determine each actor’s
identification of entrepreneurial opportunities at period t (i.e., hn,k(t) = 2, vn,k(t) = 2).
4.3.2 Evaluating and exploiting first-person opportunities
After identifying possible opportunities based on hn,k(t) and vn,k(t), an actor next must
choose one among the possible courses of actions (Haynie et al., 2009; Shepherd et al.,
2007). Specifically, we consider the actor’s commitment to either pursue the best possible
state post recovery regardless of the possible time lag of receiving reciprocal return (i.e., the
max-rule)
 n,k(t) = max{hn,k(t), vn,k(t)},
or act conservatively subject to the concerns on time lag (i.e., the min-rule)
⇥n,k(t) = min{hn,k(t), vn,k(t)},
such that  n,k(t) 2 { n,k(t),⇥n,k(t)}. Table 4.1 illustrates these two rules on evaluating first
person opportunities. In general,  n,k(t) is easily determined if hn,k(t) and vn,k(t) return the
same entrepreneurial state. Otherwise, the actor needs to chose between these two possible
future states.
Additionally, it is essential for the actors to examine their possessed value since they can
only act upon feasible opportunities. An actor’s value at period t is
Un,k(t) = Un,k(t  1) +   C( n,k(t), n,k(t)),
where parameter   is the increase in value per period, and parameter C is the cost function
for an actor with prior-recovery state  n,k(t) to reach post-recovery state  n,k(t). This cost
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Table 4.1: Entrepreneurial opportunities motived by altruistic reciprocity in times of disaster
Third-person opportunities Altruistic reciprocity First-person opportunities
O1



















2 if ^ j2H  j = 2,
1 otherwise.











2 if ^ j2V  j = 2,
1 otherwise.
Remark : This opportunity belief reflects an interaction history among neighboring actors that an altruist cannot receive reciprocal
payback, i.e., b/c < 2. Hence, an actor is not motivated to act selflessly to help his/her neighbors. The recognition of a recovery












































2 if ^qj2Qv qj = 2,
1 otherwise.
Remark : While the benefit-cost-ratio (b/c) is higher than that of O1, an actor does not believe the cost of helping neighbors can be
returned. The recognition of a recovery opportunity is dependent upon at least two good-state actors post disaster.
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= { n 1,k = 1, n,k = 1},
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= { n,k 1 = 1, n,k = 1}, and
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Remark : An actor holding opportunity belief O3 is not motivated to help neighbors altruistically since the returned benefit cannot
compensate the cost, i.e., b/c < 2. The recognition of a recovery opportunity is dependent upon either 1) an actor having a good-state

































1 if  n,k ^ [( n 1,k ^  n+1,k) _ ( n,k 1 ^  n,k+1)] = 2,
2 otherwise.
Remark : This opportunity belief reflects an interaction history among neighboring actors that an actor’s altruistic act will be
returned, i.e., b/c > 2. Hence, he/she is motivated to act selflessly to help his/her neighbors in times of disaster. The recognition of
a recovery opportunity is dependent upon no one or two good-state actors post disaster.
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Third-person opportunities Altruistic reciprocity First-person opportunities
O5
hn,k = _ j2H j . The recipients will
reciprocate the benefits
as b/c ! 1.
 n,k = _ j2(H[V ) j .
vn,k = _ j2V  j . ⇥n,k =  n,k _ [( n 1,k _  n+1,k) ^ ( n,k 1 _  n,k+1)].
Remark : An actor holding the opportunity belief O5 is willing to help his/her neighbors at a very low cost, which can be easily



























2 if  n,k _ [( n 1,k _  n+1,k) ^ ( n,k 1 _  n,k+1)] = 2,
1 otherwise.
Remark : This opportunity belief reflects that there is very low cost associated with acting selflessly. Hence, an actor is motivated to
help his/her neighbors. The recognition of a recovery opportunity is dependent upon no less than one good-state actor post disaster.
O7
hn,k = 2. The recipients will
reciprocate the benefits
as b/c ! 1.
 n,k = 2.
vn,k = 2. ⇥n,k = 2.
Remark : This opportunity belief reflects an interaction history that all actors will strive to recover self and help others. That is, an
altruist will always receive reciprocal payback from the recipients.
Note. Following the standard convention, a _ b := max{a, b} and a ^ b := min{a, b} for a, b 2 R. The details for calculating the benefit-to-cost ratios
under each opportunity belief are included in Supplementary note.
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0 for { n,k(t) =  n,k(t)},
y
1
for { n,k(t) = 0} \ { n,k(t) = 2},
y
2
for { n,k(t) = 0} \ { n,k(t) = 1},
y
3
for { n,k(t) = 1} \ { n,k(t) = 2},
where the actor does not need to pay for a decreased state, y
1
is the cost spent to pursue
an opportunity under major disasters, y
2
is the cost spend to act upon an opportunity
under minor disasters, and y
3
is the cost required to maintain survival. Table 4.2 lists the












, where a ^ b := min{a, b} for
a, b 2 R. These six cost scenarios are further divided into three categories, each describing
an innovative way of pursuing an opportunity (with the minimum cost).
Table 4.2: Recovery cost scenarios
Scenarios y
1
(0 ! 2) y
2
(0 ! 1) y
3
(1 ! 2) Remark




Y2 1 10 5




Y4 5 1 10




Y6 5 10 1
Specifically, cost scenarios 1 (Y1) and 2 (Y2) illustrate the cases that an actor can









. Likewise, cost scenarios 5 (Y5) and 6 (Y6) suggest the innovative
use of possessed values to pursue an opportunity arising from minor disasters, i.e., y
2
=
^iyi, i 2 {1, 2, 3}. For instance, in our opening example, Findus’s audition on its suppliers
is a cost-e cient way to pursue a sustainable opportunity and restore customers’ confidence
after the “horse-meat” scandal. Finally, Y3 and Y4 are costly for the actor to exploit an
opportunity of  n,k = 2, or y1, y3 > y2. In other words, the actor experiences cost barriers to
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pursue the good state post recovery under these two scenarios. In this chapter, we consider
all the six cost scenarios to evaluate the robustness of altruistic entrepreneurship.
4.3.3 Simulating the model
The simulation procedure for the proposed model as follows. At period 0, we assign the
entrepreneurial opportunity belief (Oi), the cost scenario (Yi), the probabilities of disasters
(f and g), and the initial state ( n,k(0)) for each networked actor. We assume the neighbors
outside the edge of the network have the good state. (This assumption does not impact
our outcomes.) The simulation is executed until time T is reached. Next, we calculate
the entrepreneurial value creation of the network by adding up the state of each actor to
evaluate the robustness of the seven opportunity beliefs.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the entrepreneurial action process at period t. After a disaster
occurs, the networked actors share information with each other for discovering opportunities,
which may arise from an altruist’s exploitation of a specific opportunity. Next an actor will
act upon an identified opportunity that is feasible and desirable to his/her recovery from a
disastrous event. In sum, the network portrays a feedback system where the actors act in
cooperation to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities in times of disasters.
Value-destryoing 



















Figure 4.2: Timeline of entrepreneurial action process.
Our objective is to explore the mechanism of altruistic reciprocity that explains why
some systems facilitate a large number of entrepreneurial opportunity recognition whereas
others do not, to examine how this mechanism influence an actor’s seemingly counterintuitive
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behaviors in the network, and particularly in times of disasters. We simulated our CA model
in a MATLAB program.
4.4 Results
In this section, we unpack the robustness of opportunity recognition beliefs in the presence
of altruistic reciprocity for networked actors facing disasters using a careful computational
analysis. Following the simulation research practice, we first perform a base case in a pilot
study, and then run an extensive experimental analysis. The results are summarized below.
4.4.1 Base case analysis
We set N = 5, K = 3, T = 365, Un,k(0) = 3,   = 1 in the base case. Based on She ’s (2007)
empirical study, g = 134/365 and f = 17/365 are chosen for the probabilities of minor and
major disasters occurring during a year, and these values are also fixed in our experimental
analysis. Each actor’s state at period 0 is randomly assigned, poor (0), fair (1), or good
(2). Every parameter instance is repeated 200 times for outcome reliability. Table 4.3 shows
the average, the 5th percentile, and the 1st percentile of entrepreneurial value creation  
per period. These three measures results in very similar ranking outcomes across the seven
opportunity beliefs. In line with the emergency management and risk analysis literatures
(e.g., Myerson, 2004; Tang, 2006), we primary concerne about the worst-case-scenario rather
than average outcomes of disasters since it provides a strict standard by which to assess the
e↵ectiveness of entrepreneurial opportunity beliefs in times of disasters.
To visualize the entrepreneurial value creation in Panel 3 of Table 4.3, we plot the rank-
ings of the seven opportunity beliefs in Figure 4.3. Notice that each opportunity belief’s
performance is dependent on the opportunity-evaluation rules and the cost scenarios. Specif-
ically, under the max-rule (see the solid line), we observe that altruistic opportunity beliefs,
O4 to O7, generally result in a better value-creation than the non-altruistic opportunity be-
liefs, O1 to O3, expect for the relatively low ranking of O4 and O7 under the cost scenario
Y3. Under the min-rule (see the dashed line), on the other hand, some non-altruistic oppor-
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Table 4.3: Base case result on entrepreneurial value creation
O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7
max min max min max min max min max min max min max min
Panel 1 : Average of value per period
Y1 14.646 14.608 14.764 14.597 19.142 7.151 48.683 46.168 45.439 0.658 45.289 14.932 49.057 49.031
Y2 7.261 7.308 7.557 7.327 30.107 3.524 51.800 48.221 51.560 0.611 51.516 7.716 52.524 52.510
Y3 30.012 30.001 30.046 30.017 27.617 21.747 22.008 19.337 31.853 0.806 32.144 30.065 22.247 22.182
Y4 30.012 30.001 30.060 30.0108 29.614 21.107 37.898 33.667 38.030 0.860 38.162 30.084 38.509 38.550
Y5 14.630 14.547 14.786 14.657 19.293 6.159 53.328 39.818 56.833 0.610 56.781 14.893 57.986 57.979
Y6 7.303 7.627 7.517 7.336 40.790 3.126 57.873 50.429 59.455 0.792 59.492 7.888 59.838 59.848
Panel 2 : The 5th percentile of value per period
Y1 13.981 14.010 14.178 13.919 18.049 6.736 48.173 45.810 43.899 0.345 43.899 14.252 48.580 48.497
Y2 6.793 6.842 7.031 6.810 27.822 3.353 51.341 47.942 50.831 0.230 50.831 7.147 51.990 52.060
Y3 30.000 30.000 28.984 30.000 27.144 21.493 20.782 18.353 30.859 0.382 31.253 29.992 20.926 20.881
Y4 30.000 30.000 30.004 30.000 29.067 20.889 36.851 32.700 37.147 0.501 37.220 30.008 37.504 37.471
Y5 13.890 13.817 14.125 13.952 17.149 6.082 51.473 37.899 55.048 0.288 54.711 14.158 56.869 56.704
Y6 6.834 6.801 6.999 6.859 35.901 3.045 57.559 49.331 59.211 0.230 59.252 7.167 59.655 59.704
Panel 3 : The 1st percentile of value per period
Y1 13.726 13.755 13.915 13.825 17.733 6.501 47.963 45.686 43.599 0.177 42.867 14.129 48.312 48.325
Y2 6.625 6.690 6.867 6.534 26.897 3.292 51.090 47.782 50.663 0.078 50.453 6.933 51.851 51.842
Y3 30.000 30.000 29.971 29.992 26.975 21.374 20.228 17.823 30.539 0.247 31.052 29.963 20.408 20.478
Y4 30.000 30.000 29.992 29.992 28.956 20.725 36.571 32.384 36.884 0.374 36.814 29.992 37.085 37.192
Y5 13.541 13.488 13.718 13.722 16.669 6.066 50.458 37.130 53.342 0.144 53.971 13.911 56.384 55.973
Y6 6.629 6.666 6.756 6.695 33.448 3.025 57.428 48.908 59.051 0.082 59.071 6.834 59.499 59.622
Note. The upper bound of entrepreneurial value creation is 30 (= N ⇥K ⇥ 2) that every networked actor
has a good state. Each result is an average of 200 runs of 365 period experiments.
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Note. The plots are based on the 1st percentile of value ranking of the opportunity recognition beliefs in
Panel 3 of Table 4.3. The solid line represents the max-rule; the dashed line depicts the min-rule.
Opportunity beliefs with smaller numbers rank higher in entrepreneurial value creation, where 1 is the
best possible ranking.
Figure 4.3: Base case plot on the ranking of entrepreneurial opportunity beliefs.
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tunity beliefs, O1 and O2, facilitate actions in pursuit of high value creation under the cost
scenarios Y3 and Y4, whereas an altruistic one, O5, consistently has the worst ranking on
value creation among the seven opportunity beliefs. In sum, the ranking variations mostly
occur under the cost scenarios Y3 and Y4 so that we examine the average ranking of each
opportunity belief in the three categories of cost scenarios – Y1-Y2, Y3-Y4, and Y5-Y6 (see
Table 4.2) – for robustness analysis. We find that when all actors act aggressively (i.e.,
following the max-rule), the altruistic opportunity beliefs result in better positivest-disaster
states following disasters.
4.4.2 Experimental design
To assess the impact of each parameter and characterize the range of entrepreneurial value
creation in times of disasters, we analyze the proposed model under a variety of parameter
instances (Montgomery, 2004). Hence, a full factorial design is employed to explore the
proposed model and to check whether the insights derived from the base case are applicable
in other circumstances as well. We examine 72 (= 3 ⇥ 3 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2 ⇥ 2) parameter instances
consisting of every combination in Table 4.4. These parameter instances are selected to
provide a wide range of possible scenarios (i.e., one of the three categories of cost scenarios
Y , a small, medium, or large number of network columns, N , a small-to-large number of
network rows, K, a low-to-high value increase per period,  , and short-to-long simulated
periods, T ). We run each parameter instance 200 times to achieve statistical reliability. This
computational analysis enables us to identify the underlying conditions for one opportunity
belief to dominate another.
Table 4.4: Parameter values in experiments
Parameter Values Meaning
Y {Y1-Y2, Y3-Y4, Y5-Y6} The cost scenarios
N {3, 5,10} The number of columns in the network
K {3,5} The number of rows in the network
  {1,10} Value creation at each time period
T {365, 3650} Simulation period of each run
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4.4.3 Max-rule analysis
Table 4.5 shows the main e↵ects of experimental factors under the max-rule. We highlight
the parameters that lead to significant di↵erences in the value ranking of opportunity beliefs
at p < 0.05. Consistent with the base case results (see Figure 4.3), the recovery cost scenario
has the largest impact on all opportunity beliefs, followed by the value increment (parameter
 ), the network size (parameters N and K). Note that time (parameter T ) does not have
significant impacts; so we omit it in the following analysis. Specifically, under the cost
scenarios Y3 and Y4, two altruistic opportunity beliefs, O4 and O7, decrease their ranking
by up to 1.458 (= 4.750  3.292) and 1.250 (= 2.250  1.000), respectively. In contrast, the
rankings of the three non-altruistic opportunity beliefs, O1 to O3, increases under Y3 and
Y4 by up to 1.208 (= 6.625  5.417), 0.833 (= 6.125  5.292), and 0.333 (= 5.250  4.917),
respectively. Besides, O5 and O6 performs better under the cost scenarios Y5 and Y6 whose
ranking increase by up to 0.292 (= 2.542  2.250) and 0.666 (= 3.083  2.417), respectively.
This suggests that the altruistic opportunity beliefs lead to better post-recovery states when
the actors can use the possesses values innovatively to act upon entrepreneurial opportunities
arising from either major (i.e., Y1 and Y2) or minor (i.e., Y5 and Y6) disasters.
As illustrated in Table 4.5, we observe that value increment ( ) is the second most
influential factor, where the e↵ects are significant for O1, O2, O5 and O7 with p < 0.05.
The parameter   negatively impacts the ranking of O1 and O2 by 0.709 (= 6.528  5.819)
and 0.375 (= 6.000   5.625), respectively. On the contrary, it has a positive e↵ect on O5
with a 0.389 (= 2.639 2.250) increase in ranking and on O7 with a 1.069 (= 2.069 1.000)
increase. Finally, the number of network columns (N) and rows (K) significantly influence
the rankings of O1, O5 and O6. For instance, O1 will lead to worse entrepreneurial value
creation as the network grows larger in either rows or columns. On the other hand, the
number of network rows (K) has a positive impact on the ranking of O5 yet a negative
impact on that of O6.
Figure 4.4 shows the boxplots of the opportunity beliefs’ ranking under the six recovery
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Table 4.5: Experimental results under the max-rule
Parameter value O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7
Y {Y1-Y2} 6.625 6.125 5.000 3.292 2.542 3.083 1.000
(0.495) (0.338) (0.000) (0.955) (0.658) (0.717) (0.000)
{Y3-Y4} 5.417 5.292 4.917 4.750 2.542 2.625 2.250
(2.062) (1.732) (0.282) (1.327) (0.977) (0.711) (2.212)
{Y5-Y6} 6.458 6.042 5.250 4.000 2.250 2.417 1.292
(0.658) (0.359) (0.676) (0.000) (0.442) (0.830) (0.624)
N {3} 5.958 5.792 4.958 4.083 2.354 2.812 1.604
(1.515) (1.202) (0.202) (1.048) (0.812) (0.704) (1.440)
{5} 6.021 5.833 5.042 4.021 2.458 2.688 1.542
(1.422) (1.226) (0.289) (1.082) (0.651) (0.879) (1.429)
{10} 6.542 5.812 5.167 3.917 2.521 2.583 1.458
(1.051) (0.673) (0.559) (1.200) (0.618) (0.846) (1.398)
K {3} 5.986 5.861 5.069 4.014 2.583 2.556 1.528
(1.449) (1.066) (0.422) (1.107) (0.687) (0.803) (1.424)
{5} 6.361 5.764 5.042 4.000 2.306 2.833 1.542
(1.248) (1.055) (0.354) (1.113) (0.685) (0.805) (1.414)
  {1} 5.819 5.625 5.111 4.014 2.639 2.694 2.069
(1.795) (1.477) (0.545) (1.570) (0.844) (1.057) (1.856)
{10} 6.528 6.000 5.000 4.000 2.250 2.694 1.000
(0.503) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.436) (0.464) (0.000)
T {365} 6.292 5.750 5.056 4.000 2.472 2.694 1.542
(1.399) (1.045) (0.441) (1.113) (0.769) (0.816) (1.414)
{3650} 6.056 5.875 5.056 4.014 2.417 2.694 1.528
(1.320) (1.074) (0.331) (1.107) (0.622) (0.816) (1.424)
Note. The ranking of (third-person) opportunity beliefs is based on the 1st percentile of entrepreneurial
value creation per period; each is based on 200 runs of 24 experiments. Standard deviations are in
parentheses. Third-person opportunity beliefs with smaller numbers have higher rankings, where 1 is the
best possible ranking.
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cost scenarios, where the robustness of each belief is clearly expressed by its mean and
variation in value ranking. We observe a large variation under Y3 and Y4 across all the seven
opportunity beliefs in Figure 4.4b-h. Yet as illustrated in Figure 4.4a, the four altruistic
opportunity beliefs (O4–O7) on average rank higher than the non-altruistic ones (O1–O3),
in line with our findings in Table 4.5.
Note. Figure a) illustrates the overall ranking of the seven opportunity beliefs under the max-rule. Figures
b)–h) depict the ranking of each opportunity belief under the six cost scenarios.
Figure 4.4: Ranking of opportunity beliefs under the max-rule.
4.4.4 Min-rule analysis
Under the min-rule, results in Table 4.6 shows that the value ranking of opportunity beliefs
are consistently influenced by the cost scenarios (Y ), the value increment ( ), and network
size (N and K). Moreover, the impacts of these parameters di↵er between the altruistic
and non-altruistic opportunity beliefs. For instance, O1 to O3 (the non-altruistic beliefs)
increases their rankings by 1 unit when the cost scenarios Y3 and Y4 are applied, such as
1.542 (= 4.292  2.750) for O1, 1.167 (= 4.167  3.000) for O2, and 0.917 ( 6.000  5.083)
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Table 4.6: Experimental results under the min-rule
Parameter value O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7
Y {Y1-Y2} 4.292 4.167 6.000 2.000 7.000 3.167 1.000
(0.550) (0.381) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.381) (0.000)
{Y3-Y4} 2.750 3.000 5.083 4.000 7.000 3.125 2.917
(1.422) (1.022) (0.974) (2.043) (0.000) (0.338) (1.976)
{Y5-Y6} 3.938 4.083 6.000 2.062 7.000 3.583 1.000
(0.633) (0.347) (0.000) (0.433) (0.000) (0.794) (0.000)
N {3} 3.854 3.938 5.833 2.396 7.000 3.458 1.333
(0.922) (0.697) (0.559) (1.180) (0.000) (0.651) (1.117)
{5} 3.875 3.938 5.833 2.333 7.000 3.250 1.333
(0.937) (0.697) (0.559) (1.117) (0.000) (0.565) (1.117)
{10} 4.021 3.938 5.875 2.333 7.000 3.208 1.292
(0.956) (0.697) (0.444) (1.117) (0.000) (0.582) (0.988)
K {3} 3.722 3.958 5.833 2.375 7.000 3.444 1.333
(0.982) (0.740) (0.557) (1.156) (0.000) (0.625) (1.113)
{5} 4.111 3.917 5.861 2.333 7.000 3.167 1.306
(0.848) (0.645) (0.484) (1.113) (0.000) (0.557) (1.030)
  {1} 3.764 3.875 5.694 2.708 7.000 3.403 1.639
(1.284) (0.978) (0.705) (1.524) (0.000) (0.744) (1.447)
{10} 4.069 4.000 6.000 2.000 7.000 3.208 1.000
(0.256) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.409) (0.000)
T {365} 3.986 3.917 5.847 2.375 7.000 3.264 1.319
(1.000) (0.666) (0.522) (1.156) (0.000) (0.556) (1.072)
{3650} 3.847 3.958 5.847 2.333 7.000 3.347 1.319
(0.867) (0.721) (0.522) (1.113) (0.000) (0.653) (1.072)
Note. The experiment settings are identical to those in Table 4.5.
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for O3. Yet the performance of the two altruistic ones, O4 and O7, significantly decrease by
2(= 4.000  2.000) and 1.917(= 2.917  1.000), respectively. Likewise, the value increment
and network size both generate positive e↵ects on the altruistic opportunity beliefs such
as O6, yet negative impacts on non-altruistic beliefs like O1. Therefore, the altruistic
opportunity beliefs seem being associated with greater value creation when the actors are
in a large network, have higher value increment per period, and Y3 and Y4 are not applied.
The impact of time (T ) is again insignificant (p > 0.05), so omitted in our analysis.
To illustrate the rankings of the seven opportunity beliefs, we provide the boxplots under
various cost scenarios in Figure 4.5. This time, the performance of the beliefs are fairly
insensitive to the cost scenarios expect for Y3. As a result, we almost observe no variations
in value ranking (see Figure 4.5a). O7 is consistently the best opportunity belief to attain
good recovery state following disasters. O4 and O6 are the next best opportunity beliefs
that outperform the three non-altruistic beliefs (O1, O2 and O3). However, compared to
the results under the max rule in Table 4.5, a notable di↵erence is the dramatic decrease
of O5’s ranking from 2.5 (see Figure 4.4) to 7. This surprising finding suggests that under
the min-rule, while altruistic opportunity beliefs can be a necessary condition for value
creation in times of disasters (see O4, O6 and O7), they are not su cient conditions to
facilitate entrepreneurial action (e.g., O5). The rule on evaluating first-person opportunities
also matters in the entrepreneurial action decision process: When actors doubt about the
attractiveness of the identified opportunities (i.e., low desirability), eventually they are less
likely to take actions to recover from the disasters. The interaction between the altruistic
beliefs in recognizing third-person opportunities and the min-rule in evaluating first-person
opportunities will be further examined in the discussion section using analytical methods.
Since Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show that the opportunity beliefs perform di↵erently under
the two evaluation rules. We calculate the ranking di↵erences by subtracting the ranking
under the max-rule from that under the min-rule. So a positive di↵erence suggests that
the specific opportunity belief performance better under the max-rule; a negative di↵erence
suggests otherwise. Consider O5 as an example. On average, its ranking di↵erence between
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Note. Figure a) illustrates the overall ranking of the seven opportunity beliefs under the max-rule. Figures
b)–h) depict the ranking of each opportunity belief under the six cost scenarios.
Figure 4.5: Ranking of opportunity beliefs under the min-rule.
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the min-rule (7) and the max-rule (2.5) is 4.5 (= 7  2.5) where O5’s ranking is 4.5 higher
under the max-rule. Following this logic, as O1 consistently ranks the first no di↵erence
is observed. O5, O3 and O6 are more likely to rank higher among the seven opportunity
beliefs under the max-rule. In turn, the rankings of O1, O2 are higher under the min-rule.
This result is very much consistent with the insights derived from Figure 4.3. [The ranking
di↵erences of the seven opportunity beliefs with respect to each cost scenario can be found
in the Supplementary note. In general, we observe similar patterns across most scenarios.]
4.5 Discussion
The central theme of this chapter is to examine altruistic reciprocity (Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Nowak, 2006; Trivers, 1971) and entrepreneurship (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006) in
times of extreme environmental events. This is an important topic since these disastrous
events disproportionately influence the business landscape. In addition, there is little litera-
ture on how these events influence entrepreneurship, altruism, and collective value creation.
Our work addresses this limitation by extending the theory of entrepreneurial action into
the context of disasters and develop a concept of altruistic entrepreneurship. Our focus is
on the dynamic interactions between opportunity recognition beliefs motivated by altruistic
reciprocity, opportunity evaluation rules (i.e., the willingness to act) and cost scenarios (i.e.,
feasibility of taking actions) and their overall impact on collective recovery performance.
Essentially, our simulation outcomes, illustrated in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, suggest that al-
truistic opportunity beliefs generally facilitate better overall entrepreneurial value creation
following disasters than non-altruistic opportunity beliefs. To further support this altruis-
tic entrepreneurship hypothesis, following the lead of complex systems studies (Miller and
Page, 2007), we derive some analytic results about the structure and function of altruis-
tic entrepreneurship in times of disasters. Let Pr{ i = 0} = ✓0, Pr{ i = 1} = ✓1, and
Pr{ i = 2} = 1  ✓0  ✓1 = 1 ✓ be the possibilities of an actor having a poor, fair, or good
pre-recovery state, respectively. Note that they are somewhat equivalent to the probability
of someone encountering a major (f), minor (g), or none (1 f g) disaster. In the standard
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von Newmann neighborhood network, the number of good-state actors, denoted as X, is
a random variable, following the binomial distribution, i.e., X ⇠ B(5, 1   ✓). (A graphic
illustration is included in the supplementary note.) The probability of having exactly m
good-state actors prior to recovery in the neighborhood is





(1  ✓)m✓5 m, for m = 0, 1, · · · , 5.
Take O1 as an example. A networked actor adopting O1 is motivated to return to
the good state when his/her immediate row-/column-neighbors and self are in the good
state prior to recovery activities. Under the min-rule, in addition to the actor self, all
the four neighbors, ease, south, west, and north, must be in the good state, i.e., m = 5.
This restriction is relaxed under the max-rule where m 2 {3, 4, 5}. That is, the good-state
actor is willing to take recovery action when at least two of the four neighbors, either row-
neighbors (west and east) or column-neighbors (north and south), are in the good state
prior to recovery. Following this logic, we get:
Claim 1. In the von Neumann neighborhood network, under the max-rule ( n,k =  n,k),
(i) an actor adopting O1 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
2(1  ✓)3   (1  ✓)5;
(ii) an actor adopting O2 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
1 + 3✓4   4✓3;
(iii) an actor adopting O3 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of















(iv) an actor adopting O4 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
1  (1  ✓)5;
(v) an actor adopting O5 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
1  ✓5;
(vi) an actor adopting O6 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
1  ✓5;
(vii) an actor adopting O7 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of 1.
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Accordingly, we can find the boundary conditions where the actors adopting an altruistic
opportunity belief are more likely to take recovery actions than those adopting a non-
altruistic belief:
Proposition 1. Under the max-rule,
(i) when ✓ > 1
3
, actors adopting O3 are more likely to pursue an entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity than those adopting O2;
(ii) when ✓ < 1
2
, actors adopting O5 and O6 are more likely to pursue an entrepreneurial
opportunity than those adopting O4;
(iii) when 1
3
< ✓ < 1
2
, the ranking of the seven opportunity beliefs follows O1 < O2 < O3 <
O4 < O5 = O6 < O7.
Note that our simulation outcomes in Figure 4.4a support this proposition perfectly.
One plausible explanation lies in our parameter setting in Section 4.4.1, where f = 17/365
and g = 134/365, that satisfies 1
3
< f + g < 1
2
. In general, Proposition 1 (P1) specifies
the impact of extreme events, both major and minor disasters, on the e↵ectiveness of altru-
istic opportunity beliefs and the resultant likelihood of pursuing an opportunity following
disasters. Additionally, because no conditions attached to the better ranking of altruistic
opportunity beliefs (O4 to O7), we can conclude that altruistic entrepreneurship under the
max-rule is always able to achieve the best value creation for recovery.
Likewise, we can derive the proposition under the min-rule by specifying the action
probabilities associated with each opportunity beliefs. Formally,
Claim 2. In the von Neumann neighborhood network, under the min-rule, ( n,k = ⇥n,k)
(i) an actor adopting O1 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
(1  ✓)5;
(ii) an actor adopting O2 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
(1  ✓)3(1 + 3✓);
(iii) an actor adopting O3 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of












(iv) an actor adopting O4 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
1 + (1  ✓)5   2(1  ✓)3;
(v) an actor adopting O5 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
1 + ✓5   2✓3;
(vi) an actor adopting O6 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of
1 + ✓5   2✓3;
(vii) an actor adopting O7 pursues an entrepreneurial opportunity with the probability of 1.
Proposition 2. Under the min-rule,
(i) when ✓ > 2
3
, actors adopting O3 are more likely to pursue an entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity than those adopting O2;
(ii) when ✓ > 1
2
, actors adopting O4 are more likely to pursue an entrepreneurial oppor-
tunity than those adopting O5 and O6;




, actors adopting O5 and O6 are more likely to pursue an entrepreneurial







, the ranking of the seven opportunity beliefs follows O1 < O2 <
O3 < O5 = O6 < O4 < O7.
Under the min-rule, the robustness of altruistic opportunity beliefs is dependent upon
the number of good-state actors in the neighborhood, or equivalently the probability of
disasters. When disasters sway most actors, altruistic entrepreneurship cannot restore the
system e↵ectively since actors have doubts on the time lag of receiving repayment, hence
are very conservative on pursuing identified opportunities. Note that altruistic reciprocity
is considered inherently selfish in a sense that a rational actor strives for (long-term) self
benefit derived from reciprocal return (Kenrick et al., 2009; Nowak, 2006). Accordingly, as
suggested by Shepherd et al. (2007) and McMullen and Shepherd (2006), such doubt is very
likely to obfuscate the evaluation of the first-person opportunity and prevent entrepreneurial
actions.
Figure 4.5a reports a very similar ranking pattern to Proposition 2 (P2). For instance,
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O7 and O4 are the most robust altruistic opportunity beliefs to pursue entrepreneurial value
creation. One notable di↵erence in our simulation is the rankings of O5 and O3. A plausible
explanation is that among the seven opportunity beliefs, only these two have a possibility
of returning a poor state post recovery:
Claim 3. In the von Neumann neighborhood network, under the min-rule, ( n,k = ⇥n,k)













Recall that we adopt worst-case-scenario (1st percentile) of entrepreneurial value creation
as the performance measure. Therefore, unlike the other five opportunity beliefs, whose
worst post-recovery state has a value of 1 (i.e., fair state), O3 and O5 are more likely to
return a poor state (0). So O5’s low ranking under the min-rule suggest that altruistic
entrepreneurship requires aggressive opportunity evaluation methods to launch the action.
Finally, our results statistically demonstrate that the robustness of altruistic opportunity
beliefs are further moderated by the high value increment per period and large network size.
On the country, the value creation resulting from the non-altruistic beliefs are negatively
a↵ected as the value increment increases and/or the network grows large.
4.6 Supplementary Notes
4.6.1 The benefit-to-cost ratio
To determine whether can receive reciprocal benefits, an altruist compares the benefit-cost-
ratio, b/c, with the average number of neighbors, w = 2 in our study. Specifically, the
cost of helping a poor-state or fair-state neighbor is given by the scenarios 1 to 9 in Table
4-7 by counting the frequency of the altruist having good pre-recovery state yet poor or
fair post-recovery state. That is, the deteriorate state post recovery indicates the altruist’s
cost. On the other hand, the scenarios 10-27 then illustrate the possible benefits that can
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be returned by the recipients – we count the frequency of the altruist having a poor or fair




The number of { n,k 6= 2, n,k = 2}/Total number of benefit-related scenarios
The number of { n,k = 2, n,k 6= 2}/Total number of cost-related scenarios
.
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( n,k 1(t)) ( n,k+1(t)) O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7
1 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 2 2 2
2 0 2 1 1 1 0 2 2 2 2
3 0 2 2 1 2 0 2 2 2 2
4 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
5 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
6 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2
7 2 2 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
8 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
9 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2
10 0 1 0 1 1 0 2 1 1 2
11 0 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 2
12 0 1 2 1 1 0 2 2 2 2
13 1 1 0 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
14 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2
15 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
16 2 1 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
17 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
18 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
19 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 0 2
20 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
21 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
22 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
23 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
24 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
25 2 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
26 2 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
27 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
98
4.6.2 Cost scenario analysis on the opportunity belief ranking di↵erence
Figure 4.6 illustrates the ranking di↵erences of the seven opportunity beliefs with respect to
each cost scenario can be found in the Supplementary note. In general, we observe similar
patterns across most scenarios.
























































Note. A larger value on the y-axis indicates better ranking under the max-rue, where 0 represents the
same performance under the two opportunity evaluation rules.
Figure 4.6: The boxplot of opportunity beliefs ranking di↵erence under the six cost scenarios.
99
4.6.3 The state distribution table
Figure 4.7 illustrate the distribution of good-state actors in the standard vonNewmann
neighborhood. We calculate the likelihood of recovery action under each opportunity belief
accordingly.
O1. Under the max-rule, an actor employing O1 will act entrepreneurially in scenarios s1
– s5, s7, and s12 in Figure 4.10. So, we derive































In contrast, under the min-rule, the actor will only take recovery action when all the five
firms in the neighborhood are in the good state (scenario s1 in Figure 4.10), formally,
Pr{ n,k = 2|⇥} = (1  ✓0   ✓1)5| {z }
s1
.
O2. Under the max-rule, an actor employing O2 will act entrepreneurially in scenarios s1
– s21, and s26 in Figure 4.10. So, we derive
































s17 – s21, s26






























In contrast, under the min-rule, the actor will take recovery action in scenarios s1 – s6 and
s8 – s11 in Figure 4.10, formally,


































s2) s3) s4) s5) s6)
s7) s8) s9) s10) s11)
s12) s13) s14) s15) s16)
s17) s18) s19) s20) s21)
s27) s28) s29) s30) s31)
s22) s23) s24) s25) s26)
s32)
Note. The first row shows the probability of having five good-state actors prior to recovery in the
neighborhood, the second for four good-state actors, the third for three good-state actors, the fourth for
two good-state actors, the fifth for one good-state actor, and the sixth for no good-state actors in the
neighborhood.
Figure 4.7: The state distribution of networked actors in the von Neumann neighborhood.
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O3. Under the max-rule, an actor employing O3 will act entrepreneurially in scenarios s1
– s10, s12 – s18, s21 – s23, s25 – s26, s28 – s29, and s32 in Figure 4.10. So, we derive















































































In contrast, under the min-rule, the actor will take recovery action in scenarios s1 – s3, s6,
s8, s13, s16, s22, and s32 in Figure 4.10, formally,



































































O4. Under the max-rule, an actor employing O4 will act entrepreneurially in all scenarios
except for s1 in Figure 4.10. So, we derive
Pr{ n,k = 2| } = 1  (1  ✓0   ✓1)5| {z }
s1
.
In contrast, under the min-rule, the actor will take recovery action in scenarios s6, s8 – s11,
s13 – s16, and s17 – s32 in Figure 4.10, formally,
































O5. Under the max-rule, an actor employing O5 will act entrepreneurially in all scenarios
except for s32 in Figure 4.10. So, we derive


















































In contrast, under the min-rule, the actor will take recovery action in scenarios s1 – s6 and
s8 – s11 in Figure 4.10, formally,




































































O6. Under the max-rule, an actor employing O5 will act entrepreneurially in all scenarios
except for s32 in Figure 4.10. So, we derive


















































In contrast, under the min-rule, the actor will take recovery action in scenarios s1 – s6, s7
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– 16, s17 – s20, s22 – s25, and s27 in Figure 4.10, formally,




















































O7. Under the max-rule, an actor employing O5 will act entrepreneurially in all scenarios
in Figure 4.10. So, we derive
Pr{ n,k = 2| } = 1.
Likewise, under the min-rule, the actor will take recovery action in all scenarios as well,
Pr{ n,k = 2|⇥} = 1.
4.6.4 Proofs
Proofs of Proposition 1. For part (i), given O3’s associated action probability is bounded
by [1  ✓2, 1  ✓2 + ✓5], we make a comparison between the lower bound of O3 and O2 and
get
(1  ✓2)  [1  ✓3   3✓3(1  ✓)] = ✓2 (1  ✓)| {z }
+ve
(3✓   1) > 0 , ✓ > 1
3
.
For part (ii), the action probability associated with O5 and O6 are the same according to
Claim 1. We obtain the condition that O5 (or O6) outperforms O4 by
(1  ✓5)  [1  (1  ✓)5] = (1  2✓) [(1  ✓)4 + (1  ✓)3✓ + (1  ✓)2✓2 + (1  ✓)✓3 + ✓4]| {z }
+ve
> 0
, ✓ < 1
2
.
For part (iii), we compare the action likelihood associated with each opportunity belief in
pairs. For instance, O2 ranks higher than O1 due to a larger probability of pursuing an
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entrepreneurial opportunity:
[1 ✓3 3✓3(1 ✓)]  [2(1 ✓)3 (1 ✓)5] = (1  ✓)| {z }
+ve
[✓2 (1  ✓)(6  ✓)| {z }
+ve
+(1+✓) (2  ✓)| {z }
+ve
] > 0.
Likewise, O4 outperforms O3 as the action probability associated with O4 exceeds the upper
bound of that with O3,
[1  (1  ✓)5]  (1  ✓2 + ✓5) = (1  ✓)| {z }
+ve
[5✓3 + (1  ✓)| {z }
+ve
(1 + 5✓)] > 0.
Together with the results in parts (i) and (ii), the result follows.
Proofs of Proposition 2. For part (i), given O3’s associated action probability is bounded
by [(1  ✓)2, (1  ✓)2 + ✓5], we make a comparison between the lower bound of O3 and O2
and get
(1  ✓)2   (1  ✓)3(1 + 3✓) = ✓(1  ✓)2(3✓   2) > 0 , ✓ > 2
3
.
For part (ii), the action probability associated with O5 and O6 are the same according to
Claim 2. We obtain the condition that O4 outperforms O5 (or O6) by
[1 + (1  ✓)5   2(1  ✓)3]  [1 + ✓5   2✓3] > 0 , ✓ > 1
2
.
For part (iii), we compare the O5’s (or O6’s) action probability with the upper bound of
O3





For part (iv), we compare the action likelihood associated with each opportunity belief in
pairs. For instance, O2 ranks higher than O1 due to a larger probability of pursuing an
entrepreneurial opportunity:
(1  ✓)3(1 + 3✓)  (1  ✓)5 = ✓ (1  ✓)3| {z }
+ve
(5  ✓)| {z }
+ve
> 0.
Likewise, O4 outperforms O3 as the action probability associated with O4 exceeds the upper
bound of that with O3,
[1  (1  ✓)5]  (1  ✓2 + ✓5) = (1  ✓)| {z }
+ve
[5✓3 + (1  ✓)| {z }
+ve
(1 + 5✓)] > 0.
Together with the results in parts (i), (ii), and (iii), the result follows.
Chapter 5
Who sways whom: The spatiotemporal dynamics
of entrepreneurial action
5.1 Introduction
An entrepreneurial opportunity such as the launch of new products, services or processes,
the development of new business models, and the creation of new organizational routines,
typically provides a more e cient way of utilizing resources for value creation than current
existing practices (Keyhani et al., 2015; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013). A number of net-
worked actors (i.e., community members) – individuals, organizations, or firms – who may
act entrepreneurially will be alerted to this opportunity via their business or social network
and exploit it for benefits via their entrepreneurial actions (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006;
Phan and Chambers, 2013). In this sense, entrepreneurship is a spatiotemporal process of
identification, evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities for potential value creation aris-
ing from direct and indirect interactions among potential actors networked with each other.
The dynamic process involves making sense of the feedback from spatially interdependent
others to identify opportunities (third person opportunity), evaluating the feasibility and
desirability of identified opportunities (first person opportunity), and engaging or disengag-
ing from action by mobilizing resources and e↵orts with uncertain outcomes and payo↵s
(entrepreneurial action). In short, the entrepreneurial action emerges from the interactions
among potential actors over not only time but also space.
Evidence indicates that entrepreneurs are intimately embedded in a broader business
(and social) network and benefit from their connections with other entrepreneurs for the
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discovery of entrepreneurial opportunities (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Markman et al., 2005;
Parker, 2008). A notable example is the “open government data” initiatives in America.
By 2009 big data have made big di↵erence in business sectors. Pioneers like Google and
Microsoft have identified and exploited significant amount of entrepreneurial opportunities
to unlock new forms of value creation Keyhani et al., 2015. Their successful lessons later
convinced the government, the original gather of mass data (i.e., information hub), to release
the data to private sectors. Action was taken; on 21 January 2009, President Barack Obama
issued a presidential memorandum authorizing public access of government data to the
most extent (WhiteHouse, 2009). Google and Microsoft then took advantage of these rich
data to identify and pursue subsequent opportunities. In parallel, they have been keen to
making government data more open, transparent, and easily accessed to communities of
web developers and other users (WashingtonPost, 2009; Micosoft, 2014). As a result, those
developers do not need to collect or control mass data, could still utilize open government
data for exploring and then exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities. Successful ones may be
acquired by the pioneer firms later (Businessweek, 2014). In this sense, the open government
data initiative is an evolving spatiotemporal process where the pioneers play a central role
in engaging the government and developers to entrepreneurial activities: they are the hub
of this network. So network does matter for entrepreneurial action.
The aforementioned case demonstrates that network connections facilitate the feedback
from exploitation of an existing opportunity to discovery of subsequent opportunities over
space and over time. In any system, networked actors continuously modify the identification,
evaluation, and exploitation of opportunities based on connected others’ behavior. An
actor’s entrepreneurial action may increase the feasibility and desirability of subsequent
opportunities and provide such information to other actors through network connections
(Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013). In the open data case, the government and pioneering firms’
entrepreneurial actions make the opportunity exploration of big data feasible and desirable
to web developers and other potential users. The role of network here is to determine the
magnitude of feedback one’s action could possible generate, in terms of how many (i.e., the
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number of connected others) and how much (i.e., the degree of connections).
The underlying mechanism of entrepreneurial process in a networked system is the feed-
back loop from an exploitation of an existing opportunity to the recognition and evaluation
of subsequent opportunities (Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013). Loosely speaking, entrepreneurial
action displays spatial and contagious patterns, that is, how the actors are connected and
influenced in the system – who sways whom, shortly. In the graph theory sense, it refers
to both spatial and temporal interdependence between actors during repeated interactions
(Barabási, 2009; Newman et al., 2001; Nowak, 2006; Suweis et al., 2013; Vazquez et al., 2007).
That is, one’s (her) entrepreneurial action is likely to impact a connected actor’s (his) de-
cision on discovering an opportunity (i.e., space dimension), as well as provide information
and experience to herself on exploiting subsequent opportunities (i.e., time dimension). In
other words, her subsequent entrepreneurial-action decision is spatially dependent on his
feedback and temporally dependent on her past decisions (McMullen and Dimov, 2013;
Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013).
Graph theory has been widely applied to formalize spatial feedback processes of human
behavior, such as cooperation in the evolutionary literature (e.g., Lieberman et al. (2005);
Ohtsuki et al. (2006); Santos et al. (2008); Szabó and Fáth (2007), disease spreading in
the epistemology literature (e.g., Keeling (1999); Kretzschmar and Morris (1996)), and
innovation in the business literature (e.g., Schilling and Phelps, 2007; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005).
Graph theorists generalize network structure by arranging actors on a graph, where each
node (or vertex) represents an actor, and the arcs (or edges, links) depict who interacts
with whom (Lieberman et al., 2005; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Suweis et al., 2013). Following
this logic, network structure models the feedback system within which actors capture value
from opportunity exploitation to enhance recognition of subsequent opportunities.
On the other hand, the entrepreneurial action theory including McMullen and Shep-
herd (2006), Shepherd and Patzelt (2013), Shepherd et al. (2007), and Choi et al. (2008),
explores the temporal action process of identification, evaluation, and exploitation of a pos-
sible opportunity in pursuit of value creation. Yet three types of uncertainty will obfuscate
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the perceived need to act; they are state uncertainty, e↵ect uncertainty, and response un-
certainty (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Milliken, 1987). State uncertainty refers to an
inability to predict the future state of environmental components (e.g., whether a connected
actor will take entrepreneurial action and provide feedback to the focal actor under market
imperfection). E↵ect uncertainty refers to an inability to predict the impact of a future state
of the environment (e.g., knowing that turbulent environment is naturally value-creating or
value-destroying does not mean that the actor know how it will impacts him/her). Finally,
response uncertainty refers to the inability to specify response options and/or predict the
likely consequences of a response choice (e.g., whether a perceived need to act will turn
to action). In this sense, the temporal process of entrepreneurial action is to make action
decisions under those three types of uncertainty over time.
In this chapter, we develop a graph-theoretic model to study the spatiotemporal dy-
namics of entrepreneurial action. Our model includes a number of heterogeneous actors
in a networked system; and, they need to identify, evaluate and exploit opportunities for
value creation. At the temporal dimension, we use the random utility framework, pioneered
by Luce (1959) and McFadden (1974), to operationalize the decision-making process (i.e.,
the behavioral rule in graph theory language) of entrepreneurial action under uncertainty
conceptualized by McMullen and Shepherd (2006), Milliken (1987), Shepherd and Patzelt
(2013), Grégoire et al. (2010), Shepherd et al. (2007), and Shepherd and Patzelt (2011). In
particular, an actor’s perceived need to act is influenced by his/her opportunity-recognition
belief on the connection’s entrepreneurial-action decision for possible feedback under mar-
ket imperfection (Shepherd et al., 2007). So, entrepreneurial action will be the outcomes
of temporally and spatially dynamical interactions between actors’ entrepreneurial-action
decisions as well as the realization of uncertainties to their networked system (McMullen
and Dimov, 2013; Yang and Chandra, 2013).
At the spatial dimension, we investigate six distinctive structures of network that have
been observed in diverse domains: the square lattice network (Hauert and Szebó, 2003),
which has been widely studied in biology and evolutionary literatures, the pack network
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(Yayavaram and Ahuja, 2008), which captures the key characteristics in product and orga-
nization design, the small-world network (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and two extreme cases,
the random graph and the ring lattice network, which are widely adopted in epidemiological
studies, and the scale-free network (Barabási and Albert, 1999), which is a typical structure
for technological systems, such as world-wide web and computer virus infections. We believe
that these six network structures should cover most spatial patterns in the real world that
potential entrepreneurial actors could possibly be embedded in for identifying, evaluating,
and exploiting opportunities.
Our formal analysis provides a clear view on entrepreneurial action as a spatiotempo-
ral dynamical process: A shift in the network structure can significantly change the total
number of entrepreneurial action taken by all actors in a networked system. The scale-free
network, square lattice network and pack network generate more entrepreneurial actions
than the other three networks under uncertainty. We further show that the impacts of the
ring lattice network, random network, and small-world network on entrepreneurial action
are sensitive to actors’ opportunity-recognition belief. Specifically, they generate the most
entrepreneurial actions when actors’ opportunity-recognition belief follows a martingale –
the actors’ expectation of receiving entrepreneurial-action feedback from connections in the
next period is equal to the present observed feedback. In addition, they are more likely
to foster entrepreneurial action under optimistic opportunity-recognition belief – receiving
feedback from connections at each time period – over pessimistic opportunity-recognition
belief – receiving no feedback from connection at each time period. We conclude that there
is a close relationship between the network structure and the dynamics of entrepreneurship.
5.2 Model
Following the notations in Chapter 2, a weighted directed graph (⌦,N ,⇤) is a collection




, · · · ,!n}, the “arcs” N = {Iij(G)} that are directed connections
from node i to node j embedded in certain network structure G, and the “arcs weights” ,
where i, j 2 {1, 2, · · · , n}. For any ordered pair of nodes (i, j), Iij(G) 2 {0, 1}. We have
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Iij(G) = 1 only if a directed link is drawn from node i to node j, denoted as i ⇠ j; in
other words, i is j’s neighbor. Then, 0   ij  1 is a measure of their connection weight,
with larger values leading to stronger connection between nodes. A graph is said to be
weighted and directed when the arcs and arcs weights are asymmetric, i.e.,  ij 6=  ji and
Iij(G) 6= Iji(G). (Since this study uses the weighted directed graph only, the following
sections will use graph/network and weighted directed graph interchangeably.)
In our model, we refer to actors – potential entrepreneurial individuals, organizations,
or firms – as nodes, to connections – business and/or social relations – as arcs, and to anti-
friction – the degree of feedback against friction arising from imperfection in the economy,
such as transactional costs and barriers to trade (e.g., Chatain and Zemsky, 2011) – as
arcs weights. In other words, we depict the phenomenon of entrepreneurship as the form of
interconnected actors who may act entrepreneurially under market imperfection on a graph.
The graph is assumed to be fixed for the duration of analysis. Consider a network of n actors
pursuing possible opportunities for value creation. An entrepreneur is a networked actor
who acts upon opportunities and her/his action creates value for self and other networked
actors to whom s/he is connected. A non-entrepreneur is a networked actor who does
not act upon opportunities, but s/he may receive value from the neighboring actors acting
entrepreneurially.
Our model possesses the following two properties in graph theory: (1) space dynamical
property that depicts a network structure in which the actors attain feedback from connected
other’s entrepreneurial action; (2) time dynamical property that depicts the process of
forming entrepreneurial action for each networked actor. Consequently, we are able to
infer the entrepreneurial action dynamics of networked actors through the number and the
type, entrepreneur or non-entrepreneur, of their connections. The goal of this paper is to
operationalize these two properties so as to provide a formalism of entrepreneurial action
theory using weighted directed networks.
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5.2.1 Spatial feedback process to recognize third person opportunity
In this chapter, we discuss the structural features of six well-established networks, G =
1, 2, · · · , 6, under the same total number of connection where M = 4n, so as to investigate
the spatiotemporal dynamics of entrepreneurial action. Specifically, they are square lattices
(G = 1), packs (G = 2), ring lattices (G = 3), random (G = 4), small-world (G = 5),
and scale-free (G = 6). The illustration of these network structures can be found in Figure
5.1. Herein, we provide a verbal description of each structure based on the in-degree and
out-degree distributions, together with a graphic illustration for visualization, a symbolic
illustration, and a numerical illustration of structure matrix N for n = 12, as well as some
applications of the network structure in literature. (Detailed explanation and the algorithms
to construct the network with each structure are specified in Chapter 2.)
The six network structures explored depict di↵erent who-connects-to-whom patterns,
which a↵ects the feedback process of networked actors in reaching interdependent entrepreneurial-
action decisions (e.g., Albert et al., 2000; Parker, 2008; Rivkin and Siggelkow, 2007; Szabó
and Fáth, 2007). For instance, in a square lattice network, actors are connected on a
checkerboard-like grid with the edges wrapped around to form a torus; so each of them will
look for feedback from four neighbors to the east, south, west, and north. In a pack network,
actors exist in packs where the possible feedback comes from the other three pack mates
and one actor outside the pack. In a ring lattice network, actors are arranged in a circle so
that entrepreneurial actions from the two adjacent neighbors in both directions are likely
to modify their opportunity recognition. If we replace some of those local connections by
random connections, we say actors live on a small-world network. At the extreme condition,
a random graph rewires all local connections to be random. And in a scale-free network, a
small number of actors have significantly large connections and work as a hub of the net-
work, whose action will fed back the most entrepreneurial spillover into the system. With



















































































































5.2.2 Temporal action process to evaluate and exploit first person opportunity
Following the lead of McMullen and Shepherd (2006) and Keyhani et al. (forthoming),
taking an entrepreneurial action or not for actor i at time t can be viewed as the realization
of a Bernoulli random variable, taking value 1 with success probability pi,t and value 0 with
failure probability 1   pi,t. The probability pi,t is always within a range of 0 to 1, i.e.,
pi,t 2 [0, 1]. Then a formal notation of entrepreneurial action launched by actor i at time t
is
zi,t = 1(pi,t   "i,t|{z}
response uncertainty
  0) for t = 1, 2, · · · , T and i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
where 1(·) is the indicator function, and "i,t is the response uncertainty associated with the
action decision. So zi,t 2 {0, 1} indicates whether or not actor i takes entrepreneurial action
at time t. The success probability pi,t is the likelihood of entrepreneurial action taken by
actor i at time t. Notice that a high success probability pi,t is likely to associated with,
but cannot guarantee, an entrepreneurial action (zi,t = 1) under response uncertainty "i,t,
which is a floating point number uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. In other words,
"i,t impedes action by obfuscating the possibility for action. Our entrepreneurial-action
formulation is thus consistent with studies on the role of (response) uncertainty that plays
in preventing actors from acting entrepreneurially (Autio et al., 2013; Keh et al., 2002;
Lipshitz and Strauss, 1997; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Milliken, 1987; Shepherd et al.,
2007).
In line with the general and widely adopted practice in the economics and econometrics
literatures on decision-making behavior and process (e.g., Luce, 1959; McFadden, 1974), the





As such, we map the original success probability pi,t, which is bounded by 0 and 1, to the
real line of value created by entrepreneurial action. Following Bradley et al. (2011) and
Wiklund and Shepherd (2003), potential value creation from exploiting an identified and
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evaluated opportunity or not (i.e., taking an entrepreneurial action or not) is modeled as an
expected utility function consisting of the value possessed by networked actors: for actor i
at time t,







where !i,t 1 is the value that the actor i has generated before time t, j ⇠ i is a set of actors j
( 6= i) who connect to actor i, i ⇠ j is a set of actors j whom actor i connects to, and E[ ij,t 1]
is the opportunity-recognition belief on the degree of feedback against friction between the
neighboring actors around actor i at time t. Following this logic, our formulation in Equation
5.1 is consistent with Shepherd et al. (2007) that an entrepreneurial-action decision is based
on priori beliefs on opportunities, not necessarily facts. In this chapter, we consider three





 ji,t 1 if actor i’s opportunity-recognition belief is a martingale,
 ji,0 if actor i has an optimistic opportunity-recognition belief,
0 if actor i has a pessimistic opportunity-recognition belief,
where 8t :  ji,t 1 2 { ji,0, 0}. Specifically, in a martingale scenario, actor i believes that the
degree of entrepreneurial feedback from a neighbor j in the next time period is the same as
the present observed degree; in an optimism scenario, the actor relies on the initial feedback
information received at time 0 (We call it an optimistic belief because it implies that actor
j will always take entrepreneurial action at each time period and provide feedback to actor
i, explained later in Equation 5.2); in a pessimism scenario, the actor will not expect any
feedback from others’ entrepreneurial actions. Since opportunities may take the forms of
possible feedback from other actors’ entrepreneurial actions in a networked system (Gaimon
and Bailey, 2013; Keyhani et al., 2015; Parker, 2008; Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013), the
opportunity-recognition belief in our model depicts an actor’s awareness of a third-person
opportunity arising from entrepreneurial action launched by connected actors under market
imperfection. The optimism scenario is associated with the most number of entrepreneurial
opportunities, followed by the martingale scenario and finally the pessimism scenario.
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After recognizing a third-person opportunity, an actor next develops and employs a
collection of knowledge, skills, abilities and resources to evaluate and exploit it in pursuit
of potential value creation (Gaimon and Bailey, 2013; Joglekar and Lévesque, 2013; Mũnoz
C. et al., 2011). Similar to the modeling rationale in Haynie et al. (2009) and Keyhani
et al. (2015), Equation 5.1 describes that for actor i at time t, the opportunity-evaluation
outcome depends on not only her/his existing value, !i,t 1, but also the expected value
creation derived from the interactive feedback from adjacent actors, !j,t 1 for j ⇠ i. This
cost-benefit calculus later tells whether an identified opportunity worths pursuing, i.e., a
first person opportunity. So, our model provides a way of formalizing the verbal arguments
of third-person and first-person opportunities in the entrepreneurial action literature.
For a collection of n networked actors, the expected potential value creation at time t is




where ⌦t 1 is a vector of n actors’ created value at time t  1, ⇤t is the anti-friction matrix
at time t, and Dt = diag{1  
P
1⇠j  1j, 1  
P
2⇠j  2j, · · · , 1  
P
n⇠j  nj}. In other words,
we formulate the dynamic interplay between spatial feedback process rooted in network
structure and temporal entrepreneurial action process.
After actors make entrepreneurial-action decisions at time t following the realization
of Bernoulli process zi,t (pi,t), at time t, actor i’s actual entrepreneurial feedback from a





 ji,0 if zj,t = 1,
0 otherwise.
(5.2)
The rationale behind this equation is that actor j not taking action at time t (zj,t = 0) will
not create valuable feedback for actor i’s opportunity discovery, following the entrepreneur-
ship literature such as Keyhani et al., 2015. Then actor i’s value at time t is updated
following the equation








In summary, Equations 5.1 to 5.3 suggest an iterative scheme for making entrepreneurial-
action decisions in a networked system, as does Shepherd et al. (2007) and Grégoire et al.




be initial inputs for potential value creation. Now iterate
between
Step 1. Solve E[⌦
1




) to give ⇤
1
,
Step 2. Update ⌦
1
. Set t ! t+ 1 and return to Step 1.
5.2.3 Operationalization
The operationalization of the proposed model framework is as follows. We specify a network
structure G 2 {1, · · · , 6} in which n actors are embedded, as well as their opportunity-
recognition belief. At time t 2 {1, · · · , T} each actor makes an interdependent decision by
taking account of the decisions of neighboring actors around the focal actor. To illustrate the
complexity of entrepreneurial decision-making, we break down the symmetry of actors by
introducing heterogeneity in actor types (possessed value, ⌦, and degree of feedback against
friction, ⇤), as does Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007). Specifically, we impose di↵erences among
actors on their value possessed at time 0,
!i,0 = µ! + "! where "! ⇠ N(0,  2!).
Parameter µ! is the average value controled by networked actors at the beginning. Standard
normal random variable "! with variance  2! captures the variability among the actors’ initial
values. Asymmetric anti-friction matrix at time 0 (i.e.,  ij,0 6=  ji,0) is modeled as
 ij,0 = µ  + "  where "  ⇠ N(0,  2 ).
Parameter µ  is the actors’ average degree of feedback against friction under market im-
perfection. Standard normal random variable "  with variance  2  captures heterogeneous
degree of feedback against friction and is censored so that the value of  ij,0 is between 0 and
1. (We can then use sensitivity analysis on parameters "! and "  to examine the impact of
networked actors’ inherent di↵erences on their spatiotemporal dynamics of entrepreneurial
actions.)
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Subsequently, the simulation starts to be executed until time T is reached. With each
time tick (time is discrete in our setting), the actors evaluate the identified entrepreneurial
opportunities following Equation 5.1 and eventually make entrepreneurial-action decisions
according to the realization of Bernoulli random variables {zi,t}.
At each time t, we are interested in the number of entrepreneurial actions in the network,







such that 0   t  1. We use this measure to evaluate the impact of network structure,
the dynamic e↵ect of opportunity-recognition belief, and the e cacy of starting value and
degree of feedback against friction. The simulation of the proposed model was carried out
in Netlogo, which is one of major platforms to conduct research in computational social
science and network science (Miller and Page, 2007).
5.2.4 Illustration
In this section, we illustrate a stylized example for the proposed formal model of en-
trepreneurial action dynamics. Consider six actors embedded in a network with 12 con-
nections in total, i.e., ⌦ = {!
1
, · · · ,!
6
} and M = 12. To make it simple for the illus-
tration purpose, we set  ij =  i for all j ⇠ i and  i,t =  i,0. The martingale scenario of
opportunity-recognition belief is applied. The spatiotemporal dynamics of entrepreneurial
action is investigated in two graphs: a random graph in the left panel and a regular network
in the right panel, shown in Figure 5.2. The two graphs have di↵erent structure matrices
so that the 12 connections are distributed in a di↵erent manner.
In the left panel, the actors have di↵erent out- and in-degrees, as described in the struc-
ture matrix N . Specifically, actors 1, 2, 4, 6 each has two neighbors (i,(out) = i,(in) =
i = 2, for i = 1, 2, 4, 6), whereas actors 3 and 5 have one neighbor and three neighbors,
respectively (
3
= 1 and 
5
= 3). The table at bottom depicts the process that each actor
interacts with neighboring actors and makes corresponding decisions on entrepreneurial ac-





































the expected value at time t + 1, E[!i,t+1], following Equation 5.1. Next, actor i assesses
the probability of taking entrepreneurial action, pi,t+1 and the resulting decision of acting
entrepreneurially or not follows the realization of a Bernoulli process at time t, zi,t+1(pi,t).
In general, according to the entrepreneurship literature (and the random utility framework
in the econometrics and statistics literature), actor i with a better outcome of opportunity
evaluation (i.e., higher probability pi,t+1) is more likely to take entrepreneurial action from
time t to time t+ 1. For instance, actor 6 with p
6,t+1 = 0.968 (> 0.171, an uniform random
number of response uncertainty to decide the realization of a Bernoulli random variable, see
Miller and Page, 2007) will act, denoted as E, whereas actor 2 with p
2,t+1 = 0.354 (< 0.739)
will not act at time t + 1, denoted as ¬E. It is noticeable that our random-utility based
formulation allows actors take action under low probabilities or take non-action under high
probabilities due to some randomness, in line with the entrepreneurship literature on un-
certainty and risk (Myerson, 2004; Nair et al., 2009). Actor 5, for example, decides not to
act upon an opportunity even at p
5,t+1 = 0.924 (< 0.977). So, our model successfully cap-
tures the phenomena of entrepreneurial action dynamics under response uncertainty. The
entrepreneurial action ratio at time t + 1 is  t+1 = 3/6 = 0.5, i.e., three out of six actors
acting. Finally, according to Equation 5.3, all actors update their possessed value as !i,t+1,
i = 1, 2, · · · , 6, when the actual degree of feedback are known upon the entrepreneurial-
action decisions.
When the network structure for these six actors is a regular network, see the right panel
of Figure 5.2, the entrepreneurial action dynamics changes dramatically. Herein, each actor
is connected to the two most adjacent neighboring actors (i = 2 for i = 1, · · · , 6). We can
see that most actors significantly modify the expectation towards potential value creation
if exercising entrepreneurial-action decisions. Take actor 3 as an example. The probability
of taking entrepreneurial action for this actor from time t to time t + 1 drops from 0.786
to 0.130, which ultimately leading to a non-action decision. At the network dimension,
the entrepreneurial action ratio increases, i.e.,  t+1 = 4/6 = 0.67, comparing to 0.5 in the
random graph. Note that the only di↵erence between the two panels is network structure.
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Thus, network structure is fully responsible for the changes in the entrepreneurial action
dynamics for potential value creation.
In the subsequent sections, we follow the best practice of developing management and
organizational theory through simulation experiments (Davis et al., 2007; Harrison et al.,
2007; Miller and Page, 2007).
5.3 Analysis
We analyze our model in two stages. First we conduct a base case analysis to investigate the
role of six network structure in entrepreneurial action dynamics. They are examined under
three scenarios – martingale, optimism, and pessimism for opportunity-recognition belief.
To understand the sensitivity of model parameters, we next resort to an extensive numerical
analysis via a careful experimental design to illustrate their e↵ects on entrepreneurial action
over time and space.
5.3.1 Base case
Without loss of much generality, we set the actors’ starting value from a standard normal
distribution with variance 1, i.e. !i,0 ⇠ N(0, 1), and the degree of feedback against friction
is drawn from a truncated normal distribution with mean µ  = 0.2 and variance  
2
  = 0.04,
ranging from 0 to 1. Table 5.1 summarizes the parameter values used in the base case.
Table 5.1: Parameter values in base case setting
Parameter Values Meaning
G {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} Six network structures (as illustrated in Figure 5.1)
↵ † 0.4 Rewiring probability in small-world networks
n 480 Total number of actors on the network
!i,0 N(0, 1) Value possessed at time 0
 ij,0 TN(0.2, 0.2) Degree of feedback between actor pairs (0   ij,0  1)
† Our results are insensitive to the choice of ↵, consistent with the findings in Rivkin and Siggelkow























































































































































































































































































Figure 5.3 vividly depicts that network structures generate heterogeneous impacts on
the dynamics of entrepreneurial action. In general, we observe that a larger number of
actors act entrepreneurially in square lattice (G = 1) network, pack (G = 2) network,
and scale-free (G = 6) network so that the entrepreneurial action ratios in these three
network structures are relatively high. The results are consistent among the three scenarios
of opportunity-recognition belief. For instance, in a pack network, over 40-percent of actors
take entrepreneurial action in each time period. On the contrary, only a small number of
actors (less than 20-percent) are motivated to act entrepreneurially when they are embedded
in ring lattice (G = 3) network, random (G = 4) graph, and small-world (G = 5) network.
Those three network structures act as suppressors of entrepreneurship.
Additionally, the impact of each network structure on entrepreneurial action dynamics
varies across the three scenarios of actors’ opportunity-recognition belief. As illustrated in
Figure 5.3, actors embedded in pack (G = 2) network and scale-free (G = 6) network are
most likely to take entrepreneurial actions when they have optimistic belief. Likewise, when
actors hold pessimistic opportunity-recognition belief, they may overlook potential feedback
from others’ entrepreneurial actions, resulting in relatively low entrepreneurial action ratios
in these two networks. The results are consistent with our expectation that entrepreneurial
action ratio increases in the number of third-person opportunities. However, for actors
embedded in the other four networks, they are most likely to act entrepreneurially under
the martingale scenario. That is, opportunity-recognition belief derived from the recent
observed entrepreneurial feedback are more e↵ective to identify third-person opportunities
that are feasible and desirable to be exploited for value creation in square lattice (G = 1)
network, ring lattice (G = 3) network, random (G = 4) graph, and small-world (G = 5)
network. These observations suggest that networked actors’ decisions on entrepreneurial
action are regulated by heir opportunity-recognition beliefs and network structure which
they are embedded in.
In the following sections, we develop a three-level full factorial design to examine the
impact of network structure under various combinations of key model parameters and to
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check the robustness of results from the base case. The parameter values used in our
experiment are listed in Table 5.2. In total, we examine 81(= 34) parameter instances
consisting a wide range of possible scenarios. We run each parameter instance 100 times
to achieve statistical reliability for inference. We investigate the spatiotemporal dynamics
of entrepreneurial action under three opportunity-recognition belief scenarios, optimism,
martingale, and pessimism, respectively. This gives a total of 8100 experiments for each
network structure under each opportunity-recognition belief scenario. Under each scenario,
we explain how di↵erences in the degree of feedback against friction and initial possessed
value change the entrepreneurial action dynamics in each network structure.
Table 5.2: Parameter values in experiments
Parameter Values Meaning
µ 0 {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} Average degree of feedback against friction
  0 {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} Standard deviation of degree of feedback among networked actors
µ!0 {-5, 0, 5} Average value possessed at time 0
 !0 {1, 5, 10} Standard deviation of possessed value among networked actors
5.3.2 Experiment under the optimism scenario
When actors hold optimistic opportunity-recognition belief, Figure 5.4 plots the ranking
outcomes on the entrepreneurial action ratio, among the network structures, at the end of
the simulation time. Rank 1 indicates the highest entrepreneurial action ratio and rank 6
indicates the lowest ratio among all the six network structures. In general, the number of
entrepreneurial actions are the most in pack (G = 2) network and square lattice (G = 1)
network, followed by scale-free (G = 6) network and random (G = 4) graph, and the least
in small-world (G = 5) network and ring lattice (G = 3) network.
To further elaborate the impact of network structure, in Table 5.3 we summarize the
degree of feedback and possessed value against the entrepreneurial action ratios under var-
ious experimental scenarios. Looking down each column of the table, i.e., holding fixed the
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Figure 5.4: Rank of network structures under the optimism scenario
Table 5.3: Entrepreneurial action dynamics under the optimism scenario
µ 0   0 µ!0  !0
L M H L M H L M H L M H
{0.2} {0.5} {0.8} {0.2} {0.5} {0.8} { 5} {0} {5} {1} {5} {10}
G = 1 45.58 24.78 8.44 29.98 25.80 23.04 25.82 26.24 26.74 26.26 26.28 26.27
(0.13) (0.05) (0.06) (0.25) (0.15) (0.07) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
G = 2 50.57 32.68 13.63 32.61 32.63 31.63 31.69 32.30 32.90 32.23 32.31 32.33
(0.10) (0.04) (0.10) (0.25) (0.15) (0.07) (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
G = 3 0.39 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.28 0.46 0.15 0.17 0.31 0.42
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
G = 4 7.36 2.87 2.30 6.44 3.08 3.01 3.63 4.02 4.87 4.42 4.29 3.82
(0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
G = 5 1.06 0.35 0.25 0.91 0.39 0.36 0.45 0.67 0.54 0.37 0.69 0.60
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
G = 6 36.97 19.19 9.30 27.06 20.35 18.06 21.86 21.92 21.70 22.07 21.64 21.76
(0.15) (0.07) (0.05) (0.22) (0.12) (0.07) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Note. The entrepreneurial action ratio (in percentage value   ⇥ 100) is based on an average of 100 runs of
81 experiments. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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experimental parameters, we shadow the network structure in grey as it is associated with
a higher entrepreneurial action ratio than the others. Specifically, actors embedded in pack
(G = 2) network, square lattice (G = 1) network, and scale-free (G = 6) network are much
more likely to take entrepreneurial actions than those embedded in the other three networks
in all experimental scenarios, consistent the findings in the base case. Further, packs are as-
sociated with the largest number of actors who acting entrepreneurially among the top three
network structures. Square lattices and scale-free are e↵ective in fostering entrepreneurial
action when the average degree of feedback (parameter µ 0) against friction is low and high,
respectively. On the contrary, random (G = 4) graph, small-world (G = 5) network, and
ring lattice (G = 3) network facilitate a small number of entrepreneurial actions in pursuit
of potential value creation. As shown in Table 5.3, no greater than 1% of actors acting
entrepreneurially when they are embedded in ring lattice network and small-world network.
Looking across each row of the table, we find that the parameters impact the en-
trepreneurial action dynamics in a consistent way across the six network structures under
the optimism scenario. The mean degree of feedback, parameter µ 0 , and the standard
deviation, parameter   0 , have more significant e↵ect on the entrepreneurial action ratio
than the parameters µ!0 and  !0 for the initial possessed value. Specifically, the degree of
feedback parameters negatively a↵ect the number of actors acting entrepreneurially. The
networked actors achieve the most entrepreneurial actions when their degrees of feedback
against friction are distributed with a low mean and low standard deviation. We plot the
interaction e↵ect of the two parameters for each network structure in the top panel of Figure
5.5. When the average degree of feedback is low (µ 0 = 0.2, circles overlayed by a dashed
line), the entrepreneurial action ratio in most network structures decreases significantly as
the standard deviation increases (with an exception of concave downwards in ring lattices).
In contrast, when the average degree of feedback against friction is high (µ 0 = 0.8, squares
overlayed by a dotted line), the entrepreneurial action ratio slightly improved in the standard
deviation. So, while a low mean degree of feedback is always associated with a larger num-
ber of entrepreneurial actions than a high mean, the advantage diminishes as the variability
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among the actors increases.



























Figure 5.5: Interaction plot of experimental parameters under the optimism scenario
The bottom panel of Figure 5.5 shows a mixed marginal impact of actors’ initial possessed
value on the entrepreneurial action ratio. In square lattice network, pack network, and
random graph, actors possessing higher starting value (µ!0 = 5, squares overlaid by a
dotted line) are marginally more likely to act entrepreneurially. When actors are embedded
in ring lattice network, small-world network, In contrast, high initial possessed value does
not give actors advantages in taking entrepreneurial actions. Note that impact of possessed
value (parameter !
0
) is not significant across all network structures. So, we will focus our
analysis on the degree of feedback against friction impacting entrepreneurial action dynamics
in various network structures.
In summary, under the optimism scenario, pack network and square lattice network
favor entrepreneurial action for the actors sharing low degree of feedback against friction,
and pack network and scale-free network for the actors sharing high degree of feedback. The
number of entrepreneurial actions is relatively high when actors have small variation in their
degrees of feedback under market imperfection.
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5.3.3 Experiment under the martingale scenario
When actors adjust their opportunity-recognition beliefs based on the entrepreneurial feed-
back from the previous period, i.e., opportunity-recognition beliefs following a martingale,
Figure 5.6 plots the ranking outcomes of network structures on entrepreneurial action ratio.
We observe that scale-free (G = 6) network ranks the first, the small-world (G = 5) the
last, and the other four network structures in the middle. That is, the ranking of network
structures are largely dispersed under the martingale scenario. We next carefully examine
the conditions moderating the rankings of network structures.










Figure 5.6: Rank of network structures under the martingale scenario
In Table 5.4 we summarize the entrepreneurial action ratio in the six network structures,
at the end of the simulation time, in the presence of various experimental parameter combi-
nations. Looking down each column of the table, we find in general that actors embedded
in scale-free (G = 6) network, square lattice (G = 1) network, and pack (G = 2) network
are more likely to take entrepreneurial actions than actors embedded in the other three
networks. However, their leading edge is very narrow (mostly less than 10% di↵erences)
under the martingale scenario in comparison to that under the optimism scenario (up to
50% di↵erences) in Section 5.3.2. In particular, when the average degree of feedback against
friction is high, i.e., µ 0 = 0.8, ring lattice (G = 3) ranks the second, random (G = 4) the
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third, and small-world (G = 5) the forth, surpassing square lattices and packs. So, the role
of networks structure is dependent on the degree of feedback under the martingale scenario.
Specifically, both the mean degree of feedback (parameter µ 0) and the standard devi-
ation (parameter   0) generate adverse impacts on the entrepreneurial action ratio across
the six network structures, consistent with the patterns under the optimism scenario. As re-
ported in Table 5.4, the most number of actors act entrepreneurially when the friction under
market imperfection resists the degree of feedback between them. That is, entrepreneurial
actions arise from imperfect market process. To visualize this finding, we further plot the
interaction e↵ect of the two parameters in the top panel of Figure 5.7. The highest en-
trepreneurial action ratio is achieved at a low mean and a small standard deviation. And
such ratio decreases as either the mean increases (the circle point above the stars and
squares), or the standard deviation increases (a downward slope of the circles overlayed by
a dashed line), or both. Similar to the optimism scenario, the impacts of initial possessed
value parameters (mean, parameter µ!0 , and standard deviation, parameter  !0) are mixed
and marginal. High average value is associated with better entrepreneurial action ratio in
most network structures, except from square lattices and scale-free.



























Figure 5.7: Interaction plot of experimental parameters under the martingale scenario
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Table 5.4: Entrepreneurial action dynamics under the martingale scenario
µ 0   0 µ!0  !0
L M H L M H L M H L M H
{0.2} {0.5} {0.8} {0.2} {0.5} {0.8} { 5} {0} {5} {1} {5} {10}
G = 1 29.04 10.35 5.34 23.03 11.15 10.54 15.00 14.82 14.91 14.93 14.98 14.82
(0.21) (0.02) (0.03) (0.25) (0.05) (0.02) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
G = 2 23.78 10.66 5.36 18.02 11.17 10.62 13.04 13.34 13.43 13.34 13.31 13.16
(0.13) (0.02) (0.03) (0.18) (0.05) (0.02) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
G = 3 10.76 9.76 8.97 9.99 9.75 9.75 9.17 9.68 10.64 9.72 9.96 9.80
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
G = 4 16.29 9.30 6.84 12.94 9.89 9.59 8.93 10.54 12.96 10.34 10.72 11.36
(0.08) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
G = 5 10.85 8.22 6.17 9.22 8.11 7.91 8.07 8.10 9.06 8.46 8.48 8.30
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
G = 6 23.26 16.32 13.76 20.17 16.69 16.48 17.88 17.64 17.82 17.70 17.84 17.79
(0.09) (0.02) (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Note. The entrepreneurial action ratio (in percentage value   ⇥ 100) is based on an average of 100 runs of
81 experiments. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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In summary, under the martingale scenario, square lattice network, pack network, and
scale-free network foster entrepreneurial actions for the actors sharing low degree of feedback
against friction, and scale-free network and ring lattice network for those sharing high degree
of feedback. The entrepreneurial action ratio decreases in the the variation of the degree of
feedback among the actors.
5.3.4 Experiment under the pessimism scenario
When actors hold pessimistic opportunity-recognition belief, Figure 5.8 plots the ranking
outcomes of the network structures on the entrepreneurial action ratio. Specifically, actors
embedded in scale-free (G = 6) network are the most likely to act entrepreneurially, followed
by those embedded in square lattice (G = 1) network, pack (G = 2) network. The number
of entrepreneurial actions in random (G = 4) graph ranks fourth among the six network
structures, whereas ring lattice (G = 3) network and small-world (G = 5) network are tied
for the worst ranking outcome.










Figure 5.8: Rank of network structures under the pessimism scenario
We summarize the experimental results of entrepreneurial action ratio under the pes-
simism scenario in Table 5.5. The number of actors acting entrepreneurially are significantly
less than that under the martingale scenario; this pattern is consistent across all network
structures. Looking down each column of the table, we find that scale-free (G = 6) net-
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Table 5.5: Entrepreneurial action dynamics under the pessimism scenario
µ 0   0 µ!0  !0
L M H L M H L M H L M H
{0.2} {0.5} {0.8} {0.2} {0.5} {0.8} { 5} {0} {5} {1} {5} {10}
G = 1 20.98 9.48 4.45 15.57 9.96 9.38 9.29 11.92 13.69 12.50 11.74 10.67
(0.12) (0.02) (0.03) (0.16) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
G = 2 20.81 9.36 4.53 15.22 10.00 9.48 9.54 12.04 13.12 12.60 11.61 10.49
(0.12) (0.02) (0.03) (0.16) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
G = 3 4.35 3.71 3.47 3.93 3.78 3.82 3.85 3.78 3.90 4.17 3.75 3.60
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
G = 4 11.12 7.28 5.57 8.65 7.68 7.64 6.04 6.92 11.02 7.96 7.87 8.14
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
G = 5 4.87 3.59 2.87 3.87 3.76 3.70 3.19 3.45 4.69 4.11 3.57 3.66
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
G = 6 19.04 14.31 10.79 15.25 14.44 14.46 13.70 16.24 14.20 15.49 14.80 13.85
(0.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Note. The entrepreneurial action ratio (in percentage value   ⇥ 100) is based on an average of 100 runs of
81 experiments. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
work, square lattice (G = 1) network, and pack (G = 2) network generally facilitate a
larger number of entrepreneurial actions than random (G = 4) graph, small-world (G = 5)
network, and ring lattice (G = 3) network. When the actors’ average degree of feedback
against friction is high (i.e., µ 0 = 0.8), however, random graph achieves the second best
ranking outcome. In other words, parameter µ 0 a↵ects the role of network structure in
entrepreneurial action dynamics.
Looking across each row of the table, we find that the e↵ects of the experimental param-
eters in all network structures are consistent under the pessimism scenario. For instance,
the networked actors are likely to take entrepreneurial action when their average degree
of feedback against friction (parameter µ 0) is low and average initial possessed value (pa-
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rameter µ!0) is high. These two mean parameters have more significant e↵ects than the
two standard-deviation parameters,   0 and  !0 , where low actor variability leads to high
entrepreneurial action ratio in both cases. In Figure 5.9 we further plot how the distribu-
tions of the actors’ degree of feedback and initial values impact the entrepreneurial action
dynamics in each network structure. Similar to the optimism and martingale scenarios,
the top panel shows that the low average degree of feedback (µ 0 = 0.2, circles overlayed
by a dashed line) dominates the medium (µ 0 = 0.5, stars overlayed by a solid line) and
high (µ 0 = 0.8, squares overlayed by a dotted line) levels. Yet the advantage diminishes
as the standard deviation increases. On the other hand, the bottom panel of Figure 5.9
highlights the favorable return of possessing high initial value (µ!0 = 5, squares overlayed
by a dotted line), especially for actors embedded in square lattice network, pack network,
random network, and small-world network.



























Figure 5.9: Interaction plot of experimental parameters under the pessimism scenario
In summary, under the pessimism scenario, square lattice network, pack network, and
scale-free network favor entrepreneurial action for the actors sharing low degree of feedback
against friction, and scale-free network and random graph for those sharing high degree of




So far we implicitly assumed compulsory participation in the entrepreneurial process by
considering every actors as a potential entrepreneurs. In nature, however, actors often have
the possibility and ability to be risk averse and refuse to participate in the entrepreneurial
process. Following Hauert and Szebó (2003), we model this by introducing a second charac-
ter: the loners. Loners act as insulators in the entrepreneurial process; they do not act upon
potential opportunities for value creation in despite of neighbors’ entrepreneurial feedback.
In this model extension, we refer to both actors and loners as nodes. The density of





, 0  d  1,
where Ii = 1 indicates an actor i, and Ij = 0 a loner j. But there is no feedback between
any connected actor and loner, i.e.,  ij = 0 for Ii 6= Ij 2 {0, 1} and i ⇠ j. So the number of
actors is [d⇥n], or [dn], where “[x]” is a function which returns the nearest integer to x. We




zi,t/[dn], for Ii = 1.
We examine 81 (= 34) parameter instances consisting of every combination in Section 5.3
and analyze the impact of parameters to the entrepreneurial action ratio under many actor
densities, d = {0.2, 0.5, 0.8}, and the martingale scenario as illustrated in Table 5.6. (The
patterns are similar under the optimistic and pessimistic opportunity-recognition believes;
we include the experiment results in the Supplementary Notes). Looking down each column
of the table, the entrepreneurial action ratios are not significantly di↵erent from each network
structure when d = 0.2, see panel 1 of Table 5.6. This is intuitive since the low actor density
disrupts the designated structure of a graph. The role of network structure in entrepreneurial
action dynamics becomes virtual as the density of actors increases. In the panel 3 of Table
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Table 5.6: Entrepreneurial action dynamics in the presence of loners under the martingale
scenario
µ 0   0 µ!0  !0
L M H L M H L M H L M H
Panel 1 : d = 0.2
G = 1 47.90 48.20 49.05 49.27 48.09 47.79 26.91 49.18 69.06 47.88 48.24 49.03
(0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.23) (0.18) (0.14)
G = 2 46.93 46.81 47.25 47.39 46.85 46.74 26.05 47.85 67.07 47.41 47.01 46.56
(0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.23) (0.18) (0.13)
G = 3 40.23 39.86 39.66 39.95 39.86 39.94 17.73 41.30 60.72 38.03 40.26 41.46
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.26) (0.18) (0.11)
G = 4 49.80 49.34 48.04 49.27 48.95 48.95 28.39 50.09 68.70 47.64 49.53 50.00
(0.20) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.11) (0.06) (0.09) (0.25) (0.18) (0.11)
G = 5 43.52 43.02 42.66 43.13 42.99 43.08 21.67 44.94 62.59 41.25 43.28 44.68
(0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.25) (0.17) (0.11)
G = 6 47.39 45.91 45.13 46.85 45.88 45.71 24.64 46.67 67.13 45.96 46.17 46.31
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.09) (0.07) (0.11) (0.25) (0.19) (0.13)
Panel 2 : d = 0.5
G = 1 43.44 40.73 33.94 40.19 39.17 38.75 33.83 39.93 44.35 39.30 39.36 39.45
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
G = 2 40.62 38.62 34.85 38.70 37.79 37.60 30.28 39.31 44.49 38.96 38.06 37.07
(0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
G = 3 27.24 26.38 25.63 26.19 26.46 26.61 17.06 28.43 33.77 23.76 26.83 28.66
(0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.11) (0.07) (0.04)
G = 4 40.61 35.17 28.97 36.34 34.53 33.89 27.23 34.34 43.19 33.56 35.10 36.09
(0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09)
G = 5 31.93 30.21 28.03 30.09 30.14 29.94 25.78 30.26 34.13 29.50 30.25 30.42
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.04)
G = 6 41.12 32.88 29.30 37.13 33.19 32.98 27.11 34.40 41.79 34.50 34.21 34.59
(0.13) (0.09) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.10)
Panel 3 : d = 0.8
G = 1 36.86 19.74 12.02 29.69 19.93 19.00 22.63 22.95 23.03 22.98 22.83 22.82
(0.19) (0.03) (0.05) (0.24) (0.07) (0.04) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
G = 2 31.15 22.24 14.81 25.67 21.63 20.89 21.18 23.11 23.91 23.15 22.65 22.39
(0.10) (0.03) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
G = 3 16.42 15.30 14.27 15.31 15.31 15.36 13.34 15.86 16.79 14.53 15.66 15.80
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
G = 4 24.80 17.15 12.18 20.17 17.20 16.76 14.54 17.53 22.05 17.28 17.99 18.86
(0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.12) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
G = 5 17.58 14.82 12.32 15.46 14.75 14.52 14.19 14.62 15.92 14.99 14.91 14.83
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
G = 6 29.84 21.14 18.31 26.20 21.68 21.41 21.98 23.09 24.22 23.05 23.03 23.21
(0.11) (0.03) (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Note. The experiment settings are identical to those in Table 5.4.
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5.6, we highlight that square lattice (G = 1) networks, pack (G = 2) networks, and scale-
free (G = 3) networks generally foster a larger number of entrepreneurial actions, consistent
with the findings in Section 5.3.
Looking across each row of the table, we observe that the e↵ect of the actors’ initial
possessed value on entrepreneurial action ratio is significant when the density of actors is
relatively low. In contrast, the degree of feedback against friction significantly impacts the
number of actors taking entrepreneurial actions when the density of actors is relatively high.
In other words, the impact of spatial feedback outweighs the impact of initial endowment
as the density of actors increases. This pattern is consistent across all the six network
structures.
In summary, the insights we derived from Section 5.3 are preserved in the presence of
loners in the model extension.
5.5 Discussion
This chapter formalizes and extends the action-based entrepreneurship framework (Mc-
Mullen and Shepherd, 2006) into the context of network dynamics. An actor’s pursuit of
an entrepreneurial opportunity is dependent on the decisions of connected others, who are
embedded in the same network with the focal actor. So, network matters since it creates a
feedback system where networked actors capture information from a connection’s exploita-
tion of an existing opportunity and enhance their identification of subsequent opportunities
(Shepherd and Patzelt, 2013). A network depicts whom the actor meets and how they inter-
act with each other, i.e., network structure and the degree of feedback against friction under
market imperfection. Herein, we study various well-received types of network structures and
how feedback a↵ects each actors’ decision of entrepreneurial action, hence influencing the
dynamics of entrepreneurship over time and space.
Essentially, entrepreneurial action dynamics vary across alternative networks. The un-
derlying “who-connects-to-whom” structure controls the direction of possible feedback from
one actor’s opportunity exploitation to opportunity recognition for someone in the same
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network. Yet the friction often undermines feedback among networked actors under market
imperfection, which takes the forms of transactional costs and barriers to trade (Chatain
and Zemsky, 2011). Our results support the literature that imperfection in the economy
creates entrepreneurial opportunities (e.g., Keyhani et al., 2015): the number of actors act-
ing entrepreneurially increases as their average degree of feedback against friction decreases.
In other words, friction gives some actors (the entrepreneurs) advantages to discover op-
portunities for potential value creation (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006). These findings are
consistent across all network structures.
In addition, the impact of network structure in fostering entrepreneurial actions is moder-
ated by actors’ beliefs on the presence of a third-person opportunity. According to Shepherd
et al. (2007) and Grégoire et al. (2010), entrepreneurs must successfully escape ignorance to
form a third-person opportunity-recognition belief and then utilizes the possible feedback
to pursue a first-person opportunity for value creation. We observe di↵erent entrepreneurial
action dynamics across the three opportunity-recognition belief scenarios. For instance,
actors holding an optimist belief of receiving feedback from connected neighbors (i.e., the
optimism scenario) are most likely to take entrepreneurial actions, especially for those em-
bedded in square lattice network, pack network, and scale-free network. In contrast, actors
holding a pessimistic belief of not receiving any feedback from connections (i.e., the pes-
simism scenario) are relatively less likely to act entrepreneurially among the three scenarios.
Finally, structures like random, ring lattice, and small-world facilitate the most number of
entrepreneurial actions when actors’ opportunity-recognition beliefs follow a martingale.
Note that possessed value is vital to the exploitation of recognized opportunities as
entrepreneurial action is inherently a value-based decision (Bradley et al., 2011; Haynie
et al., 2009). It determines whether actors will actually engage in entrepreneurial action or
not. The higher the possessed value, the more likely the entrepreneurial action will take
place. This is supported by our results under the pessimism scenario, where actors tend
to ignore third-person opportunities arising from connections’ possible feedback. Under the
martingale and optimism scenarios, however, a seemly contradicting result in our study is
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that the initial value does not impose a significant impact on the spatiotemporal dynamics
of entrepreneurial actions. Indeed, this finding is in line with McMullen and Dimov’s (2013)
process view that entrepreneurship is a journey. An actor’s possessed value is most likely
to change as long as self or any of neighboring actors made an entrepreneurial action. As a
result, the e↵ect of the starting value diminishes during a sequence of dynamic interactions
among networked actors. In other words, our formulation of entrepreneurial action is truly






























Figure 5.10: The role of network structures on entrepreneurial action dynamics
We conclude that entrepreneurship is largely influenced by actors’ degree of feedback
against friction, their opportunity-recognition beliefs, and the embedded network structure.
Figure 5.10 summarizes our insights from the analysis and discussion. This conceptual
framework provides managerial insights in the demarcating regions of e↵ective network
structures in fostering entrepreneurial actions in space-time. Our introductory case of open
government data illustrates this recommendation.Big data brings numerous opportunities to
business and public sections so that actors are optimistic about the presence of third-person
138
opportunities. However, the feedback among them are constrained by friction such as limited
access to the data, patent, and legislation. For instance, not until the government took the
open data initiatives, actors have not been able to utilize the data for entrepreneurial actions.
As actors in the big data era are mostly prospective technology-based entrepreneurs, their
embedded network often has a scale-free structure where new actors continuously join the
network and the pioneers act as hubs. In line with the real-world observation, this scale-free
network is e↵ective to facilitate entrepreneurial actions from the ever-increasing number of
actors to explore and exploit the value of big data.
5.6 Supplementary Notes
5.6.1 Sensitivity analysis on the rewiring probability in small-world networks
Figure 5.11 depicts the time plot of entrepreneurial action ratio in response to various
rewiring probabilities, where ↵ = 0.1, · · · , 0.9 under the optimism, martingale, and pes-
simism scenarios, respectively.
We observe that various rewiring probabilities results in less than 0.05% di↵erence in
entrepreneurial action; other than that, the dynamics of entrepreneurial action show the
same patterns under each opportunity-recognition scenario. So, the plots suggest that the
dynamics of entrepreneurial actions are insensitive to the choice of ↵.
5.6.2 Extension under the optimism and pessimism scenarios
Tables 5.7 and 5.8 summarize the experiment results on the entrepreneurial action dynamics
in the presence of loners under the optimism and pessimism scenarios, respectively. The
patterns are fairly consistent to those in Table 5.6 (under the martingale scenario) – When
the density is relatively low, the initial endowment has a major impact on the number of
actors taking entrepreneurial action; and the degree of feedback against friction significantly
influence the entrepreneurial action ratio as the density of actors increases. The key findings
in Section 5.3 are supported.
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a) The optimism scenario
b) The martingale scenario
c) The pessimism scenario
Figure 5.11: Sensitivity analysis on the rewiring probability in small-world networks
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Table 5.7: Entrepreneurial action dynamics in the presence of loners under the optimism
scenario
µ 0   0 µ!0  !0
L M H L M H L M H L M H
Panel 1 : d = 0.2
G = 1 49.00 50.28 51.91 50.66 50.18 50.36 29.61 50.61 70.98 50.33 50.24 50.62
(0.20) (0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) (0.22) (0.18) (0.14)
G = 2 48.01 48.92 49.81 49.00 48.78 48.95 28.94 49.30 68.49 49.48 49.02 48.24
(0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.21) (0.17) (0.13)
G = 3 28.67 27.65 27.21 27.48 27.83 28.23 11.09 28.32 44.13 27.54 27.93 28.07
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.20) (0.14) (0.10)
G = 4 46.09 44.58 43.85 44.75 44.87 44.91 24.77 46.40 63.35 44.72 44.70 45.11
(0.20) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10) (0.24) (0.17) (0.11)
G = 5 34.21 33.01 31.94 32.70 33.13 33.33 14.50 34.16 50.50 32.61 33.16 33.39
(0.18) (0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.08) (0.06) 0.09() (0.22) (0.16) (0.11)
G = 6 51.26 52.16 52.10 51.68 51.86 51.99 30.82 52.30 72.40 52.00 51.70 51.82
(0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.24) (0.18) (0.13)
Panel 2 : d = 0.5
G = 1 51.98 55.56 52.10 50.00 54.67 54.99 47.12 53.54 58.99 53.50 53.20 52.95
(0.09) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
G = 2 49.15 50.90 47.91 47.25 50.22 50.49 42.71 49.75 55.50 49.84 49.53 48.58
(0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
G = 3 8.68 7.19 6.49 7.31 7.54 7.51 3.53 8.04 10.79 7.15 7.42 7.79
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
G = 4 28.12 23.17 17.95 23.19 23.04 23.02 19.46 23.95 25.84 23.60 23.42 22.23
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
G = 5 13.88 11.48 9.81 11.35 11.84 11.99 8.81 12.23 14.13 11.40 11.98 11.79
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
G = 6 50.60 45.10 37.07 43.32 44.36 45.10 38.67 45.00 49.10 44.92 44.19 43.67
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Panel 3 : d = 0.8
G = 1 53.44 46.93 25.14 38.69 43.64 43.18 40.96 41.90 42.65 41.86 41.82 41.82
(0.06) (0.06) (0.12) (0.21) (0.12) (0.07) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
G = 2 53.10 48.60 31.94 40.61 46.42 46.60 43.08 44.57 45.98 44.70 44.67 44.26
(0.05) (0.04) (0.11) (0.17) (0.09) (0.05) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
G = 3 1.79 1.16 0.87 1.31 1.27 1.25 0.78 1.53 1.51 1.07 1.30 1.45
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
G = 4 13.36 6.66 5.29 11.01 7.41 6.89 7.83 8.73 8.74 8.84 8.47 8.00
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
G = 5 3.68 2.26 1.54 2.55 2.49 2.44 2.30 2.41 2.77 2.22 2.58 2.67
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
G = 6 43.45 31.56 18.96 33.37 30.85 29.74 31.05 31.66 31.26 31.95 31.20 30.82
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.19) (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Note. The experiment settings are identical to those in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.8: Entrepreneurial action dynamics in the presence of loners under the pessimism
scenario
µ 0   0 µ!0  !0
L M H L M H L M H L M H
Panel 1 : d = 0.2
G = 1 46.30 45.87 45.36 46.54 45.57 45.43 23.48 46.78 67.27 46.78 45.90 44.85
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.23) (0.19) (0.14)
G = 2 45.85 45.51 45.40 45.86 45.29 45.25 23.84 46.50 66.06 46.80 45.56 44.05
(0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.23) (0.18) (0.13)
G = 3 36.66 34.89 34.29 34.73 35.46 35.65 15.48 36.49 53.87 34.07 35.51 36.26
(0.18) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.09) (0.05) (0.08) (0.23) (0.16) (0.10)
G = 4 48.18 46.49 45.05 46.87 46.46 46.40 24.44 47.97 67.32 45.38 46.68 47.66
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.11) (0.07) (0.09) (0.26) (0.19) (0.12)
G = 5 42.03 39.36 37.24 39.53 39.55 39.55 39.66 39.52 39.46 39.51 39.35 39.77
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
G = 6 45.45 43.82 43.09 44.71 43.98 43.68 21.34 45.04 65.99 44.85 44.20 43.33
(0.21) (0.20) (0.19) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.26) (0.19) (0.14)
Panel 2 : d = 0.5
G = 1 37.90 34.93 30.15 35.69 33.83 33.46 24.22 32.26 42.51 37.17 34.36 31.44
(0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
G = 2 37.93 35.08 30.81 35.38 34.31 34.12 24.47 36.79 42.56 37.52 34.71 31.58
(0.11) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
G = 3 19.58 17.79 16.59 17.62 18.10 18.23 11.93 19.18 22.85 16.53 18.24 19.17
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)
G = 4 36.13 30.77 25.48 31.47 30.62 30.29 21.78 30.30 40.30 28.98 31.08 32.33
(0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11) (0.09)
G = 5 27.04 20.80 16.89 21.56 21.62 21.55 21.61 21.55 21.57 21.58 21.57 21.57
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
G = 6 37.35 30.73 27.49 33.76 31.11 30.71 21.56 33.03 40.99 32.67 31.80 31.10
(0.15) (0.10) (0.09) (0.16) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11)
Panel 3 : d = 0.8
G = 1 27.64 19.13 11.47 22.43 18.26 17.54 15.29 20.32 22.62 21.25 19.59 17.39
(0.11) (0.05) (0.05) (0.15) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
G = 2 27.90 19.66 12.67 22.63 19.15 18.45 16.13 21.16 22.95 22.18 20.21 17.85
(0.10) (0.04) (0.05) (0.14) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09)
G = 3 8.41 7.31 6.64 7.38 7.43 7.55 6.55 7.88 7.92 7.12 7.62 7.62
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
G = 4 19.17 13.20 10.17 15.23 13.70 13.61 10.34 13.56 18.64 13.61 14.35 14.58
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
G = 5 12.69 8.76 5.59 9.02 9.03 9.00 9.03 8.98 9.03 9.01 9.04 9.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
G = 6 25.77 18.92 15.61 21.79 19.44 19.06 17.16 21.30 21.83 21.23 19.96 19.10
(0.10) (0.04) (0.04) (0.12) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Note. The experiment settings are identical to those in Table 5.4.
Chapter 6
A synthesized model of entrepreneurial action un-
der uncertainty
6.1 The role of uncertainty in entrepreneurial action process
Entrepreneurial action is inherently uncertain. To be an entrepreneur is to explore a new,
untried opportunity in the dynamic, complex market, and then exploit it before the as-
sociated economic, social, and environmental value is known (Phan and Chambers, 2013;
Schumpeter, 1934; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). So a key question for scholars and
prospective entrepreneurs lies in the reduction of uncertainty that prevents both recogniz-
ing and acting on a possible opportunity for value creation. Uncertainty in times of disasters
is extremely strong to impede actions by obfuscating the identification of an entrepreneurial
opportunity, as well as the evaluation of this opportunity worth pursing (McMullen and
Shepherd, 2006). However, uncertainty taking the form of good luck and jackpot may
encourage actors to discover and pursue entrepreneurial opportunity, which is largely over-
looked by the literature. For instance, as mentioned in the early chapters, the era of big
data brings numerous opportunities to business and public sectors. Therefore, this chapter,
building upon the formal spatiotemporal model in Chapter 5, is to investigate di↵erent types
of uncertainty and how they informs the decisions of entrepreneurs to pursue an opportunity
for value creation.
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where zi,t = 1 indicates an action and zi,t = 0 otherwise. We model actor i’s likelihood
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 ij,t 1!i,t 1 + ⇣ i,t|{z}
value-changing uncertainty
(6.1)
where !i,t 1 is the value that the actor i possessed at time t 1, i ⇠ j is a set of actors j whom
actor i connects to, and  ij,t 1 is the degree of feedback against friction between a neighbor
j and actor i at time t 1. Parameter ⇣ i,t represents the e↵ect of value-changing uncertainty,
either value-destroying or value-adding, at time t: an exogenous state uncertainty impacting
actor i’s expected value at time t. Therefore, our formulation is in line with the work of
Milliken (1987) and McMullen and Shepherd (2006) that response uncertainty is frequently
stimulated by state uncertainty.
While such state uncertainty may not occur every period, we denote the frequency as
0 < ⌧ < 1. In addition, parameter m 2 [0, 1] describes the extent of the uncertainty: The
greater extend a value-changing uncertainty is, the larger proportion of the networked actors
will be a↵ected. Once the value-changing uncertainty hits the networked system, we model
it following a Gumbel (or Type I extreme value) distribution
⇣ i,t ⇠ Gumbel (a, b).
Extreme value distributions, in particular for Gumbel, have long be applied in environ-
mental science (Krishnamoorthy, 2006; Sharma et al., 1999), supply chain disruption and
emergency management (Craighead et al., 2007; She , 2007), new produce development
(Dahan and Mendelson, 2001; Girotra et al., 2010), and financial risk management (Diebold
et al., 2000; Grossi and Kunreuther, 2005). We model the e↵ect of state uncertainty either in
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a direction of value adding (i.e., good luck, such as hitting the jackpot), shortly value-adding
uncertainty, or in a direction of value destroying (i.e., bad luck, such as natural disaster and
terrorist attacks), shortly value-destroying uncertainty, to the network actors, indicated by
parameter a: a   0 for value-adding and a < 0 for value-destroying. In addition, b > 0 is
the scale parameter for the distribution. This Gumbel process in our setting enables us to
examine the impact of uncertainty that is crucial for better understanding entrepreneurial-
action dynamics (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Milliken, 1987). [The other model settings
are identical to those in Section 5.2.]
6.2 Analysis
We examine the dynamics of entrepreneurship under two scenarios – value-adding uncer-
tainty and value-destroying uncertainty. First a base case analysis is conducted to under-
stand actors’ entrepreneurial decision-making process under uncertainty. We next carefully
develop a experimental design to understand the sensitivity of model parameters on en-
trepreneurial action in space-time. In all cases, the reported results are averages based on
100 runs of each parameter instance.
6.2.1 Base case
Based on recent reports on emergency management and supply chain disruption (Glendon
and Bird, 2013; Marchese and Paramasivam, 2013), around 80 percent of firms involved
in supply chains had experienced disruptive events ranging from one to five times in the
previous 12 months and consistently over four years. In the base model, therefore, exogenous
state uncertainty is introduced four times within one-year time (⌧ = 4/365) and can impact
80 percent of actors in a networked system (m = 0.8). Such state uncertainty may generate
either a value-adding or value-destroying e↵ect. In terms of value-destroying uncertainty we
set the location parameter a =  5 and the scale parameter b = 1.36, at which an actor’s
possessed value is negatively a↵ected at a probability of 97.5%. Likewise, value-adding
uncertainty is assumed to have a = 5 and b = 3.825 so that an actor has a probability of
145
97.5% of experiencing an increase in possessed value. Table 6.1 summarizes the parameters
used in the base case.
Table 6.1: Parameter values in base case setting
Parameter Values Meaning
G {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} Six network structures
↵ 0.4 Rewiring probability in small-world networks
n 960 Total number of actors (economic size) on the network
!i0 N(0, 1) Value possess at time 0
 ij0 TN(0.2, 0.2) Degree of feedback between actor pairs (0   ij  1)
m 0.8 Extent of uncertainty
⌧ 4/365 Frequency of uncertainty
⇣i Gumbel (-5, 1.36) Value-destroying uncertainty
Gumbel (5, 3.825) Value-adding uncertainty
We would expect that value-destroying uncertainty decreases the entrepreneurial ac-
tion ratio, whereas value-adding uncertainty increases it for all six network structures, at
least in the short term. This intuition is confirmed in Figure 6.1 by a big drop (rise) of
entrepreneurial action ratio in dotted-line (dashed-line) every time value-destroying (value-
adding) uncertainty is introduced into the system. Yet the actors will quickly adjust their
subsequent entrepreneurial actions to cope with such uncertainty over time. For instance,
an increased number of actors immediately take entrepreneurial action to recover from the
disruptive value-destroying uncertainty, whereas a large value increment arising from value-
adding uncertainty may reduce the actors’ perceived need to act, resulting in a decreased
entrepreneurial action ratio. In the long run, the number of actors acting entrepreneuri-
ally under either uncertainty scenario will converge to that under no exogenous uncertainty
scenario (straight-line). That is, the e↵ect of state uncertainty, either value-destroying or
value-adding, is fully absorbed by the networked actors if the reaction time is su ciently
long. Therefore, our model successfully captures the dynamics of entrepreneurial action
under uncertainty.
Figure 6.1 also shows that network structures generate heterogeneous impacts on the
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a) Square Lattices b) Packs c) Ring Lattices
d) Random e) Small-world f) Scale-free
Note. For each network, the main figure illustrates the time plots of entrepreneurial action ratio over
one-year time (365 days). To take a close look at the changes at the early days, we include a small figure
at the corner, showing the time plot over a short starting period. Note that entrepreneurial action ratio
mostly starts from 0.5 across all networks due to our setting of initial possessed value.
Figure 6.1: Base case of entrepreneurial action ratio under uncertainty
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dynamics of entrepreneurial action. The results are consistent among the two uncertainty
scenarios. In general, we can observe a larger number of entrepreneurial actions from actors
embedded in square lattice (G = 1) networks, pack (G = 2) networks, and scale-free (G = 6)
networks. For instance, in a scale-free network, over 30-percent of actors act entrepreneurial
in each time period. On the contrary, only a small number of actors (around 10-percent) are
motivated to take entrepreneurial actions when they are embedded in ring lattice (G = 3)
networks, random (G = 4) graphs, and small-world (G = 5) networks.
A closer look at Figure 6.1 illustrates that most entrepreneurial action dynamics occur
at the starting time period across all networks. As highlighted by the corner subfigures, the
number of entrepreneurs (i.e., actors take entrepreneurial action) reaches the peak soon after
several times of interactions in the beginning. For instance, in the square lattices, packs, and
scale-free networks, up to 80-percent of actors take entrepreneurial action at the peak time.
These observations, in general, suggest that networked actors’ discovery of entrepreneurial
opportunities are regulated in a short run no matter which network structure the actors are
embedded in and the entrepreneurial behavior among the actors is steady in the long run.
Overall, the above observations clearly show that network structures play a significant
role in each networked actor’s decision on entrepreneurial action in the presence of uncer-
tainty.
6.2.2 Experimentation
We develop a factorial design to examine the e↵ect of key model parameters and to check
the robustness of results from the base case. The parameter values used in our experiment
are listed in Table 6.2. We set the degree of feedback parameters (µ 0 and   0) and initial
possessed value parameters (µ!0 and  !0) to be levels that can be practically distributed
among actors in a networked system. In addition to a low-frequent state uncertainty setting
in the base case, we model high-frequent state uncertainty occurring every 22 days, or 17
times (⌧ = 17/365) over one-year time period based on She ’s (2007) study on statistics
of annual earthquake around the world. In total, we examine 576 parameter instances
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consisting of a wide range of possible scenarios. We run each parameter instance 100 times
to achieve statistical reliability (giving a total of 57600 experiments for each of the six
network structures) for inference.
Table 6.2: Parameter values in experiments
Parameter Values Meaning
µ 0 {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} Actors’ average degree of feedback
  0 {0.2, 0.5, 0.8} Actors’ variability in degree of feedback
µ!0 {-5, 5} Actors’ average possessed value at time 0
 !0 {1, 10} Actors’ variability in initial possessed value
⌧ {4/365, 17/365} Frequency of value-destroying/-adding uncertainty
m {0.2, 0.8} Extent of value-destroying/-adding uncertainty
a {-5, 5} Average e↵ect of value-destroying and value-adding uncertainty
b {1.36, 3.825} The scale of value-destroying/-adding uncertainty
We investigate the dynamics of entrepreneurial actions under value-destroying uncer-
tainty scenario (a =  5) and value-adding uncertainty scenario (a = 5), respectively. This
gives each scenario 28800 experiments for analysis and inference. Under each scenario, we
explain how di↵erences in economic size, the frequency and extend of uncertainty, actors’
initial possessed value, and their degree of feedback against friction change the number of
actors taking entrepreneurial action.
6.2.3 Value-destroying uncertainty scenario
Under the value-destroying uncertainty scenario, there are distinctive dynamics of entrepreneurial
actions among the six network structures. In Figure 6.2, we show the ranking on the en-
trepreneurial action ratio, among the network structures, at the end of the simulation time.
Rank 1 indicates the highest entrepreneurial action ratio and rank 6 indicates the lowest.
Comparing Figures 6.2a to 6.2b it is obvious that the entrepreneurial action dynamics are
quite sensitive to the economic size. Furthermore, we do not observe a significant ranking
di↵erence among the six network structures when the economic size is small (i.e., n = 96). In
other words, no particular network structure is superior in promoting entrepreneurial action.
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As the economic size grows, however, the impact of network structure is substantial. Under
a large economic size where n = 960, the actors embedded in scale-free (G = 6) networks,
square lattice (G = 1) networks, and ring lattice (G = 3) networks are more likely to act
entrepreneurially than those embedded in the other three networks, among which random
(G = 4) graphs facilitate the least number of entrepreneurial action. Therefore, networks
structure can influence entrepreneurial action dynamics under value-destroying uncertainty
for a su ciently large economic size.
a) n = 96 b) n = 960
Note. Network structures with smaller numbers rank higher in entrepreneurial action ratio, where 1 is the
best possible ranking. Each boxplot is based on 28800 experiments under the value-destroying uncertainty
scenario.
Figure 6.2: Ranking of network structures under value-destroying uncertainty
Besides the e↵ect of the economic size, in Table 6.3 we summarize the impact of key model
parameters on the entrepreneurial action dynamics. Holding fixed the network structure and
economic size, we find that the parameters impact the entrepreneurial action dynamics in a
consistent way under the value-destroying uncertainty scenario. In the table, the parameter
levels (at column 2) shadowed in grey are associated with higher entrepreneurial action
ratio, with some exceptions highlighted separately in the cells. Specifically, the extent
(parameter m) and frequency (parameter ⌧) of value-destroying uncertainty, as well as the
degree of feedback (both mean, parameter µ 0 , and standard deviation, parameter   0)
have the most significant adverse impact on entrepreneurial action ratio. On the other
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hand, the number of actors acting entrepreneurially increases in the scale of value-destroying
uncertainty (parameter b) and the actors’ average initial possessed value (parameter µ!0).
We explain the details in the following.
Looking down each column of the table, we see a nonlinear negative impact of the
degree of feedback on the entrepreneurial action dynamics across all network structures.
The number of actors acting entrepreneurially decreases at an accelerate rate as the mean
and the standard deviation increase. The most number of entrepreneurial actions are likely
to occur when the degree of feedback between most actor pairs is low, i.e., µ 0 = 0.2, and
the variability is not widely dispersed, i.e.,   0 . Likewise, examining each row, i.e., holding
parameters µ 0 (  0) fixed, we highlight the di↵erences among network structures. For a
large economic size (n = 960), the actors embedded in the scale-free networks, square lattice
networks, and ring lattice networks are likely to have high entrepreneurial action ratio. For a
small economic size (n = 96), square lattice networks, small-world networks and ring lattice
networks are associated with high entrepreneurial action ratio for the low level of parameter
µ 0 (  0); whereas scale-free networks, pack networks, and random graphs are associated
with high entrepreneurial action ratio for the medium or high level of parameter µ 0 (  0).
The impacts of the actors’ possessed value at the beginning are mixed. For most network
structures, the entrepreneurial action ratio increases in the mean but decreases in the stan-
dard deviation. So the number of entrepreneurial action is relatively high when most actors
initially have high value (large µ!0) and small inter-individual variability (small  !0). Yet
in the scale- free networks, we observe a reversed relationship – large variability in initial
possessed value leads to higher entrepreneurial action ratio. Nonetheless, the changes in
entrepreneurial action dynamics stemming from initial possessed value are rather marginal
in comparison to those resulting from the degree of feedback. (In the supplementry note,
this finding is confirmed via a regression analysis that the e↵ects of initial possessed value
parameters, µ!0 and  !0 , are insignificant, i.e., p > .05, for many network structures.) A
plausible explanation is that repeated interaction makes the impact of the actors’ initial
possessed value weak or negligible. When we hold parameters µ!0 and  !0 fixed, actors
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Table 6.3: Entrepreneurial action dynamics under the value-destroying uncertainty scenario
G = 1 G = 2 G = 3 G = 4 G = 5 G = 6
n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960
µ 0 L (0.2) 18.30 19.88 11.20 6.94 15.11 5.33 13.05 3.73 15.59 4.31 9.65 12.26
(.208) (.192) (.091) (.054) (.151) (.019) (.134) (.031) (.168) (.017) (.081) (.087)
M (0.5) 5.51 5.48 7.04 3.13 5.52 5.01 6.32 2.35 6.00 3.39 7.44 7.64
(.039) (.028) (.049) (.018) (.040) (.019) (.046) (.018) (.043) (.013) (.055) (.045)
H (0.8) 2.60 2.61 3.35 1.47 2.64 4.88 4.63 1.79 3.25 2.68 6.46 5.86
(.029) (.023) (.035) (.-14) (.029) (.018) (.038) (.014) (.032) (.011) (.048) (.035)
  0 L (0.2) 15.36 16.94 8.65 5.26 12.26 5.12 10.96 3.00 12.88 3.75 8.46 10.08
(.221) (.210) (.098) (.061) (.163) (.021) (.138) (.031) (.177) (.019) (.077) (.090)
M (0.5) 5.78 5.81 6.65 3.27 5.73 5.05 6.63 2.46 6.35 3.35 7.59 8.06
(.051) (.040) (.053) (.025) (.049) (.018) (.053) (.020) (.052) (.014) (.057) (.051)
H (0.8) 5.28 5.23 6.29 3.01 5.28 5.05 6.41 2.40 5.88 3.28 7.49 7.63
(.041) (.030) (.047) (.019) (.041) (.018) (.049) (.018) (.044) (.013) (.056) (.044)
µ!0 L ( 5) 8.75 9.28 6.86 3.85 7.64 3.67 7.72 1.96 8.28 3.02 7.89 8.63
(.129) (.135) (.065) (.041) (.104) (.014) (.090) (.018) (.113) (.015) (.063) (.067)
H (5) 8.86 9.37 7.53 3.85 7.87 6.48 8.27 3.28 8.46 3.90 7.81 8.55
(.223) (.210) (.106) (.062) (.167) (.010) (.141) (.035) (.179) (.018) (.080) (.087)
 !0 L (1) 8.84 9.36 7.26 3.85 7.79 4.81 7.91 2.30 8.41 3.49 7.79 8.39
(.142) (.136) (.072) (.041) (.107) (.023) (.091) (.023) (.115)] (.015) (.063) (.066)
H (10) 8.77 9.29 7.13 3.85 7.72 5.34 8.08 2.95 8.33 3.44 7.91 8.79
(.164) .159 (.073) (.048) (.120) (.011) (.108) (.021) (.133) (.017) (.069) (.074)
⌧ L (120) 10.67 11.17 9.91 5.15 9.94 5.26 10.54 3.50 10.49 3.83 10.88 11.44
.155 (.160) (.090) (.054) (.133) (.021) (.099) (.025) (.127) (.015) (.062) (.066)
H (22) 6.94 7.48 4.48 2.55 5.57 4.89 5.46 1.74 6.25 3.09 4.82 5.73
(.135) (.126) (.050) (.031) (.091) (.019) (.084) (.020) (.109) (.015) (.051) (.055)
m L (0.2) 11.17 11.77 10.15 5.31 10.43 5.45 11.03 3.61 11.07 3.96 11.26 11.84
(.148) (.149) (.078) (.046) (.119) (.019) (.095) (.024) (.121) (.145) (.062) (.064)
H (0.8) 6.44 6.88 4.24 2.39 5.09 4.70 4.96 1.64 5.67 2.96 4.44 5.34
(.157) (.138) (.051) (.034) (.101) (.021) (.089) (.018) (.120) (.015) (.047) (.057)
b L (1.36) 8.22 8.64 6.47 3.51 7.08 4.80 7.22 2.19 8.77 3.32 7.08 7.75
(.140) (.130) (.068) (.039) (.102) (.021) (.091) (.023) (.112) (.016) (.063) (.064)
H (3.825) 9.39 10.01 7.92 4.19 8.43 5.35 7.68 3.05 9.06 3.60 8.62 9.43
(.150) (.145) (.058) (.036) (.106) (.018) (.090) (.022) (.119) (.015) (.054) (.058)
Note. The entrepreneurial action ratio (percentage value  ⇥ 100) is based on an average of 100 runs of 288
experiments. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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embedded in square lattice networks are the most likely to take entrepreneurial actions,
in despite of the economic size. In addition, small-world networks and scale-free networks
promote a large number of entrepreneurial action for a small and large network of actors,
respectively.
Table 6.3 supports our expectation that the number of actors taking entrepreneurial
action is reduced when the value-destroying uncertainty is destructive, large extent, and
frequent. Specifically speaking, we observe a negative impact of extent and frequency and
a positive impact of scale on the entrepreneurial action ratio. Note that the scale (b)
determines the average disruptive e↵ect of value-destroying uncertainty, a   b 0(1), where
 
0
(1) =  0.57722 is the first derivative of the gamma function  (n) with respect to n at
n = 1. Hence, an increase in b > 0 makes the value-destroying uncertainty less destructive,
leading to an increase in the number of entrepreneurial actions in the networked system.
Only a small number of actors embedded in square lattice networks and small-world networks
can cope well with such value-destroying uncertainty. As for a large economic size (n = 960),
square lattice networks and scale-free networks foster more entrepreneurial actions than the
other four networks.
Table 6.4 further examines the entrepreneurial action dynamics under four types of
value-destroying uncertainty. We categorize the types by a collective measure of extent and
frequency. The resulting entrepreneurial action ratios are displayed in respective panels
of Table 6.4. For a small economic size (n = 96), random graphs and scale-free networks
are slightly better in fostering entrepreneurial actions while the value-destroying uncer-
tainty is light and infrequent, see Panel 1. Under the other three types of value-destroying
uncertainty, square lattice networks and small-world networks are better in terms of en-
trepreneurial action ratio for a small economic size, as illustrated in Panels 2 to 4. On
the other hand, when the number of actors in the network is large (a large economic size),
the scale-free networks and square lattice networks are in favor of entrepreneurial action
across Panels 1 to 3. Finally, square lattice networks and small-world networks encourage
entrepreneurial action under frequent and large extent value-destroying uncertainty (see
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Table 6.4: Entrepreneurial action dynamics under four types of value-destroying uncertainty
G = 1 G = 2 G = 3 G = 4 G = 5 G = 6
n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960
Panel 1: m (L = 0.2) and ⌧ (L = 4/365)
12.73 13.29 12.83 6.54 12.37 5.64 13.64 4.47 12.98 4.33 14.38 14.64
(.149) (.152) (.088) (.051) (.128) (.019) (.096) (.024) (.122) (.014) (.060) (.063)
Panel 2: m (L = 0.2) and ⌧ (H = 17/365)
9.61 10.25 7.48 4.08 8.48 5.25 8.43 2.75 9.16 3.60 8.15 9.04
(.145) (.144) (.053) (.035) (.)107 (.019) (.086) (.020) (.116) (.015) (.047) (.050)
Panel 3: m (H = 0.8) and ⌧ (L = 4/365)
8.60 9.04 6.99 3.76 7.52 4.88 7.44 2.54 8.00 3.33 7.38 8.25
(.137) (.128) (.051) (.034) (.096) (.017) (.079) (.020) (.104) (.014) (.042) (.045)
Panel 4: m (H = 0.8) and ⌧ (H = 17/365)
4.28 4.71 1.49 1.01 2.66 4.53 2.48 0.73 3.34 2.58 1.50 2.42
(.118) (.098) (.018) (.013) (.058) (.018) (.069) (.012) (.091) (.014) (.027) (.038)
Note. The experiment setting is the same as that in Table 6.3.
Panel 4). The patterns above confirm and extend the findings in Table 6.3.
In summary, under the value-destroying scenario, scale-free networks and square lattice
networks mainly favor entrepreneurial action for the actors of a large economic size, and
square lattice networks and small-world networks for the actors of a small economic size.
Actors are more likely to act entrepreneurially if most of them initially possess high value
and low degree of feedback and the value-destroying uncertainty is light and infrequent.
6.2.4 Value-adding uncertainty scenario
Figure 6.3 plots the ranks of the six network structures regarding the entrepreneurial action
ratio under the value-adding scenario. Similar to the value-destroying uncertainty scenario,
the dynamics are rather di↵erent between a small economic size (n = 96) and a large
economic size (n = 960). For a small economic size, scale-free (G = 6) networks, random
(G = 4) graphs, and pack (G = 2) networks foster a greater number of entrepreneurial
action than square lattice (G = 1) networks, ring lattice (G = 3) networks, and small-world
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a) n = 96 b) n = 960
Note. Network structures with smaller numbers rank higher in entrepreneurial action ratio, where 1 is the
best possible ranking. Each boxplot is based on 28800 experiments under the value-adding uncertainty
scenario.
Figure 6.3: Ranking of network structures under value-adding uncertainty
(G = 5) networks. As to the actors of a large economic size, the number of entrepreneurial
actions is likely to be greater when they are embedded in scale-free networks (rank 1)
and square lattice networks (rank 2) than in small-world networks (rank 6), whereas the
other three network structures rank in the middle. In sum, when experiencing value-adding
uncertainty, the actors are consistently more positive to take entrepreneurial action when
they are embedded in scale-free networks than in other networks.
In addition to the structural properties of networks, the impact of other model param-
eters on entrepreneurial action dynamics are summarized in Table 6.5. Apart from some
inconsistencies in actors’ initial possessed value, the parameters impact the number of ac-
tors taking entrepreneurial action in the same direction across all network structures. We
highlight the e↵ects in grey. In general, the parameter e↵ects here are very similar to those
under the value-destroying uncertainty scenario, with the only exception of parameter m
(the extent of uncertainty). Specifically, the degree of feedback (both mean, parameter µ 0 ,
and standard deviation, parameter   0), the standard deviation of initial possessed value
(parameter  !0), as well as the frequency (parameter ⌧) of value-adding uncertainty have
adverse impact on the entrepreneurial action ratio. And the mean of the actors’ initial
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possessed value, parameter µ!0 , and the extent (parameter m) and scale (parameter b) of
value-adding uncertainty have positive impact on the dynamics of entrepreneurial action.
Holding fixed the network structure and economic size, we find that the impact of the
degree of feedback between actor pairs is convex with respect to the mean and standard
deviation. The entrepreneurial action ratio decreases sharply when parameter µ 0 and
parameter   0 increase from a low level (0.2) to a medium level (0.5). Yet the reductions
are marginal when the two parameters increase from a medium level (0.5) to a high level
(0.8). The changes in parameter µ 0 result in a more significant e↵ect on entrepreneurial
action dynamics than the changes in parameter   0 . The findings are consistent across all
network structures. So the networked actors can achieve more entrepreneurial actions when
their degree of feedback is relatively low (small mean) and the individual variability is not
large (small variance). Likewise, we examine the role of network structure by holding fixed
the degree of feedback parameters. When the economic size is large (n = 960), square
lattice networks and scale-free networks are the most e↵ective network structures to foster
entrepreneurial actions. In comparison, there are multiple choices for the actors of a small
economic size to facilitate the number of entrepreneurial actions. For instance, square lattice
networks and ring lattice networks are more e↵ective than the other four networks when
parameters µ 0 and   0 are low, whereas random graphs, scale-free networks, and pack
networks work better when parameters µ 0 and   0 are increased to a medium or high level.
In terms of initial possessed value, the impacts of parameter µ!0 and parameter  !0
on entrepreneurial action dynamics are marginal. The di↵erences of the entrepreneurial
action ratio resulting from changes in the initial possessed value distribution are mostly
within 0.1%. Similar to the value-destroying uncertainty scenario, the number of actors
taking entrepreneurial action at the end of the simulation time is largely determined by
the dynamic interaction process, rather than the starting possessed value. (The regression
analysis in the supplementary note confirms that the e↵ect of parameter µ!0 and parameter
 !0 are not significant, i.e., p > .05, for most network structures.) When examining the
rows, we find that scale-free networks and random graphs are most e↵ective to generate
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Table 6.5: Entrepreneurial action dynamics under the value-adding uncertainty scenario
G = 1 G = 2 G = 3 G = 4 G = 5 G = 6
n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960
µ 0 L (0.2) 33.66 34.69 31.29 15.80 34.00 6.97 30.65 9.67 31.87 6.03 26.70 30.42
(.251) (.250) (.156) (.078) (.243) (.011) (.163) (.033) (.209) (.014) (.106) (.116)
M (0.5) 11.94 11.92 15.97 7.33 12.49 6.68 16.82 6.80 13.68 4.94 18.72 18.37
(.041) (.016) (.048) (.012) (.044) (.013) (.046) (.017) (.044) (.010) (.053) (.030)
H (0.8) 6.08 6.10 7.85 3.57 6.21 6.41 12.44 5.47 8.24 4.02 15.42 13.81
(.046) (.037) (.056) (.023) (.047) (.015) (.048) (.016) (.047) (.010) (.052) (.031)
  0 L (0.2) 26.43 27.41 23.18 11.40 26.48 6.74 24.73 8.10 24.91 5.23 22.02 24.88
(.299) (.302) (.213) (.110) (.293) (.014) (.197) (.042) (.252) (.019) (.126) (.152)
M (0.5) 13.01 13.02 16.33 7.89 13.52 6.67 17.68 6.99 14.69 4.91 19.51 19.40
(.070) (.055) (.078) (.035) (.073) (.013) (.064) (.020) (.069) (.011) (.063) (.057)
H (0.8) 12.24 12.27 15.59 7.41 12.71 6.66 17.50 6.86 14.20 4.85 19.31 18.34
(.048) (.027) (.055) (.018) (.051) (.013) (.051) (.017) (.051) (.010) (.056) (.034)
µ!0 L ( 5) 17.26 17.56 18.31 8.89 17.55 5.64 19.78 7.49 17.88 4.59 20.26 21.07
(.191) (.191) (.138) (.070) (.187) (.009) (.128) (.031) (.161) (.013) (.087) (.098)
H (5) 17.19 17.57 18.42 8.91 17.59 7.74 20.16 7.14 17.98 5.40 20.30 20.67
(.298) (.302) (.215) (.111) (.293) (.006) (.198) (.041) (.254) (.020) (.128) (.156)
 !0 L (1) 17.18 17.56 18.47 8.91 17.59 6.75 19.98 7.13 17.90 5.04 20.37 20.55
(.190) (.192) (.140) (.070) (.188) (.013) (.128) (.029) (.161) (.014) (.088) (.100)
H (10) 17.28 17.57 18.26 8.89 17.55 6.63 19.96 7.51 17.96 4.95 20.19 21.19
(.228) (.228) (.160) (.083) (.222) (.010) (.152) (.034) (.191) (.015) (.099) (.114)
⌧ L (120) 17.45 17.62 19.05 9.25 17.64 6.81 20.09 7.17 18.15 5.12 20.68 21.43
(.185) (.183) (.131) (.069) (.169) (.015) (.116) (.026) (.153) (.014) (.079) (.090)
H (22) 17.01 17.52 17.68 8.55 17.50 6.56 19.85 7.46 17.71 4.87 19.88 20.31
(.192) (.195) (.131) (.065) (.193) (.012) (.129) (.028) (.162) (.014) (.087) (.098)
m L (0.2) 15.88 16.28 17.03 8.25 15.98 6.56 18.24 6.65 16.42 4.86 18.85 19.24
(.174) (.176) (.126) (.063) (.164) (.014) (.114) (.026) (.145) (.014) (.077) (.086)
H (0.8) 18.58 18.85 19.70 9.55 19.16 6.82 21.70 7.99 19.44 5.14 21.71 22.50
(.242) (.244) (.175) (.089) (.245) (.011) (.161 (.033) (.206) (.015) (.109) (.128)
b L (1.36) 17.07 17.45 18.30 8.85 17.42 6.68 19.84 7.26 17.81 5.00 20.11 20.64
(.189) (.190) (.138) (.069) (.185) (.013) (.125) (.029) (.160) (.014) (.087) (.098)
H (3.825) 17.38 17.69 18.43 8.95 17.72 6.69 20.11 7.37 18.05 5.00 20.45 21.10
(.197) (.202) (.135) (.068) (.195) (.012) (.134) (.028) (.167) (.014) (.088) (.100)
Note. The entrepreneurial action ratio (percentage value  ⇥ 100) is based on an average of 100 runs of 288
experiments. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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entrepreneurial action for a small-sized network (n = 96), and scale-free networks and square
lattice networks for a large-sized network (n = 960). In particular, scale-free networks are
always associated with the most entrepreneurial actions among the six networks.
Finally, Table 6.5 shows that more entrepreneurial actions are attained when a large
number of actors experience value-adding uncertainty. That is, the entrepreneurial action
ratio increases in parameters m and b. However, such intensive value-adding uncertainty, if
occurring frequently within the simulation time period, will be detrimental to the dynamics
of entrepreneurial action. This is in line with the findings in the base case where the
value gained from such uncertainty may discourage the actors from identifying subsequent
entrepreneurial opportunities. Holding the uncertainty-related parameters fixed, we find
that a small economic size of actors embedded in the scale-free networks and random graphs
can best cope with value-adding uncertainty. As for a large economic size of actors (n = 960),
square lattice networks and scale-free networks foster a larger number of entrepreneurial
actions than the other four networks. A further inspection on the network e↵ect under four
types of value-adding uncertainty confirm the above patterns, as illustrated in Table 6.6.
In summary, under the value-adding uncertainty scenario, scale-free networks favor en-
trepreneurial actions regardless of the economic size. Furthermore, square lattice networks
foster entrepreneurial actions for a large economic size of actors and the random graphs
for a small economic size of actors. We conclude that the large number of entrepreneurial
actions can be achieved in an e↵ective manner when most actors initially possess high value
and low degree of feedback and the value-adding uncertainty is large extent (high m) yet
infrequent (low ⌧).
6.3 Discussion
This work provides a synthesized formal model of entrepreneurial dynamics over space and
time with the presence of uncertainty. Essentially, entrepreneurial action dynamics vary
across alternative network structures; and the e↵ects are moderated by some contextual
factors such as the economic size and the state uncertainty scenarios. Intuitively, value-
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Table 6.6: Entrepreneurial action dynamics under four types of value-adding uncertainty
G = 1 G = 2 G = 3 G = 4 G = 5 G = 6
n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960 n=96 n=960
Panel 1: m (L = 0.2) and ⌧ (L = 4/365)
16.01 16.25 17.15 8.40 15.99 6.54 18.01 6.22 16.49 4.90 18.94 19.43
(.176) (.174) (.126) (.065) (.161) (.015) (.112) (.026) (.145) (.014) (.077) (.087)
Panel 2: m (L = 0.2) and ⌧ (H = 17/365)
15.74 16.32 16.90 8.10 15.98 6.58 18.47 7.07 16.35 4.82 18.76 19.05
(.172) (.178) (.125) (.061) (.167) (.013) (.117) (.025) (.145) (.014) (.077) (.086)
Panel 3: m (H = 0.8) and ⌧ (L = 4/365)
18.88 18.99 20.95 10.10 19.29 7.08 22.18 8.12 19.82 5.34 22.42 23.42
(.201) (.199) (.161) (.081) (.199) (.012) (.136) (.031) (.173) (.014) (.097) (.111)
Panel 4: m (H = 0.8) and ⌧ (H = 17/365)
18.28 18.71 18.45 9.00 19.02 6.55 21.33 7.85 19.07 4.93 21.00 21.58
(.209) (.210) (.137) (.069) (.215) (.011) (.140) (.030) (.177) (.013) (.095) (.108)
Note. The experiment setting is the same as that in Table 6.5.
adding uncertainty leads to more entrepreneurial actions than value-destroying uncertainty.
In the square lattices and scale-free networks, most actors are likely to act entrepreneurially
when the economic size is large. On the contrary, in the packs, ring lattices, random graphs,
and small-world networks, entrepreneurial action ratio is high in a network of small economic
size. Table 6.7 summarizes our findings contingent on the economic size and the type of state
uncertainty. The table shows under which condition the network structures are beneficial to
entrepreneurial action ratio (the light grey cells including a plus sign), and those conditions
in which the network structures are detrimental to foster entrepreneurial actions (the dark
grey cells including a minus sign).
Square lattice (G = 1) network facilitate most number of entrepreneurial actions among
the three regular networks. Although the packs (G = 2) and ring lattices (G = 3) both have
the same uniform degree distribution as the square lattices, according to Miller and Page
(2007), they are di↵erent in the patterns of “shared” connections, defined as the average
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Table 6.7: Entrepreneurial action dynamics under uncertainty
Small economic size Large economic size




Low m +   0 0 + 0 + 0 0     +
High m +   0 0 +   +   +   0 0
Low ⌧
Low m 0 0 0 + 0 + + 0 0     +




Low m   0   + 0 + + 0 0 0   +
High m     0 + 0 + + 0   0   +
Low ⌧
Low m   0   + 0 + + 0 0 0   +
High m   0 0 + 0 + + 0   0   +
Note. A plus sign denotes that the network structure has a top rank associated with high entrepreneurial
action ratio. A negative sign denotes that the network structure fosters a small number of entrepreneurial
actions, i.e., low rank. A zero denotes that the entrepreneurial action ratio rank of the network structure
is in the middle. Each result is on average of 7200 experiments.
number of overlap between an actor’s connections (including oneself) to the connections
of her/his connections. For instance, consider an actor in a ring lattices. S/he shares
4 connections with the nearest neighbor; the next nearest neighbor has 3 connections in
common. So the overlap of ring lattices is 3.5. Similarly, the overlaps of packs and square
lattices equal to 3 and 2, respectively. In this sense, given the same number of connections,
actors embedded in square lattices are more likely to access diverse possessed values for the
discovery of entrepreneurial opportunity (Smilor, 1997).
Besides, scholars verify that scale-free networks has exceptional robustness to random
node failures than random graphs and small-world networks (Albert et al., 2000; Motter,
2004). That is, the information and resource flows among networked actors are not disrupted
under random actor’s non-action decision. Unless the rare condition occurs that the hub
actors are attacked by extreme value-destroying uncertainty, then we grossly overestimate
the potential entrepreneurial action ratio, as verified by the minus sign under the severe and
frequent value-destroying uncertainty scenario in Table 6.7.

























Figure 6.4: Entrepreneurial action dynamics on graphs
entrepreneurially than the other four network structures in most scenarios. They are more
robust against value-change uncertainty than loop-based structures including packs, ring
lattices, and small-world networks, especially when the economic size is large. (Note that
packs have a small-world-alike structure that each actor has a group of localized connections
together with one connection outside of the local group (Miller and Page, 2007).)
The insights from the analysis and discussion are distilled into a conceptual framework
in Figure 6.4, which provides managerial insights in the demarcating regions of e↵ective
network structures in fostering entrepreneurial action under uncertainty. Specifically, the
actors embedded the scale-free networks and spatial lattices are beneficial to grow a large
economic size. These two network structures favor entrepreneurial action under both value-
creating uncertainty and value-destroying uncertainty scenarios. When the economic size is
small, small-world networks and packs facilitate a great amount of entrepreneurial action
under value-destroying uncertainty, whereas the actors embedded in scale-free networks and
random graphs are more likely to act entrepreneurially under the value-adding uncertainty.
This recommendation is applicable to the era of big data, which is considered value-adding
uncertainty that brings numerous opportunities to business actors. A small number of big-
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data pioneers, who were randomly connected, were alerted to the opportunities for potential
value creation (located in the right bottom cell of Figure 6.4). Later, an increasing number
of actors joined the network, which grows to be a scale-free network with the pioneers as
the hubs (moved to the right top bell). Then, this scale free network has continuously
encouraged entrepreneurial actions from the ever-increasing number of actors to explore
and exploit the value of big data.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
This thesis responds Shepherd’s (2015) call for a more interaction- and community-based
perspective of entrepreneurial action to alleviate human su↵ering following uncertain value-
destroying events such as nature- and man-made disasters. We extend recent literature and
develop the idea that the connection structure and feedback pattern between community
members can foster di↵erent forms and levels of entrepreneurial action to bring about relief
and well being for the community in response to a disaster. Our extension is realized
through three graph-theoretic models to study how di↵erent levels of prosocial motivation
(i.e., the desire to benefit others) a↵ect the community’s collective value resulting from
entrepreneurial action upon uncertain value destruction. We operationalize the models
using the computational techniques, CA and ABM, to explore the entrepreneurial dynamics
over space and time.
In our models, we incorporate feedback from the connected community members into
an actor’s entrepreneurial-action decision process (e.g., Keyhani et al., 2015; Shepherd and
Patzelt, 2013), as a central element in an interaction-based entrepreneurial action in response
to random value-destroying events. That is, the actor makes sense of other members’ pains
and losses following a disaster to discover, evaluate and exploit a potential opportunity in
pursuit of value creation for one self and the entire community (McMullen and Shepherd,
2006; Patzelt and Shepherd, 2011; Shepherd, 2015; Shepherd et al., 2007).
We show that under a chain structure (i.e., supply chains in Chapter 3), actors that are
strive to help neighboring members through benchmarking are likely to create high collective
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values in the aftermath of disasters, in particular for a small-size community. Under the
grid structure in Chapter 4, we observe better community value creation when members are
more likely to help each other through exchanging reciprocal benefits over time. This finding
is robust in large communities. When further comparing grid structure with other network
structures in Chapters 5 and 6, we find that actors embedded in a scale-free network are
even more likely to engage in pro-social entrepreneurial actions in face of adversity. Our
result implies a new framework of entrepreneurship as a spatiotemporal process to develop
su↵ering venturing for collective value creation.
Our work o↵ers several important implications to theory and practice of entrepreneurial
action in the aftermath of disasters. Entrepreneurial action is the emergence resulted
from the dynamic interactions among community members who have potential to act en-
trepreneurially (Parker, 2008; Phan and Chambers, 2013). This implies that network struc-
ture in which the members are embedded has such a nonignorant impact on entrepreneurial
action dynamics. No much development in entrepreneurship theory can be achieved unless
we exploit the network structure. To the best our knowledge, this work is the first attempt to
extend the action-based entrepreneurship framework into the context of network dynamics
and disasters. Specifically, we clarify the importance of the joint e↵ect of network structure,
feedback, reciprocity, resourcefulness, and uncertainty type on the identification of third
person and evaluation of first person opportunities, entrepreneurial action process and col-
lective value creation. Importantly, we find support for the impact of network structure
on the spatiotemporal dynamics of entrepreneurial action in times of disasters. We claim
that this is the first attempt to link the entrepreneurial action theory and graph theory to
formalize and explain pro-social entrepreneurial action processes and outcomes over time
and space.
7.1 Limitation and future research
In this thesis, we employ the best practice for developing management theory through com-
puter simulations and deriving insights for prospective entrepreneurs to identify, evaluate
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and exploit possible opportunities for value creation. As noted by Davis et al. (2007); Har-
rison et al. (2007), and Miller and Page (2007), when a study does not aim to predict the
outcome of a particular set of equations, as in our study, a computational model using a
set of parameter values is a valid experimental process if it satisfies the problem’s general
conditions and shows a property of general interest.
In practice, community members’ entrepreneurial activities for disaster recovery must
satisfy two prerequisites: 1) desirability (i.e., the motivation to help others alleviate their
su↵erings), and 2) feasibility (i.e., the ability to meet the resource consumption requirements
for taking actions). The three models in the thesis all consider both desirability and feasi-
bility of pro-social entrepreneurial actions in the aftermath of disasters. Our model settings
thus mimic the behavioral aspects of entrepreneurship and emergency management by con-
sidering the motivation behind actions and the limits of resource consumption (e.g., Sheu,
2007; 007b; 2010). However, in addition to the selected decision rules – recovery strategies
in Chapter 3, altruistic entrepreneurial opportunity beliefs in Chapter 4, and the expected
utility function of entrepreneurial action in Chapters 5 and 6 – future studies can explore
and examine other novel rules that could e↵ectively improve the collective community value
creation in times of disasters.
Second, our formal models in chapters 3 to 6 all have fixed community size, following
the lead of Rivkin and Siggelkow (2007) and Szabó and Fáth (2007). So the total number of
community members is constant. Future research can extend to consider the community as
an evolving system so that it can respond disasters by adding and/or removing a member
(i.e., flexible community size) over time.
Finally, further empirical research could test our findings in di↵erent industries (i.e., logis-
tic, semiconductor, service) with real disaster dataset (e.g., www.emdat.be; www.airdisaster.com).
We believe that the analytical observations and managerial framework derived from our re-
sults provide rich insights into pro-social entrepreneurial-action decisions facing disastrous




This thesis begins with the grand idea that pro-social entrepreneurship spreads over space
and time in the aftermath of disasters (Shepherd, 2010; Shepherd and Williams, 2014; Shep-
herd, 2015), and, from this starting point, we formalize the action-based entrepreneurship
framework (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006) from an interaction- and community-based per-
spective and extend it to the context of disasters. An actor’s pursuit of an entrepreneurial
opportunity to alleviate others’ pains and losses is dependent on the decisions of other
community members. So, connection structure of the community (i.e., network structure)
matters since it depicts whom the actor meets and how they interact with each other.
We study various well-received types of network structures and how their (reciprocal) in-
teractions a↵ect each actor’s decision of entrepreneurial action in face of adversity, hence
influencing the dynamics of entrepreneurship at both time and space dimensions.
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Choi, Y., Lévesque, M., and Shepherd, D. (2008). When should entrepreneurs expedite or
delay opportunity exploitation? Journal of Business Venturing, 23:333–355.
Choi, Y. and Shepherd, D. (2004). Entrepreneurs’ decisions to exploit opportunities. Journal
169
of Management, 30(3):377–395.
Chopra, S. and Sodhi, M. (2004). Avoiding supply chain breakdowns. Sloan Management
Review, 46(1):53–62.
Chopra, S. and Sodhi, M. (2014). Recuding the risk of supply chain disruptions. Sloan
Management Review, 55(3):73–80.
Ciborra, C. (1996). The platform organization: Recombining strategies, structures, and
surprises. Organization Science, 7(2):103–118.
Cio -Revilla, C. (2014). Introduction to Computational Social Science. Springer.
Corbett, A. (2007). Learning asymmetries and the discovery of entrepreneurial opportuni-
ties. Journal of Business Venturing, 22(1):97–118.
Craighead, C., Blackhurst, J., Rungtusanatham, M., and Handfield, R. (2007). The severity
of supply chain disruptions: Design characteristics and mitigation capacities. Decision
Sciences, 38(1):131–156.
Dahan, E. and Mendelson, H. (2001). An extreme value model of concept testing. Manage-
ment Science, 47(1):102–116.
Davis, J., Eisenhardt, K., and Bingham, C. (2007). Developing theory through simulation
methods. Academy of Management Review, 32(2):480–499.
Desa, G. (2012). Resource mobilization in international social entrepreneurship: Bricolage
as a mechanism of institutional transformation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
36(4):727–751.
Di Domenico, M., Haugh, H., and Tracey, P. (2010). Social bricolage: Theorizing social value
creation in social enterprises. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(4):681–703.
Diebold, F. X., Schuermann, T., and Stroughair, J. D. (2000). Pitfalls and opportunities
in the use of extreme value theory in risk management. Journal of Risk Finance,
1(2):30–35.
Douglas, E. and Shepherd, D. (2002). Self-employment as a career choice: Attitudes, en-
170
trepreneurial intentions and utility maximisation. Entrepreneurship Theory and Prac-
tice, 26(3):81–90.
Dutton, J., Worline, M., Frost, P., and Lilius, J. (2006). Explaining compassion organizing.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 51(1):59–96.
Economist (2011). Food scandals in taiwan plastic unfantastic: Tained products also poison
the president’s chances of re-election. Acccessed on 20 October 2014 at http://www.
economist.com/node/18837149.
Erdős, P. and Rényi, A. (1960). On the evolution of random graphs. Publications of the
Mathematical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 5:17–61.
Eskew, M. (2004). Mitigating supply chain risk. CEO, April:25–26.
Ethiraj, S. and Levinthal, D. (2004). Modularity and innovation in complex systems. Man-
agement Science, 50(2):159–173.
Faloutsos, M., Faloutsos, P., and Faloutsos, C. (1999). On power-law relationships of the
internet topology. Computer Communication Review, 29:251–262.
Fisher, G. (2012). E↵ectuation, causation, and bricolage: A behavioral comparison of
emerging theories in entrepreneurship research. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice,
36(5):1019–1051.
Fitzsimmons, J. and Douglas, E. (2011). Interaction between feasibility and desirability in
the formation of entrepreneurial intentions. Journal of Business Venturing, 26(4):431–
440.
Gaglio, C. (2004). Simulations and counterfactual thinking in the opportunity identification
process. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28(6):533–552.
Gaglio, C. and Katz, J. (2001). The psychological basis of opportunity identification: En-
trepreneurial alertness. Small Business Economics, 16(2):95–111.
Gaimon, C. and Bailey, J. (2013). Knowledge management for the entrepreneurial venture.
Production and Operations Management, 22(6):1429–1438.
171
Garud, R. and Karnøe (2003). Bricolage versus breakthrough: Distributed and embedded
agency in technology entrepreneurship. Research Policy, 32:277–300.
Gilbert, N. and Troitzsch, K. (2005). Simulation for the Social Scientist. Open University
Press, 2nd edition.
Gintis, H. (2009). Game Theory Evolving: A Problem-Centered Introduction to Modeling
Strategic Interation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2nd edition.
Girotra, K., Terwiesch, C., and Ulrich, K. T. (2010). Idea generation and the quality of the
best idea. Management Science, 56(4):591–605.
Glendon, L. and Bird, L. (2013). Supply chain resilience 2013: An international survey
to consider the origin, causes and consequences of supply chain disruption. Technical
report, The Business Continuity Institute.
Grant, A. (2007). Relational job design and the motivation to make a prosocial di↵erence.
Academy of Management Review, 32(2):393–417.
Grant, A. and Berry, J. (2011). The necessity of others is the mother of invention: Intrinsic
and prosocial motivations, perspective taking, and creativity. Academy of Management
Journal, 54(1):73–96.
Green, J., Singh, S., and King, I. (2011). U.s. companies rush to fill japan’s supply gap.
Bloomberg Businessweek, April:11–17.
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8.1 MATLAB code for Chapter 3
8.1.1 Base model
The following MATLAB code is applied in Section 3.3 for both the base case analysis and
the experimental design analysis. The statement following % is a comment. Herein, we use
DR10 as an example. Di↵erent recovery strategies are provided separately afterwards and
can be implemented by substituting the relevant part of the sample code (see the comment).
function [average performance per period] = ca DR10 RC1 ran(N , T , Delta, g,
f , RC1)
%% Initial setting %%
for i = 1 : 1 : N
R(i, 1) = 3; % set the initial resource level
x = rand; % firms have random states – Random setting
if x <= 0.33
s(i, 1) = 0;
elseif 0.33 < x <= 0.67
s(i, 1) = 1;
else
s(i, 1) = 2;
end




for t = 1 : 1 : T
performance(t)= 0;
%% Disaster strikes %%
for i = 1 : 1 : N
x = rand;
if (x < f)
s(i, t) = 0; % hit by a severe disaster
elseif (f < x) & (x < f + g)
s(i, t) = max(s(i, t)  1, 0); % hit by a mild disaster
else
s(i, t) = s(i, t);
end
end
%% Recovery activities %%
for i = 1 : 1 : N
% Apply recovery strategy here (use DR10 as an example) %
if (i == 1); % Firm 1
if (s(i, t) = max(2, s(i+ 1, t)))
(s(i, t+ 1) = max(2, s(i+ 1, t)));
else
s(i, t+ 1) = min(s(i, t) + 1, 2);
end
elseif (i == N); % Firm N
if (s(i, t) = max(s(i  1, t), 2))
(s(i, t+ 1) = max(s(i  1, t), 2));
else
s(i, t+ 1) = min(s(i, t) + 1, 2);
end
else % Firm 2, 3, · · · , N   1
if (s(i, t) = max(s(i  1, t), s(i+ 1, t)))
(s(i, t+ 1) = max(s(i  1, t), s(i+ 1, t)));
else




% The recovery strategy ends here %
% Apply resource consumption function C %
if (s(i, t) == 0) & (s(i, t+ 1) == 1)
R(i, t+ 1) = R(i, t) + Delta  RC1(1); % apply c
1
(0 ! 1)
elseif (s(i, t) == 1) & (s(i, t+ 1) == 2)
R(i, t+ 1) = R(i, t) + Delta  RC1(2); % apply c
2
(1 ! 2)
elseif (s(i, t) == 0) & (s(i, t+ 1) == 2)




R(i, t+ 1) = R(i, t) + Delta;
end
if R(i, t+ 1) < 0 % lack of resources to execute the strategy
s(i, t+ 1) = s(i, t);







for t = 1 : 1 : T
x = x+ performance(t);
end
average performance per period=x/T;
end
function[] = main()
N = 5; % for base case, later vary for experimental design {3,5,10}
T = 365; % for base case, later vary for experimental design {365, 3650}




RC(1, :) = [1, 2, 10];
RC(2, :) = [2, 1, 10];
RC(3, :) = [1, 10, 2];
RC(4, :) = [2, 10, 1];
RC(5, :) = [10, 1, 2];
RC(6, :) = [10, 2, 1];
sumulation num = 200; %200 runs
total performance = 0;
for j = 1 : 1 : 6
for i = 1 : 1 : simulation num
[performance DR10 RC(i, j)] = ca DR10 RC1 ran(N , T , Delta, g, f , RC(j, :))
end
end
for j = 1 : 1 : 6
mu DR10(j) ran = mean(performance DR10 RC(:, j)); % mean performance
sd DR10(j) ran = std(performance DR10 RC(:, j)); % standard deviation
per25 DR10(j) ran = prctile(performance DR10 RC(:, j), 25); % 25% percentile
per5 DR10(j) ran = prctile(performance DR10 RC(:, j), 5); % 5% percentile








%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%The end of sample code %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
The codes for DR1 to DR9 are specified in the following:
% DR1 %
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
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% DR2 %
if (i == 1); % Firm 1
s(i, t+ 1) = 2
elseif (i == N); % Firm N
s(i, t+ 1) = 2
else % Firm 2, 3, · · · , N   1
if (max(s(i  1, t),max((s(i, t), s(i+ 1, t))) == 2
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else




if (i == 1); % Firm 1
if (s(i, t) == 2 | s(i+ 1, t) == 2)
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else
s(i, t+ 1) = 1;
end
elseif (i == N); % Firm N
if (s(i  1, t) == 2 | s(i, t) == 2)
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else
s(i, t+ 1) = 1;
end
else % Firm 2, 3, · · · , N   1
if (s(i   1, t) == 2 & s(i, t) == 2) | (s(i   1, t) == 2 & s(i + 1, t) == 2) |
(s(i, t) == 2 & s(i+ 1, t) == 2)
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else





if (i == 1); % Firm 1
if (s(i, t) + s(i+ 1, t) == 4)
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else
s(i, t+ 1) = 1;
end
elseif (i == N); % Firm N
if (s(i  1, t) + s(i, t) == 4)
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else
s(i, t+ 1) = 1;
end
else % Firm 2, 3, · · · , N   1
if (s(i  1, t) + s(i, t) + s(i+ 1, t) == 6)
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else




if (i == 1); % Firm 1
if (s(i, t) + s(i+ 1, t) < 4)
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else
s(i, t+ 1) = 1;
end
elseif (i == N); % Firm N
if (s(i  1, t) + s(i, t) < 4)
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else
s(i, t+ 1) = 1;
end
else % Firm 2, 3, · · · , N   1
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if (s(i  1, t) + s(i, t) + s(i+ 1, t) < 6)
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
else




if (i == 1); % Firm 1
s(i, t+ 1) = max(2,max(s(i, t), s(i+ 1, t)));
elseif (i == N); % Firm N
s(i, t+ 1) = max(s(i  1, t), s(i, t), 2);
else % Firm 2, 3, · · · , N   1
s(i, t+ 1) = max(s(i  1, t),max(s(i, t), s(i+ 1, t)));
end
% DR7 %
s(i, t+ 1) = min(s(i, t) + 1, 2);
% DR8 %
if (i == 1); % Firm 1
if (s(i, t) = 2)
(s(i, t+ 1) = 2);
else
s(i, t+ 1) = min(s(i, t) + 1, 2);
end
else % Firm 2, 3, · · · , N
if (s(i, t) = s(i  1, t))
(s(i, t+ 1) = s(i  1, t));
else





if (i == N); % Firm N
if (s(i, t) = 2)
(s(i, t+ 1) = 2);
else
s(i, t+ 1) = min(s(i, t) + 1, 2);
end
else % Firm 1, 2, 3, · · · , N   1
if (s(i, t) = s(i+ 1, t))
(s(i, t+ 1) = s(i+ 1, t));
else
s(i, t+ 1) = min(s(i, t) + 1, 2);
end
end
8.1.2 Stochastic decision rule
The following MATLAB code is for DR11 in Section 3.4. We first assign the initial proba-
bilities for each of the ten recovery strategy at time 0:




for k = 2 : 1 : 10
thres(k) = thres(k   1) + prob(k);
end
Then, the rest of the code can be applied by substitute the relevant part of the sample
code in the previous section, as other recovery strategies.
x = rand;
if x < thres(1) % DR1 is selected
for i = 1 : 1 : N
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
performance(t) = performance(t) + s(i, t+ 1);
end
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% Compare performance t with average performance per period till t  1
old performance = 0;
for tt = 1 : 1 : t
old performance = old performance + performance(t);
end
if performance(t) > old performance + performance(t);
prob(2) = max(prob(2)  0.001, 0);
prob(3) = max(prob(3)  0.001, 0);
prob(4) = max(prob(4)  0.001, 0);
prob(5) = max(prob(5)  0.001, 0);
prob(6) = max(prob(6)  0.001, 0);
prob(7) = max(prob(7)  0.001, 0);
prob(8) = max(prob(8)  0.001, 0);
prob(9) = max(prob(9)  0.001, 0);
prob(10) = max(prob(10)  0.001, 0);
prob(1) = 1  prob(2)  prob(3)  prob(4)  prob(5)  prob(6)  prob(7) 
prob(8)  prob(9)  prob(10);
thres(1)=prob(1);
for k = 2 : 1 : 10
thres(k) = thres(k   1) + prob(k);
end
end
elseif thres(1) < x <thres(2)
for i = 1 : 1 : N
if i == 1;
%%% *** %%%
if max(2,max(s(i, t), s(i+ 1, t))) == 2
s(i, t+ 1) = 2;
if (s(i, t) == 1) & (s(i, t+ 1) == 2)
R(i, t+ 1) = R(i, t)+Delta   RC1(2);
elseif (s(i, t) == 0) & (s(i, t+ 1) == 2)
R(i, t+ 1) = R(i, t)+Delta   RC1(3);
else




s(i, t+ 1) = 1;
if (s(i, t) == 0) & (s(i, t+ 1) == 1)
R(i, t+ 1) = R(i, t)+Delta   RC1(1);
else




elseif i == N
repeat the *** section
else
repeat the *** section
end
% Compare performance t with average performance per period till t  1
· · ·
end
elseif thres(2) < x <thres(3)
· · ·
elseif thres(3) < x <thres(4)
· · ·
elseif thres(4) < x <thres(5)
· · ·
elseif thres(5) < x <thres(6)
· · ·
elseif thres(6) < x <thres(7)
· · ·
elseif thres(7) < x <thres(8)
· · ·
elseif thres(8) < x <thres(9)
· · ·






for t = 2 : 1 : T + 1
x = x+ performance(t);
end
average performance per period=x/T;
end
8.2 MATLAB code for Chapter 4
The following MATLAB code is applied in Section 4.4 for both the base case analysis and
experimental design analysis. The statement following % is a comment. Herein, we use O5
as an example. The codes for other opportunity beliefs are consistent with the illustrations
in Table 4.1.
function [average value] = ca O1 Y1 ran(N , K, T , Delta, g, f , Y1)
% Initial setting at t = 0, n is the column of the network, k indicate the row number
for n = 1 : 1 : N
for k = 1 : 1 : K
U(n, k, 1) = 3; % set the initial resource level
x = rand; % firms have random states – Random setting
if x <= 0.33
s(n, k, 1) = 0;
elseif 0.33 < x <= 0.67
s(n, k, 1, ) = 1;
else
s(n, k, 1) = 2;
end
end
for t = 1 : 1 : T
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% Row 1 (k = 1)
for k = 1 : 1 : K
value(k, t)= 0;
% Disaster strikes
for n = 1 : 1 : N
x = rand
if (x < f)
s(n, k, t) = 0; % hit by a major disaster
elseif (f < x) & (x < f + g)
s(n, k, t) = max(s(n, k, t)  1, 0); % hit by a minor disaster
else





for n = 1 : 1 : N
if n == 1
h(n, k, t+ 1) = max(2,max(s(n, 1, t), s(n+ 1, 1, t))); % apply O5 to the row
neighbors
v(n, k, t + 1) = max(s(n, 1, t),max(s(n, 2, t), s(n, k, t))); % apply O5 to the
column neighbors
s(n, 1, t+ 1) = max(h(n, 1, t+ 1), v(n, 1, t+ 1)); % max-rule
% s(n, 1, t+ 1) = min(h(n, 1, t+ 1), v(n, 1, t+ 1)); % min-rule
elseif n == N
h(n, k, t+ 1) = max(2,max(s(n, 1, t), s(n  1, 1, t)));
v(n, k, t+ 1) = max(s(n, 1, t),max(s(n,K, t), s(n, k, t)));
s(n, 1, t+ 1) = max(h(n, 1, t+ 1), v(n, 1, t+ 1)); % max-rule
% s(n, 1, t+ 1) = min(h(n, 1, t+ 1), v(n, 1, t+ 1)); % min-rule
else
h(n, k, t+ 1) = max(s(n  1, 1, t),max(s(n, 1, t), s(n+ 1, 1, t)));
v(n, k, t+ 1) = max(s(n, 1, t),max(s(n, 2, t), s(n,K, t)));
s(n, 1, t+ 1) = max(h(n, 1, t+ 1), v(n, 1, t+ 1)); % max-rule
% s(n, 1, t+ 1) = min(h(n, 1, t+ 1), v(n, 1, t+ 1)); % min-rule
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end
if (s(n, 1, t) == 0) & (s(n, 1, t+ 1) == 2)
U(n, k, t+ 1) = U(n, k, t) + Delta  Y1(1); % apply y
1
(0 ! 2)
elseif (s(n, 1, t) == 0) & (s(n, 1, t+ 1) == 1)
U(n, k, t+ 1) = U(n, k, t) + Delta  Y1(2); % apply y
2
(0 ! 1)
elseif (s(n, 1, t) == 1) & (s(n, 1, t+ 1) == 2)




U(n, k, t+ 1) = U(n, k, t) + Delta;
end
if U(n, k, t+ 1) < 0
s(n, k, t+ 1) = s(n, k, t);
U(n, k, t+ 1) = U(n, k, t) + Delta;
end
value(1, t)=value(1, t)+s(n, k, t+ 1);







for k = 1 : 1 : K
for t = 1 : 1 : T
x = x+ value(t);
end
average value = x/T ;
end
8.3 NetLogo code for Chapter 5
The following NetLogo code is applied in Section 5.3 for both the base case analysis and
the experimental design analysis. The statement following ;; is a comment. The code to
196
set up each network structure is consistent with the algorithms introduced in Chapter 2, so
omitted here.
globals [ entrepreneurial-ratio ]
;; nodes to be occupied





;; actors occupy nodes








;; create link breeds (undirected - symmetric links, directed - asymmetric links)
undirected-link-breed [ s-links s-link ]
directed-link-breed [ a-links a-link ]
;; generate a list of an actor’s neighbors
to-report my-neighbors
report [who] of link-neighbors with [is-occupied?]
end
;; count the number of an actor’s neighbors
to-report n




;; calculate the likelihood of taking entrepreneurial action
to-report R ;;
P
j⇠i E[ ji,t!j,t 1] in Equation 5.1




i⇠j E[ ij,t!i,t 1] in Equation 5.1
report (n * [my-feedback * my-value] of person actor-id)
end
to-report the probability
let logit-prob ( R - Q + [my-value] of person actor-id)
let prob exp (logit-prob) / (1 + exp (logit-prob))
;; debugging
if (prob < 0 or prob > 1)
[show “Probability is outside the allowed range!”]
report prob
end




ask node node-id [set is-occupied? true]
end
;; clear the world and set up the network structures
to setup
clear-all
if (network-type = “Square lattices”) [setup-square-lattices]
if (network-type = “Packs”) [setup-packs]
if (network-type = “Ring lattices”) [setup-ring-lattices]
if (network-type = “Random”) [setup-random]
if (network-type = “Small world”) [setup-small-world]
if (network-type = “Scale free”) [setup-scale-free]
198
foreach ([who] of nodes) [










ask node node-id [set actor-id [who] of myself]
;; set up the actor’s initial value and degree of feedback against friction at time 0
set my-value random-normal mean-value sd-value
set my-feedback-0 random-normal mean-feedback sd-feedback
;; resample until the degree of feedback is within the allowed range [0,1]
while [my-feedback-0 < 0 or my-feedback-0 > 1]






if ticks >= 365 [ stop ]
update my-feedback for value creation in the next period
ask actors [
if else (random-float 1 <= [probability] of node node-id )
[ set action? true
set colour blue
set my-feedback my-feedback-0 ]
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[ set action? false
set colour red
set my-feedback 0 ]
]
;; update the value
ask actors with [action?] [ set my-value my-value + [R - Q] of node node-id]





set-current-plot “Entrepreneurial Action Ratio”
set entrepreneurial-ratio (count actors with [action?] / count actors)
set-current-plot-pen “ratio”
plot entrepreneurial-ratio
end
